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Introduction to the Thesis
The title of my thesis is "Essays on Fiscal and Monetary Policy“ The thesis is composed of 
three chapters that examine current policy related developments in the international economic 
environment. It examines issues related to the decision on undertaking labor market reform by the 
countries participating in a Monetary Fnion. Moreover, it does so by using a framework of analysis 
that adopts the conventional belief advocated by many international organizations (like the IMF 
and the OECD) that strict labor market institutions are related to the high unemployment 
problem in continental Europe, as well as, the proposed solutions that involve reduction of labor 
market rigidities by means of structural reform. Furthermore, it investigates empirically the 
transition and propagation mechanism of macroeconomic policy shocks through the labor market 
channel in the l TK. In addition, it examines whether the labor market reforms undergone in the 
FK economy during the 1980s have affected the responsiveness of labor market variables over 
time, hast but not least, it analyses the effects that fiscal policy actions could have on private 
consumption in OECD countries. IIow these are altered when we consider upturns and downturns 
ill economic activity, as well as. when a fraction of the population has limited access to financial 
markets.
More specifically, the first chapter (Labor Market Reform in a Monetary Fnion) builds on 
the idea that an improvement in labor market flexibility due to deregulation can be beneficial to 
the long run success of the Economic and Monetary Fnion (EM F). This happens because it will 
provide an alternative adjustment mechanism at the national level to symmetric and asymmetric 
shocks that might hit the Euro-zone economies. The importance of this labor market channel 
is attributed to the fact that exchange rate and monetary policies are no longer available at the 
national level as tools for macroeconomic adjustment, whereas, fiscal policy is restrained by the 
Fact on Stability and Growth and the tendency to fiscal harmonization. The paper examines 
the interaction between monopolistic labor unions and governments and its implications on the 
decisions for labor market reform, insult1 and outside a symmetric and an asymmetric monetary 
union (MF). The main findings of the analysis are as follows: Incentives for reform art' increased 
inside tin1 MF when governments and labor unions move simultaneously in the first stage of the 
policy game. Inside the MF there is also a possibility of a "race to the bottom" deregulation.
vii
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This can bo avoided by cooperation of the two governments, only in the case of a symmetric 
M l1 and in particular when unions are powerful in wage setting. Area-wide reform is above its 
pre-MU levels when labor unions have incentives to coordinate their wage setting decisions in an 
asymmetric: MU. In that case the governments have no incentive to set reform in a cooperative 
manner, because this would lead to higher nominal wage demands by the union members.
The second chapter (The Effects of Macroeconomic Policy Shocks on the UK Labor Marked) 
aims at analyzing the effects of various macroeconomic policy shocks on the UK labor market 
(for the period 1970:Ql-2003:Ql). which has experienced a scries of reforms that improved its 
flexibility and performance in the 1980s. It investigates whether the dynamic responses of the 
labor m arket variables (real wages, employment, total and average hours) obtained are in line 
with what the economic theory would suggest and whether they resemble relevant findings for 
the US economy and previous l TK evidence. Furthermore, it examines liow the responsiveness 
of labor market variables lias evolved over time. The decomposition of total labor input to 
employment and average hours is crucial for two reasons. The first one is that the labor input 
in the UK was found to adjust both with respect to the intensive and extensive margin following 
cyclical movements in economic activity. While the second one is that several reforms that were 
introduced in the 1980s were aiming at mincing adjustment costs of labor input. The main 
findings are as follows: The responses of labor market variables to a monetary policy shock are 
in line with economic theory and previous evidence for the US economy. The adjustment of 
labor input is primarily along the extensive margin, however, contrary to the evidence for the US 
economy, there is also significant adjustment along the intensive margin one year after the shock. 
Moreover, when examining a smaller sample this result is overturned with average hours response 
being faster and of a bigger magnitude two quarters after the shock. This implies that labor 
market reforms undergone in the UK economy during the 1980s have reduced the adjustment 
cost of labor input- over time. A spending shock leads to negative employment, hours and output 
responses, while real wages increase. This pattern of responses is attributed to the government 
consumption part of spending, and in particular its wage bill component (this is the "cost or labor 
market channel" of fiscal policy as is defined by Lane and Perotti (2003) and Alesina ct al (2002). 
respectively). The effect of a net tax shock generates transitory negative effects on employment 
and hours, tha t become positive raising output after the second quarter. The output effects of 
both spending and tax shocks are in line with previous UK evidence.
The last chapter the thesis ("The Asymmetric Effects of Fiscal Policy on Private Consump­
tion over the Business Cyde") explores the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption. In 
particular, it analyzes the possibility of asymmetric effects in recessions and expansions, when 
a fraction of the population lias lim ited access to financial markets (especially in Bad times). 
The simple theoretical framework employed illustrates the idea that unanticipated fiscal policy
WMltt rtMtMBunmmtifliii ma
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fhanp.cs will be more effective in stimulating; private eoiismiiption and pushing tlie txonomy out 
of a recession, when liquidity constraints bind for a large fraction of the population. Whereas, the 
empirical analysis was conducted using a yearly panel of nineteen OFCI) countries (1970-2001) 
and it involved characterizing periods of recession (Bad times), using as proxy of the degree of 
credit constraints the maximum ratio of loan to the value oi house in housing mortgages (LTV 
ratio), following related work by Jappelli and Pagano (11)91) and Perotti (191)9), as well as. 
extracting the fiscal policy shock. The empirical evidence confirmed the theoretical prediction 
suggesting that both a government spending and a tax shock have a stronger positive effect on 
private consumption in recessions than in expansions. The effect is more pronounced in coun­
tries characterized by less developed consumer credit markets that are more likely to have a 
larger group of liquidity constrained individuals. Furthermore, in countries with less developed 
consumer credit markets consumption is affected the most by expansionary spending shock and 
contractionary tax shocks in Bad times, while in more financially developed economies the effects 
on private consumption arc driven by contractionary spending and tax shocks in Bad times, and 
solely by expansionary tax shocks in Good times. The conclusion of the paper casts doubt upon 
the usefulness of tight fiscal rules, which impair fiscal flexibility over the business cycle when 
countries have less developed financial systems.
X
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Abstract of Thesis Chapters
Abstract of Chapter 1: Labor Market Reform in a Monetary Union
1 his paper examines the effect of monopolistic labor unions' behavior on governments* in­
centives to undertake labor market reform, inside and outside a symmetric and an asymmetric 
monetary union (M l’). Incentives for reform are increased inside the M l’ when governments and 
labor unions move simultaneously in the first stage of tbe policy game. Inside the M l’ there is also 
a possibility of a “race to the bottom" deregulation. This can be avoided by cooperation of the 
two governments, only in the casi' of a symmetric Ml* ami in particular when unions are powerful 
in wage setting. Area-wide reform is above its pre-Ml’ levels when labor unions have incentives to 
coordinate their wage setting decisions in an asymmetric M l’. In that case the governments have 
no incentive to set reform in a cooperative manner, because this would lead to higher nominal 
wage demands by the union members.
Kt yic(mk: Labor Market reform, monetary union. Labor Unions
JEL riarsijiralion: ,150. ,15L E50. E5S
Abstract of Chapter 2: The Effects of Macroeconomic Policy Shocks on the UK 
Labor Market
Ibis paper discusses the dynamic response of employment, average hours and real wages to 
monetary, government spending and net taxes shocks in the UK for thelíJTO Q1-201KJ Ql period. 
I he response of labor market variables to a monetary policy shock are in line with economic 
theory and previous empirical evidence. The adjustment of labor input is primarily along the 
extensive margin. However, there is also significant adjustment along tbe intensive margin one 
year after the shock. Over the more recent period this result is overturned with bigger and 
faster response in average hours two quarters after the shock. We interpret this result as being 
suggestive of labor market reforms during the lUSOs having reduced the labor adjustment costs. 
A government spending shock leads to negative employment, hours and output responses, while 
real wages increase. It is attributed to the government consumption part of spending, and in 
particular its wage bill component. J he eflect of a net tax shock generates transitory negative
xi
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{■fleet s on employment and hours, that become positive raising output after the second quarter- 
The output effects of both spending and tax shocks are in line with previous t*K evidence. 
Keyiroj'ds: Monetary Policy Sliocks. Fiscal Policy Shocks. Labor Market Adjustment, T.K. 
JEL Classification: E2Jf. E52. 1120. 1120
Abstract o f Chapter 3: The Asymmetric Effects of Fiscal Policy on Private Con­
sumption over the Business Cycle
This paper explores in a yearly panel of nineteen OECD countries from 1970-2001 the effects 
of fiscal policy changes on private consumption in recessions and expansions. In the presence 
of binding liquidity constraints on households, fiscal policy is more effective in boosting private 
consumption in recessions than in expansions. The effect is more pronounced in countries char­
acterized by a less developed consumer credit market. This happens because the fraction of 
individuals that face binding liquidity constraints in a recession will consume the extra income 
generated following a unanticipated tax cut or government spending increase.
Kvy words: Fiscal policy, liquidity constraints, consumption, recessions.
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C h ap ter  1
Labor Market Reform in a Monetary 
Union
First version: 7 .June .2001 
This version:1 7 October 2001
1 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The performance of labor markets in Kurope after the Economic and Monetary t'nion (EMF) 
is crucial for the long-run success or failure of the monetary union: with the introduction ol the 
euro, exchange rule ami monetary policies are no longer available at the national level as tools for 
macroeconomic adjustment. Furthermore, fiscal policy is restrained by the I'act on Stability and 
Growth and the tendency to fiscal harmonization. Without the nominal exchange1 rate as shock 
absorber mechanism, asymmetric and possibly symmetric shocks might exert increased pressure 
on national labor markets and entail a substantial risk of rising unemployment, lienee, the 
national governments should undertake reforms that enhance labor market flexibility, providing 
thus an alternative adjustment mechanism to these shocks,
Anderson et al (2000). as well as I Sort ol a and lloeri (2002) haw put forward a "real effects" of 
EMF argument that leads to more reform in the post-EMI' era. According to which, economic
! l am  g ra te fu l to  M ichael J. A rtis  for h is  va lu ab le  co m m en ts  an ti co n s tan t su p p o r t ,  as well a s . for u rg ing  m e 
to  finish th is  p a p e r . 1 w ould  like to  th a n k  H o b e rto  I 'e ro tli . a n d  tw o an o n y m o u s referees of th e  O x fo rd  E conom ic 
P a p e rs  w hose c o m m e n ts  im p roved  sign ifican t)y  th e  paper. A t th e  first s ta g e  of th e  p ro jec t th e  a u th o r  h as been 
b en efited  from  h e lp fu l d iscu ssio n s w ith  K arl S d d a g  and (J iu se p p e  IJe rto la . I also th a n k  co n fe ren ce  p a r tic ip a n ts  
at the  V D iversity  o f  X ice-S .A ., a s  well a s  se m in a r  p a r tic ip a n ts  at th e  E u ro p ean  I 'n iv e rs itv  I n s t i tu te  (F lo rence) 
for useful su g g estio n s . T h e  p a p e r  is in su b m iss io n  (second ro u n d )  to  th e  O xford E conom ic P a p e rs . T h e  usual 
d isc la im er app lies.
A d d ress  for c o rre sp o n d en ce : E u ro p e a n  U n iv ersity  In s titu te . D e p a rtm e n t o f E conom ies, V ia P ia z z u o la  IT  oOlTJ 
Florence, Italy . E m ail: a th a n a s io s .1a g k a la k jso iu e .i t
1
U liaiC U W U U C B If^WWWWJUHMIC** Willi will I U tl W « HII WWW
o CHAPTER 1. LABOR M A R K E T  REFORM  IN  A M O N E TA R Y UNION
stability, higher product market competition, and increased economic integration will be charac­
terizing the post-EMU era. Thus, in this context relative labor costs will become a crucial factor 
in firms' locational decisions. Hence, governments will try to make the environment more attrac­
tive for firms in order to encourage capital investments; which will lead to more labor market 
reform that lowers labor costs2.
Calmfors (2001a) argues that although there is a need for labor market reform inside the* 
EMU. it has been substituted by a consensus among social partners to moderate wages in order 
to avoid the painful and politically costly reform efforts. Moreover, Calmfors (2001a) claims 
that the observed wage moderation was successful so far in substituting reform efforts because 
the macroeconomic environment was favorable, since major shocks were absent and there was 
good growth performance. However, unfavorable economic conditions will increase the pressure 
for structural reform of the labor market. Notice, however, that according to Bcrtola and Boeri 
(2002) the pace of labor market deregulation accelerated in the build up to the EMU.
An alternative perspective on labor market reform is provided by the "time inconsistency" 
approach. In this context, the monetary authority wants to got inflation and unemployment 
close to their targeted levels. Monetary policy decisions are taken after inflation expectations 
have been formed so there exists a short-run trade off between inflation and unemployment that 
governments try to exploit. Moreover, product and labor market imperfec tions lead to divergence 
of the natural level of unemployment from the targeted level. Under the rational expectation 
hypothesis employed in this model, the private sector correctly anticipates the government's 
reaction. This will lead to even higher inflation without reducing unemployment.
Notice' that in this framework, the higher the gap between the natural rate of unemploy­
ment and the targeted unemployment rate, the higher the equilibrium inflation. So inflation 
bias (arising from discretionary monetary policy) can be reduced by appointing a conservative 
central banker (Rogoff 1985). by establishing a linear contract between the government and the 
central banker (Walsh 1995). by introducing an inflation target (Svonsson 1997). or by reducing 
distortions in the labor market (Calmfors 2001b). Incentives for (costly) reform will be greater 
when the time inconsistency problem 1ms not been addressed. However, these incentives are fewer 
inside the EMU since the act of delegation of the monetary policy to the “very conservative" Eu­
ropean Central Bank (ECB) eliminates the inflationary bias, reducing the need for reforms*4. In
■’A ccording; to  th is  view la b o u r  m ark e t d e reg u la tio n  m ig h t re su lt in  a  “race  to  th e  b o t to m “ .
T la l le t t  a n d  V ieg i (2001) su p p o r t  th is  v iew  in a s lig h tly  d iffe ren t se t t in g .  T h e y  d is t in g u ish  th e  la b o u r  m a r k e t
in s t i tu t io n s  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  d e g ree  o f c e n tra l iz a t io n  o f  th e  w age b a rg a in in g  (W I1). a n d  h a v e  th e  fiscal a u th o r i t y  
in flu en c in g  t h e  la b o u r  costs. C e n tra l iz e d  \V H  (less f le x ib i li ty /re  fo r in )  p ro v id es  an  e x tr a  in s tru m e n t o f e c o n o m ic  
po licy  b e c a u se  w a g e  restra in t b y  th e  un ion  in c re a se s  th e  c o m p e tit iv e n e s s  o f  th e  n a tio n a l  e co n o m y  re la tiv e  to  m e m b e r  
s ta te s .  On t h e  c o n tra ry ,  u n d e r  D e c e n tra liz e d  \YI1 (m ore  f le x ib le /re fo rm e d )  n a tio n a l o b je c tiv e s  can  b e  only p u r s u e d  
by fiscal p o lic ie s , lie fo rm  in ce n tiv e s  will b e  red u ced  in sid e  th e  M l ’ b e c a u se  th e  less "flex ib le" c o u n tr ie s  w o u ld  l ik e  
to  keep  th e  e x t r a  po licy  in s tru m e n t to  re p la c e  th e  loss o f  n a tio n a l  m o n e ta ry  policy.
a iwnnttiii OUàMiàiUÉliititMiihM mmicia
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the case that ECB is as conservative as the national central banks, then the fact that it cares 
about area-wide developments and does not accommodate regional imbalances, reduces incentives 
for reform. One more' disincentive arises from the fact that labor market reform in an individual 
country has only a small effect on aggregate equilibrium unemployment and area-wide inflation, 
so each member state internalizes only a small part of the benefits from reform, while bearing all 
the cost of the national reform effort4.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of the formation of a monetary union (M l’] on 
governments* incentives to undertake labor market reform. It merges two strands of tin* literature. 
The first is related to the "time inconsistency" approach regarding incentives to undertake reform 
inside the EMI’, whereas the second is related to the literature analyzing the interaction between 
EME ami wage bargaining, The model builds on the analysis of Oalmfors (200lb). Cukierman 
and Lippi (2001) and Gruner and Ilefeker (1909). Calmfors (2001b) aims at analyzing the effects 
of the formation of the monetary union on governments' incentives to undertake reform, without 
considering explicitly the wage bargaining pit »cess. On the other hand. Cukierman and Lippi 
(2001). Gruner and Ilefeker ( 1999) analyze the effects of EMtr on inflation and unemployment 
in the context of decentralized anti centralized wage bargaining without addressing the issue of 
labor market deregulation1'*.
lienee, distinct to the relevant previous literature, this paper analyses governments* incentives 
for reform in a simplified two-coimtry monetary union where national labor markets art1 charac­
terized by centralized wage bargaining, and explicitly models labor unions' behavior regarding 
labor market reform, as well as. its effects on governments’ policies.
We assume that, before and after the ME has been formed, the labor union and the government 
behave as Nash plagtrs with respect to each other in the first stage of the game. The monetary 
policy has been delegated to an independent central bank. So. after the labor market institutions 
have been determined by the government and nominal wages have been set by the labor union, the 
independent CB (or KGB in the ME case), which is expected to be credible, deckles on monetary 
policy, and lienee determines the inflation rate. The model is solved by backwards induction1"'. We
'S im ila r  a i r  th e  re su lts  o f Sibert a n d  S u th e r la n d  (2000). la b o u r  m ark e t d is to rtio n s  le a d  p o lic y -m a k e rs  to  in fla te  
to o  much. T h e  c o s ily  sp illovers of u n c o o rd in a te d  m o n e ta ry  p o licy  c a n  b e  red u ced  by la b o u r  m a rk e t reform , T lie  
au th o rs  s u r e s t  (h a t  reform  is h ig h er w hen th e re  is no m o n e ta ry  p o lic y  c o o p era tio n , re la tiv e  to  t h e  case  w here 
n a tio n s n eg o lia le  o v e r m o n eta ry  policy, w h ich  h a p p e n s  b e c a u se  c o o p e ra tio n  reduces sp illo v ers  le a d in g  to  fewer 
incentives for reform .
L ab o u r u n io n s a re  assum ed  to  c a re  a b o u t in fla tio n : th is  c r e a te s  in te rd e p e n d e n c ie s  b e tw een  th e  real variab les 
o f  th e  m em b er s ta te s .  W age p rem iu m s ab ove  th e  c o m p e titiv e  w age te n d  to  b e  ’“s tra te g ic  s u b s t i tu te s  lead ing  to  
a m o d e ra tin g  effect. However, in th e  M l ' m o re  p lay ers in te ra c t ,  th is  re d u ce s  the  im p a c l ol e ach  u n io n 's  wage1 
decisions on  th e  a re a  w ide in fla tion . So th e  M l ' can  lead  to  m ore ag g ress iv e  wage b e h a v io u r  le a d in g  to  h igher 
unem ploym ent a n d  in fla tio n , if u n io n s’ an d  C 'lJ 's  p refe ren ces a re  id e n tic a l a c ro ss  c o u n trie s  b e fo re  a n d  a f te r  th e  M l ' 
(C u k ie rm an  .V L ipp i 2001. C ru n e r  a n d  Ile fek er 190!)).
' The so lu tio n  co rre sp o n d s  to  th e  no tion  o f  su b g a m e  perfec t N ash e q u ilib r iu m . 1 he sequencing of  the game is
m mam mam snpmpmmnMMun
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examine two cases; the first one refers to a MU of two symmetric economies, while in the second 
one we allow for asymmetries with respect to labor unions' bargaining power in wage setting and 
their opposition to labor market reform. The solutions are evaluated by calibrating the model 
parameters.
The outcome of this analysis is that contrary to what the "time-inconsistency** literature 
on labor market reform has suggested, incentives for reform will increase in the context of a 
Ml\ when governments and labor unions move simultaneously in the first stage of the policy 
game. Labor unions are worse oh when wages and reform are substitutes in their wage setting 
decisions, because higher reform worsens the wage-unemployment trade of that they face. The 
opposite holds when wages and reform are perceived as complements. The government in the 
more distorted economy is always better off inside the Ml*, because it can pass to the foreign 
government some of the losses it incurs from its "fight" against the powerful home-labor u n i o n .  
Consequently the government of the country with the less distorted economy is always made worst* 
off inside the. MU. Moreover, a "race to the bottom" ofTect regarding deregulation is p o s s ib le .  A  
cooperation among the governments in the post-MU era could address this problem: though, 
the governments have incentives to coordinate in deciding labor market institutions only in the 
symmetric: ease, in particular when reform is not very effective in reducing union power in wage 
setting. In an "asymmetric: MU", the cooperative outcome does not emerges endogenously from 
the model.
The benchmark model was also extended to allow' for an inter-labor union cooperation in s e t ­
ting nominal wages inside the MU. The two labor unions could he made better offby cooperating 
(relative to participating in a non-cooperative .Nash play) in some model specifications, however 
only in case of an "asymmetric MU". In these specific cases area-wide* reform would still be 
above its pro-MU levels. When labor unions play cooperatively, the national governments have 
no incentive to set reform in a cooperative manner, because* the lower reform levels, although 
beneficial due to tlie decrease in the political cost of reform, imply much less wage moderation 
on the part of the unions. In some model specifications the government in country 1 can attain 
a higher payoff by cooperating, though the foreign government has no incentives to cooperate 
Kcause it will end up in a worse position.
The paper is organized as follows: Section two presents the model, i.e. section 2.1 discusses 
lie pre-MU case, section 2.2 the post-MU case, and section 2.3 presents the numerical evaluation 
>f the model in the symmetric: (section 2.3.2) anti the asymmetric (2.3.3) case. Finallv. section 
line concludes.
is tified  a s  follow s; m o  n r  t ary p o lic y  is d e c id e d  a t  the* last s ta g e  o f  t h e  g am e  since it can  b e  c h an g e d  verv e a s ilv  
ad q u i te  o ften  so  a s  t o  a d d re ss  u n fa v o u ra b le  e co n o m ic  c o n d itio n s . D e reg u la tio n  tak e s  p lace  a t  th e  sam e  tim e (f irs t 
age) th a t  w a g es  a re  d e c id ed , a n d  p ro b a b ly  a s  o ften  as th e  w age  s e t t in g .  T h e  im plicit a s su m p tio n  is th a t p la y e rs  
he g o v e rn m e n t a n d  la b o u r  u n io n ) h av e  im p e rfe c t in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t  each  o th e rs  ac tio n s .
y ?  * !»  M.M.M Hill.
1.2. THE MODEL o
1.2 The Model
We analyze two cases: (i) a representative country outside the M l', and (ii) a simple two-country 
MU. We will consider both a benchmark case of a Ml* composed of symmetric lalx>r unions and 
countries, as well as the case of a MU composed of asymmetric labor unions and countries. Prod­
uct markets are assumed to be competitive and perfectly integrated; identical firms are assumed 
to produce the same homogent'ous good. Following Oalmfors (2001) and Sibert and Sutherland
(2000) we assume that the government in a representative country cares not only about inflation 
and unemployment, but also about labor market institutions. The labor market is characterized 
bv the presence of a monopolistic labor union (Centralized Wage Bargaining-CWIJ); so the com­
petitive outcome is not achieved (leading to unemployment and output loss), which creates an 
incentive for the government to inflate. This problem can be eliminated by undertaking labor- 
market reform, which is costly, because it affects employed insiders (the electorate in terms of po­
litical economy models). The structural reform variable is assumed, in the Calmfors (2001b) and 
Sibert and Sutherland (2000) spirit, to be a composite index that reduces labor marked rigidities 
(specifically wo consider employment protection legislation (FPL) and union bargaining power in 
the wage setting process) thus increasing employment'. Analogous measures of composite reform 
indices have been used in empirical studies, such as Baker et a] (2001). Van Porch and Borghijs
(2001) and were based on the OECD (1099) study on the degree to which countries complied 
with policy recommendations towards labor marked deregulation made in the OECD's Jobs Study 
(1991). Moreover, they are justified by chapter IV of IMF’s World Economic Outlook (201)3),
'A lth o u g h  th is  w ay  o f m odelling  la b o u r  m ark e t reform  is a  s tro n g  sim p lif ica tio n , n e v e rth e le ss  it c a p tu re s  the  
beneficial effects th a t  lab o u r m ark e t re fo rm  is e x p e c te d  to  h av e  on e m p lo y m en t. X o tice . how ever, th a t  several 
ty p es of reform  re g a rd in g  lab o u r m ark e t in s t i tu t io n s  m ight h av e  an a m b ig u o u s  effect on u n e m p lo y m en t. For 
exam ple, s tr ic te r  la b o u r  s ta n d a rd s  a n d /o r  em p lo y m en t p ro te c tio n  leg is la tio n  (E P F ) is e x p e c te d  to  lead  to  h igher 
levels of lo n g  te rm  u n em p lo y m en t, w hile  it low ers sh o rt te rm  u n em p lo y m en t by red u c in g  th e  flows in to  and  out 
o f  u n em ploym en t ( red u c in g  th e  la b o u r  tu rn o v e r) . T h is  m ean s  th a t low er levels o f  E P L  m ight n o t lead  to  the 
ex p eeled  o u tco m e  (N ickell 1997). T h o u g h  sev e ra l s tu d ie s  like E lm eskov et a l (1 DOS). IM F 's  W E O  (20011). Nickell et 
al (200:!), B lan d ) a rd  a n d  W olfers (2000) re p o rt a  th a t  s tr ic te r  E P L  in c re a se  tin em p lo y m en t. S tro n g  la b o u r  unions 
are  e x p ec te d  to  ra ise  u n em p lo y m en t, u n less  th e y  c o -o rd in a te  w ith  firm s in  th e  w age .setting  p ro c ess . However. 
Ih is is po ss ib le  on ly  in  th e  case o f  e x te rn a l c o m p e tit iv e  p re ssu re  (N ickell a n d  Lay a rd  1999, E lm eskov  a t al 1998. 
Illan c lia rd  an d  W olfers 2000. IM F 's  W E O  200.'! e tc ).
F u rth e rm o re , th e  d iscussion  a b o u t la b o u r  m ark e t d e reg u la tio n  th a t  im p ro v e s  unem p lo y m en t o u tc o m e s  involves 
also ol her la b o u r  m ark e t in s t itu t io n s  like la b o u r  t a x es an d  u n em p lo y m en t b e n e fits , how ever th ese  a re  not considered  
in ou r m o d el sp ec ifica tio n . H igher ta x e s  on la b o u r ,  th a t  in c lu d e  p ayro ll ta x e s ,  incom e ta x e s  a n d  c o n su m p tio n  laxes 
increase th e  w edge b e tw een  tlie  real cost o f a  w o rk e r to  an em p lo y e r a n d  th e  rea l c o n su m p tio n  w age  o f  th e  worker. 
Hence, low ering  th e  ta x  w edge will resu lt in low er la b o u r  co sts  in  th e  lo n g  ru n  an d  in low er u n em p lo y m en t (Belot 
and  Van O u rs  (2(X)1), Nickell et al (200:1). IM F 's  W E O  (2003) e tc ). I 'n e m p io y n ie n t is a lso  in c re a s in g  th e  m ore 
generous a n d  lo n g -la s tin g  th e  u n em p lo y m en t b en efit e n ti t le m e n ts  are. H e n ce  re fo rm  a im in g  to  re d u c e  th e  generosity  
o f social se c u rity  sy s te m  will red u ce  u n em p lo y m en t (Nickell 1997. E lm esk o v  e t al 199S e tc ) .
m m m m m m H i m r m m m m m m m mcjsrircccr
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as well as a series of labor market studies that do not discuss each labor market institution in
with a direct effect of institutions on unemployment assumes the presence of rigid labor contracts 
that allows for more aggressive wage setting on the part of the labor unions. Therefore, it is cru­
cial to study the effect of unions' behavior on governments' incentives to undertake labor market 
reform.
1.2.1 L abor market in s titu tio n s  and m onetary  policy outside th e  MU
First we consider the case of a representative country that does not participate in the monetary 
union (alternatively, a representative country before joining the MU). Tlie model is developed in 
two stages. In the first stage the government and the national labor union move simitllnnvously. 
i.e. they play Nash against each other. Union members will set nominal wages treating the 
actions of the. government as given. The government will decide on reform taking nominal wages 
as given. Both the labor union and the government are Stackelberg leaders with r e s p e c t  to the 
CB. which moves in the second stage of the game and sets the rate of inflation.
In the spirit of Ilefeker (2001), Sibert and Sutherland (2000) and Calmfors (20011)). we for­
mulate the unemployment equation as:
u denotes the unemployment rate. «• is the logarithm of nominal wages and ~ is the inflation 
rate which is defined as follows: rr =  p — p _ p  is the log of the price level I*. normalizing 
P -1  =  1. we have p_i =  0. thus we get "  ~  p. Hence we define ic — "  as being real wages. 
We assume that there exists a level of reform R  corresponding to the current level of labor 
market institutions (related to the current amount of distortions in the labor market) which is 
normalized to 1, so that its log is zero, lienee, r  =  Ini?. and is thought to be a romposiU index 
representing the degree of labor market deregulation; S is the impact of deregulation (we assume 
S >  0). Thus, the unemployment rate increases with the real wage tv — tt and decreases with 
the index r  (i.e. deviation from current labor market institutions which are related to a certain 
amount of distortions; so if r  =  0. no reform is undertaken, and distortions remain at the same 
level). The composite reform index as was mentioned before refers to employment protection 
legislation and union bargaining power in wage setting, implying that institutions do not act 
in isolation, as well as that there are complex linkages between institutions and unemployment. 
Notice that such institutional reforms have been proposed by several OECD's (e.g. Jobs Study 
1991. Implementation of Jobs Study (199!))) and IMF's (WEO 2003) studies as a way of reducing 
labor market rigidities and fighting unemployment.
s l'o r  e x a m p le ,  K lm eskov et al (1!)0S), H elot a n d  Van O u rs  (2 0 0 2 ). N ickell et al (200:.iJ. B a k e r  et al (20(H).
isolation but consider interactions among them*. Finally note that the CWB assumption coupled
a =  a(w — tv) — Sr (1.1)
1.2. T in :  M O D E L t
S ta g e  2: T h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ’s p r o b le m
T h e  m onetary  a u th o rity  w ants to  m inim ize the  deviations o f inflation and  unem ploym ent from 
th e ir  target levels, assum ed to  be zero for simplicity. So th e  cen tra l bank is m inim izing a s tandard  
q u ad ra tic  loss function  of the  form:
B  =  x 2 +  \ u* (1.2 )
with respect to  t: an d  sub jec t to eq. ( 1 ) taking as given nom inal wages an d  reform . Ac d  is 
th e  unem ploym ent aversion p a ram ete r. We assum e th a t th e  cen tral bank does not c a re  directly  
abou t the level o f la b o r m arket reform . T h e  central b an k 's  reaction  function is o b ta in ed  afte r the 
P B  has equalized th e  m arginal benefits an d  the m arginal costs o f a higher inflation ra te :
77 =  ^ I T T  a^ w  ~  ^  =  ^  ( a w  ~  S r* 0  - 3)
Note th a t th e  reaction  p aram ete r of th e  central bank: <1* <  1. thus the m onetary  policy  is not 
fully accom m odating  union 's nom inal wage demands. N otice also th a t an increase in  th e  level of 
reform  lowers th e  inflation ra te . L abor m arket d istortions reduce ou tpu t below its efficient level; 
th is creates an  incentive to  th e  CB to  ra ise inflation above its  optim al level in o rder to  boost real 
ac tiv ity  an d  reduce unem ploym ent'1.
S ta g e  1 : T h e  l a b o r  u n io n  a n d  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t p la y  N a s h
T h e  G o v e rn m e n t  The' governm ent m inim izes the following loss function:
<; = 772 +/m* + 7 r ‘2 (1 . 1)
w ith respect to r . sub ject to  ( 1 ) and  (3). taking nom inal wages set by the labor un ion  as given. 
T h e  gow nim en t w ants to  m inim ize th e  deviation of r .  from  current labor m arket in stitu tions 
( r  =  U). Hence, reform  has a d irect negative effect th rough  r  itself (because it is opposed  by its 
electorate', the m ajo rity  of th e  em ployed insiders according to  Saint-Paul, 1990). a n d  an  indirect 
positive effect th ro u g h  lower inflation an d  unem ploym ent. T h e  government is assum ed  to  care 
m ore ab o u t unem ploym ent re la tive  to  th e  central bank ft >  A.
T he m in im iza tion  problem  yields a reaction function of th e  form:
r  =  f c ( u ' )
n u '6 ( f i  +  a 2 A2 )
7 +  f t à 2 +  '2 a 2 A-/ +  a 4A27  +  a 2 X 2 à 2
l.o)
9 If th e  m u u ra l  r a te  o f  u n em p lo y m en t ( X I U )  was assum ed  to  b e  h ig h e r  th a n  zero  a n d  th e  O il  w as ta rg e tin g  
an  u n em p lo y m en t r a te  below  th a t ,  th e  m o d e l w ou ld  have e x h ib ite d  th e  lla rro -G o rd o n  in fla t io n -b ia s . In  th a t  
e a se , in cor] »o ra ting  e x p e c te d  in fla tio n  a n d  m a k in g  use o f th e  ra tio n a l e x p e c ta t io n s  a s su m p tio n , re fo rm  w o u ld  have 
re d u ce d  th e  in fla tio n  b ia s , a n d  h e n ce  th e  in ce n tiv e s  to  g en era te  su rp r ise  in fla tio n .
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i.e. the reform undertaken by the government is an increasing function of the wages { fa (ir)  >  
0) set by the union. In the absence of reform, t he effect of labor market distortions (e.g. increased 
union power and strict rules on employment protection legislation) leads to high wages and low 
labor demand, and thus to high unemployment. Hence, labor demand-enhancing reform should 
be undertaken (reduction of the union power and abolishment of strict EPL rules), in order to 
shift the labor demand schedule outwards (so as to reduce unemployment and inflation). Iieform 
is an increasing function of nominal wage demands by the union members, in order to outweigh 
the effect that unions* wage setting behavior has on unemployment and inflation.
The labor union Employing the assumption that all labor union members are identical and 
that firms produce a homogeneous good we can assume tin' presence of only one labor union in 
the economy. The single labor union that represents all workers in the economy prefers a higher 
real wage for its members, and dislikes deviations of unemployment from its targeted level. The 
targeted level of unemployment (u) is affected in a negative manner by labor market reform; v can 
be considered as a proxy of union bargaining power in wage setting (in many empirical studies this 
is proxied by union density)10. Therefore, we assume that reform undertaken by the government 
affects negatively union power. Labor unions strongly averse any kind of reform that implies 
less strict employment protection legislation (job security rules and regulations that concern 
administrative procedures, like reasons for dismissal, length of notice of termination, severance 
payments, unfair and collective dismissals), as well as. any attempt by the government that 
reduces their bargaining power in the wage setting process11. Therefore labor unions oppose any 
form of deregulation that imply less rigid labor contracts and worsens the wage-unemployment 
trade ofr that they face. Nevertheless, reform has also a positive effect on union members by 
reducing inflation and unemployment.
The labor union is minimizing the following loss function1'2;
L =  —,3(w — rr) +  (?/. — r )2 (1.0)
10 F or ex A m ple. B a k e r  et a] (2001). IM F ’s W E O  (2003).
11 T in  s so rt ol re fo rm  is o p p o sed  by u n io n  m em b ers  b e c a u se  it d i r e c tly  red u ces th e i r  w elfare , s in ce  it im p lie s  a  
lack ol c o n tro l in  fu tu re  p e rio d s  a n d  th a t  th e  un ion  will d im in ish  in  s ize  an d  in fluence  (tlie  I ’K ex p erien c e  in  t h e
1980s).
1_A p re c io u s  v e rs io n  o f the  p a p e r  a ssu m ed  th a t  th e  la b o u r  u n io n  is in f la tio n  averse, w hich  is a  re a l is t ic  a s s u m p tio n  
tor a  m o n o p o lis tic  u n io n  th a t re p re se n ts  a ll w o rk ers  in th e  econom y. H ow ever, we d o  n o t c o n sid e r th is  case  h e re  fo r  
tw o reaso n s . 1 lie first one is to  keep llie m o d e l sim ple  a n d  th e  se c o n d  is to  focus on th e  m ain c o n c e rn  o f  th e  p a p e r  
w hich  is la b o u r  m ark e t reform . In  th e  c u r re n t  se ttin g , in f la tio n  a v ers io n  w ou ld  m ak e  un io n s fa v o u ra b le  to  re fo rm  
u n d e r ta k e n  b y  th e  g o v e rn m en t, th e  elFoct w o u ld  be in c reas in g  on  th e  a v e rs io n  to  in fla tio n  p a ra m e te r  a ssu m ed  in  t h e  
u n io n s  lo ss fu n c tio n . F u rth e rm o re , un io n  m em b e rs  tak e  a lre a d y  in to  a cco u n t th e  real and  not th e  n o m in a l w a g es .
dnrii«
1.2. T i l t :  M O D E L  
where
9
v  =  k — s r  (1.7)
w ith respect to  nominal wages w. su b jec t to  (1 ) an d  (3) tak in g  reform  as given. ¡3 is a positive 
param eter represen ting  the lab o r u n io n 's  preferences on  real wages over unem ploym ent, k is a 
positive constan t n o t affected b y  labor reform , while s  represen ts th e  effectiveness of reform  efforts 
on reducing the bargain ing  power of th e  lab o r union (as proxied by u) in wage se tt in g 1,1.
Tlie m in im ization problem  yields th e  reaction  function o f th e  labor union:
w  =  ¿>(7 ) =  [/3 +  2 ax +  2 ar(S  — e — a2A£) +  a2,SX +  2a‘*KA] (1.8 )
where if 6 f(r)  >  0 nom inal wage’s am i reform a re  "stm tu jic  com plt.incuts“. i.e. if ^ 7  =  
£ (if — £ — a 2As) >  0 . or >  &(1 4- a 2A); otherw ise if 6*{r) < 0 wages am i reform  are  "stratigir 
substituiis". N otice also that: = }, (« 2A +  l)  > 0 (and  ^ 7  =  £ (a2A +  l )  >  0). w hich suggest
th a t the bigger th e  targeted level of unem ploym ent is (or th e  union power in  wage se tting), the 
higher nom inal w ages will be. M oreover. ^ 7  =  , (1^ a q j e an  jncrease ¡n th e  effectiveness
of reform efforts in  reducing union barg a in in g  power in wage se tting , leads to  lower nom inal wage 
dem ands a t a given reform level.
Therefore, th e  union facing th e  possib ility  of labor m arket reform  un d ertak en  by th e  govern­
m ent. which leads to  more flexible lab o r contracts by reducing un ion 's bargain ing  pow er in wage 
setting  an d  by a n d  introducing less s tr ic t EPL. decides to  react "aggressively" ra ising  nominal 
wage dem ands w hen <5 >  s ( l  +  a 2A), i.e. when the reduction  in unemployment- caused  by reform 
is higher than  th e  reduction in union pow er so that th e re  is still room for h igher w ages with out 
affecting much unem ploym ent am ong its  un ion m em bers. I11 th is  case m ore reform  im proves the 
wage-unem ploym ent trad e  off faced by th e  labor union. In  th e  opposite case, re form  anti wages 
are substitu tes because the reduction of unem ploym ent due to  reform  is sm aller com pared  to its 
negative effect o n  th e  union bargain ing  power proxy. Hence, a  bigger am ount of reform  worsens 
the wage-unem ploym ent trade off faced by  the  union, i.e. th e  dem ise of un io n iza tio n  (the union 
dim inish in size a n d  influence) forces th e  labor union to  m o d era te  its nom inal wage dem ands in
u  Not ice that r  >  0. i.e r  =
k  — sr i f  K t > 0
. W e focus on  th e  m ost in te re s t  in s  c a se  k —
I 0  if  k  — sr  <  0
fact r  >  0 ) . how ever, a s  will be  show n in se c tio n  2.3.1 we sh a ll allow  fo r a  h igh  and  a low  v a lu e  o f t ’ i.e. 
union h as high a n d  low  b arg a in in g  in  w age s e t t in g .
•■r >  0 (in 
w hen the
P
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order to avoid facing higher unemployment among its members111".
1.2.2 L abor m arke t institu tions an d  m onetary  policy inside th e  M U
Wo now turn to examine the effect that the establishment of a monetary imion1^’ might have on 
decisions regarding labor market reform, which are still taken by national governments in order 
to deal with the heterogeneous labor market structures in each country. This is a real life fact, 
despite the initiatives undertaken by EU member states in developing a coordinated strategy 
for employment (Lisbon 2000)1'. The labor union in each country decides on nominal wages 
taking as given the nominal wage demanded in the other country. The common central bank (we 
call it for brevity European Central Bank or ECB) determines the common inflation rate for all 
participating countries. We analyze a two-country (1 and 2) monetary union, and we consider 
first the benchmark case of two identical countries having identical unions. The next step, will be 
introduce some asymmetries between the two economies. To focus on the direct effects of EMU 
we can also assume that Ae c b  =  A. although it would probably be more realistic to consider the 
case where the ECB cares less about unemployment relative to the national central banks.
The unemployment equation is determined as follows:
Ui + U2 , , ,
U M U  = ----- ^ ------ =  a { d ' M U  — ~  M U )  —  M ' f l f r (UJ)
we have defined icjur =  »l-f tf’2 ? Vfl/r — n ±L2 < while we have assumed that the unemployment 
equation in each country i is defined as follows:
■Uj =  a(wi -  TTji/i.-) -  Srj (1 • 10)
i.e. it is affected by the nominal wage demands in country /, the common inflation rate in the 14
14 Not ice  th a t  a  s i tu a t io n  w h e re  t lie g o v e rn m e n t d ec id es first on  refo rm  (ijta ck e lb e rg  lea d e r)  an d  th e n  th e  la b o u r  
un ion  .sets n o m in a l w a g e s  im p lic itly  a ssu m e s  t h a t  t h e  go v ern m en t d e te rm in e s  u n ila te ra lly  th e  in s t i tu t io n a l  fram e­
w ork in t h e  la b o u r  m a rk e t ,  a n tic ip a tin g  th e  r e a c t io n  of th e  u n io n  to  each  refo rm  level r. M o reo v er, all p rev io u s  
m oves a re  o b se rv e d  b e fo re  th e  n ex t is ch o sen . S o  c o m p le te  a n d  p e rfec t in fo rm a tio n  arc  a ssu m ed . F o r th is  reason w e 
th in k  th a t  t h e  S ta c k e lb e rg  case  can  b e  c h a ra c te r iz e d  a s  u n in te re s t in g  b e c a u se  th e  real life d e te rm in a tio n  o f la b o u r  
m arket in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  n o m in a l w ages is  m u ch  m o re  c o m p lic a te d  a llo w in g  fo r im perfect in fo rm a tio n  am o n g  th e  
p layers. T h is  c a n  b e  c a p tu r e d  by th e  s im u lta n e o u s  m ove g am e  s t ru c tu re .
F u r th e rm o re ,  a llo w in g  th e  la b o u r  u n io n  to  se t  re fo rm  u n ila te ra ly  is a lso  an  u n rea lis tic  a s su m p tio n , how ever th e  
c u rre n t s e t t i n g  a llo w s it to  h av e  a  s tro n g  sa y  o n  t h e  fo rm atio n  o f  la b o u r  m a rk e t in s titu tio n s  a s  we w ill see  in sec tion  
2.3.1.
l j T h e  N a sh  e q u il ib r iu m  so lu tio n s  a re  p re s e n te d  in  A p pend ix  1.V 1.
In th is  b e n c h m a rk  c a se , a b s t r a c tin g  fro m  re a lity , we a ssu m e  th a t  th e  im position  o f  th e  M l '  c an  only b e
re p re se n te d  by  tlie  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f th e  co m m o n  c e n tra l  b an k  (C I1). w h ich  d e c id es  on th e  c o m m o n  in ila tio n  ra te .
H ie  E u ro p e a n  C o u n c il  m ee tin g  ill L isbon  (2 0 0 0 )  ad o p te d  a  s t ra te g y  to  b r in g  em p lo y m en t to  a ll m e m b e r s ta te s  
close to  70(X o f  th e  w o rk in g  a g e  p o p u la t io n  b v  2010 .
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monetary union and the reform undertaken in country t. We assume for simplicity that ti and a 
are identical across countries, and that the two countries are of equal size.
The simple MU case we are considering with the common inflation rate determined by the 
ECB. contrary to a situation where the ECB would care about a weighted average of the inflation 
rates in each member state, could be thought of as the limiting case of the situation described by 
the ‘'real effects" argument discussed previously. It could be described as a world with economic 
stability, and increased economic integration, where product market competition has led to price 
convergence within the MU. In this context, national labor market institutions will have very 
important effects on member states' economies.
Stage 2: The ECB’s problem
In stage 2 the European Central Bank determines the common inflation rate taking into account 
u m v  and taking as given the nominal wages set by the unions in the two countries, as well as. 
the amount of reform decided by the national governments in the first stage of the game1 \
The ECB is minimizing the following loss function with respect to tt¿/p, subject to (9):
B e c b  ~  +  ^e c b u \ iu (Ell)
The reaction function of the ECB is defined in terms of area-wide variables:
ft\w =  1 , f C/?X [aa’A/r -  ¿ a /r ]  =  [««’a/p  ~  ¿Eur] (1-12)
1 + * e c b {i
as in the case of national monetary policy a bigger amount of reform results in lower area-wide 
inflation. We can see also that since X^c b  — X the ECB responds in the same way to an increase 
in the average nominal wages in the monetary union, as a national central bank would respond 
to an increase in nominal wage demands bv the national labor union.
Stage 1: The Governments and the Unions play Nash
T he Governments The national governments decide about the level of labor market reform 
in each country, subject to the ECB's reaction function, and taking as given the nominal wages 
set by the labor unions, as well as the amount of reform decided by the other government. Each 
national government in country / is minimizing the following loss function with respect to i
G; — “i/p + (1-13)
subject to eqs. (1 0 ) and (1 2), and taking as given tr,\ ivj and r j. Notice that the two govern­
ments attach the same weights ft and 7  on unemployment and reform, respectively. Reform has a 
l s Tlu* EC'B c a re s  o n ly  in d ire c tly  a b o u t la b o u r  m ark e t reform .
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direct negative  effect on governm ents’ decisions, as well as. an ind irect positive eflect th ro u g h  llie 
reduction  o f unem ploym ent and  inflation, for the sam e reasons th a t were discussed in  th e  case of 
a rep resen ta tiv e  coun try  outside th e  M U. T he reaction function  for each governm ent will be  (see 
A ppendix  1.5.2):
n  = fG,(rj.Wi,Wj) (l.H)
E qu atio n  ( I I )  im plies that: Reform  undertaken  in  th e  hom e coun try  is an  increasing  function 
of nom inal wage dem ands by th e  hom e labo r union ( ^ ¡ -  >  0 . for the  sam e reasons analyzed  in 
the pre-M U  case). Notice also th a t  th e  higher the wages in th e  foreign country, th e  sm aller th e  
am ount o f  reform  undertaken by th e  hom e government <  0 ), because a high w-j will increase 
area w ide in flation, reducing unem ploym ent in coun try  1 (by reducing  real wages in  coun try  1 ). 
leading, thus, to  fewer incentives for reform .
On th e  o th er hand, a bigger am oun t of reform in the foreign country will induce th e  hom e 
governm ent to  u n d ertak e  more lab o r m arket reform  ( ^  >  0 ). T h is  is a "race to flu bottom“ 
argum ent: a h igh r? (by increasing ryi/f ) reduces area-w ide inflation , o ther th ings being  equal, 
resulting  in h igher unem ploym ent in coun try  1 (by increasing  real wages in co u n try  1 ). d im s 
reform lias the effect of a "beggar-tliy-neighbor' policy. So the  governm ent in co u n try  1 decides to  
u n d ertak e  reform  in order to co u n terb a lan ce  this “negativt. spill-over effect''. Hence, we p o s tu la te  
th a t th e  level of institu tional reform  on each country can  bo th o u g h t of being strait (fir. comph went. 
an argum ent th a t  has no t d raw n m uch a tten tion  in th e  l i te ra tu re  and  can possib ly  shed  some 
m ore lig h t in th e  workings of a m o n e ta ry  union and  th e  decisions to  form a n d /o r  p a r tic ip a te  in 
a MU.
S tra teg ic  com plem entarity  o f in stitu tio n a l reform in the  co n tex t of the  perfec tly  in teg ra ted  
MU th a t  we a re  considering, im plies th a t m em ber s ta te s ’ econom ies will incur "real effects“ 
by the reform  decision undertaken  by each national governm ent. In real life s itu a tio n s  lab o r 
m arket in s titu tio n s  (LM I). by affecting lab o r costs, w ould be a n  im portan t d e te rm in an t for firm s’ 
decisions ab o u t foreign direct investm ent (FD I) in an  env ironm en t o f intensified p ro d u c t m arket 
com petition . lien ee  government ac tion  w ould be im p o rtan t in a ttra c tin g  FD I. gen era tin g  negative 
side-effects to  th e  o ther countries in th e  M U th a t are  co m p etin g  for FD I (o rig inated  from o u tside  
the MU ). A dditionally , o ther th ings be ing  equal. LMI could  b e  im p o rtan t facto r in th e  re location  
decisions o f firm s from one M U coun try  to another, d e te rio ra tin g  the economy w ith  th e  m ore 
'■rigid” lab o r m arket.
T h e  L a b o r  U n io n s  T he n a tional la b o r  union in co u n try  / se ts  nom inal wages m inim izing th e  
following loss function  w ith respect to  tr;:
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Li = -;3(wi -  77m u ) + (ui -  Vj)2 (1.15)
iij =  k — evj (1.1C)
subject to eqs (10) and (12). The reaction function for each union is* 1' :
•t.
U’i =  / l, (rj • r i«Wj) (1.17)
The nominal wage set by the home labor union is determined with respect to the nominal 
wage set by the foreign labor union, and the amount of reform decided by the home and foreign 
government. Two effects that hold for the pre-MU case carry over here. First, > 0
a higher target value of unemployment on the part of the labor union leads to higher nominal 
wages. Second. 4 ^  < 0 i.e. the more effective the reform effort is in reducing union power, the 
lower wages will be at a given reform level.
Examining the reaction function of the labor union in country 1 we see that: > 0. the
home union will respond in an aggressive manner to a nominal wage hike by the foreign union20. 
A bigger amount of employment enhancing reform in the home country generates an ambiguous 
effect on wage decisions taken by the home labor union. Specifically we have: > or < 0.
It is positive if <f(2 + a2 Ae c b ) >  - -0  + <i2^£Cb ) (or 6 > )• i-e* if reform reduces
unemployment to a greater extent than it reduces union power, the labor union will set wage 
in an aggressive manner. In the opposite case: ' uni°ns* i)argaining power is
reduced to a great extent be reform, thus it has a strong moderating effect on labor union's wage 
setting behavior.
Finally a higher reform level in the foreign country induces a wage moderation on the part of 
the home labor union (4-^ < 0 ). A bigger amount of reform in country 2 raises area-wide reform 
mincing area-wide inflation, which in turn increases real wages and unemployment in country 
1 ; this sequence of events will produce a moderating effect on the wage setting decisions of the 
labor union in country l21.
A key feature is that the interaction of more labor unions inside the ME. makes them react 
aggressively to a nominal wage hikes in the foreign country. This will force national governments
ly Tor all m a th e m a tic a l expression  a n d  e q u ilib r iu m  so lu tio n s see A p p e n d ix  1.5.2.
" ° ln  a  p re v io u s  version  o f  th e  pa p er w h e re  u n io n s  w e re  in fla tion  av erse  th is  effect co u ld  even b e  n e g a tiv e  ( t^ -  <  0). 
T h o u g h  th is  “‘m o d era tin g  e f fe c t ' w ould  b e  p o ss ib le  o n ly  if  u n io n s w ere  v e ry  in f la tio n  av erse  o r  th e  c o m m o n  CB 
w as not very co n se rv a tiv e  (i.e . liberal h av in g  h ig h  Af c b ). In th a t  case, a  h ig h  n o m in a l w age  d e m a n d  in  c o u n try
i m o d era te s  w age  d e m a n d s  in  co u n try  j . since th e  un io n  in  c o u n try  j  re a liz e s  th e  positive  effect o f  h ig h e r  wage 
d e m a n d s  on a re a  w ide in f la tio n .
_l In a  p rev io u s  version  o f  th e  p ap er w h en  la b o u r  u n io n s  were in fla tio n  a v e rse  th is  effect c o u ld  oven b e  p o sitiv e , 
a ssu m in g  th o u g h  th e  p re se n c e  o f  a very  in fla tion  a v e rse  lab o u r un ion o r  a  l ib e ra l  co m m o n  c e n tra l  b a n k  (h ig h  Af c b ).
llliHITIfjf
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to react in a stronger and positive manner to nominal wage increases by the home union, as well 
as. to reform decisions taken in the foreign country. The home labor union, in turn, will either 
raise or moderate (decrease) its nominal wages demands, depending on the effect of home reform 
effort on its bargaining power. Furthermore, there are two more moderating effects at work: first 
the home labor union moderates its wage demands in the event of higher reform in the foreign 
country, and second the home government reduces reform when nominal wage increase in the 
foreign country. Therefore, there is some ambiguity with respect to how the Nash solutions in 
the post-MF case compare to those in the pre-MU case. To resolve this ambiguity we resort to 
numerical evaluation of the two cases.
1.2.3 N um erical evaluation 
Calibration of parameters
We need to choose values for the parameters in the unemployment equation, a the slope of the 
Phillips curve, and S the effect of labor market reform (concerning EPL and union bargaining 
power). In order to calibrate the parameter n we follow the analysis in Saint-Paul and Bentolila 
(2001). They compare real wage flexibility parameters from a series of studies and they calculate 
upper and lower values corresponding to "flexible" and “rigid" labor markets. Since we examine 
an economy with a monopolistic labor union we consider only the rigid labor market case of 
Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2001). In this case the real wage flexibility parameter was found to be 
1.2-5 which in our setting translates"- to a — =  0.8. The parameter 6 captures the effect of
reform regarding EPL and labor union bargaining power on unemployment. Several studies have 
examined the effects of EPL and union power (as proxied by union density) on unemployment, 
and their estimates vary to a great extent'3. Therefore', we have decided to consider a high anti
“'I n  c a se  o f  a  f lex ib le  econom y t lie v a lu e  fo r  t l ie  real w age flex ib ility  p a ra m e te r  was 1 in  S a in t-P a u l  ancl l ie n lo li la  
(*2(X> 1). 4 'he  S a in t-P a u l  an d  B en to lila  p a p e r  w a s  b ased  a m o n g  o th e rs  to  th e  b a y a rd . Nickel 1 a n d  .Jackm an or L X J  
(1091) e s t im a tio n s .  L N J  h a d  e s t im a te d  for 19 O E C D  c o u n tr ie s  for th e  p e r io d  1909-8-) th e  fo llow ing  w age e q u a tio n :
><■( — Pt — (1 — ~i ) ( t t ’t - 1 — Pt — i ) -s 'to  — ”/ iVt — "m i A m  — " 2A  p
an d  th e  re a l w a g e  flex ib ility  p a ra m e te r  u s e d  by  S a in t-P a u l a n d  B e n to lila  co rre sp o n d ed  to  th e  av erag e  va lue  o f
th e  lo n g -ru n  p a r a m e te r  in  th e  19 O E C D  co u n trie s .
Jh o r  e x a m p le .  E lm esk o v  et al (1 9 9 8 ) e s t im a te d  th a t  1 u n it  in c re a s e  in  th e  E P L  in d ex  u sed  w o u ld  lead  to  a n
increase  in u n e m p lo y m e n t by 1.13 p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts , w h ile  u n io n  d e n s i ty  has no effect. N ickell (1997) found n o  
effect fro m  E P L  o n  u n e m p lo y m e n t, w h ile  a  te n  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in t in c re a se  in  th e  union d e n s ity  w a s  found  to  r a is e  
u n em p lo y m en t b y  0.9G p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts . B la n c h a rd  and  W o lle rs  (20 0 0 ) found  th a t an in c re a se  in  th e  E PL  in d e x  
by 1 u n it ra is e s  u n e m p lo y m e n t by 0 .21  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts , w h ile  a  ten  p e rc e n ta g e  point in c re a se  in u n io n  d e n s i ty  
resu lts  in  th e  u n e m p lo y m e n t in c re a s in g  by 0 .8  f p e rce n ta g e  p o in ts .  B e r to la  et al (2001) re p o rt  th a t  s t r ic te r  E P L  w ill 
in crease  u n e m p lo y m e n t by 0 .2  p e rc e n ta g e  p o in ts ,  w hile  th ey  fo u n d  n o  effect from  union d e n sity  o n  u n e m p lo y m en t 
ra te . S im u la t io n  e x e rc is e s  in  th e  IM F ’s  W E O  (2003) suggest t h a t  a  r e d u c tio n  in E P L  from  E u ro -A re a  to  E .S . lev e ls
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a low value for <S, for the high value we use 1.61 (= 1.465 + 0.18 — 0.032) which is taken from 
the IMF's World Economic Outlook (2003), while the low value (0.2) is taken from Bertola et 
al (2001). These values are transformed into elasticities after being divided by 6 %. which is the 
average unemployment rate over 1970-2002 for the OECD countries24. Therefore, the high value 
of S is 0.268, whereas the low one is 0.033.
We also consider two values for the parameter k (determining the targeted value of unem­
ployment by the labor union); the low value being 5% and the liigh value being 109b A high 
value for k refers to a labor union that cares more about real wages, and which also has bigger 
influence on the wage setting process compared to a labor union with a low k . The parameter 
e represents the effectiveness of reform in reducing the union bargaining power, as proxied by 
v . We allow s  to take a low value 0 .1  and a high value 1 . In the latter case a given increase in 
reform reduces union power one-to-one, while in the former case it has only a minor effect on 
union power. Alternatively, a given decrease in union power has to be attained by a much greater 
amount of reform in the second case.
The parameter ,3. which represents the weight attached on real wages relative to unemploy­
ment in labor union's loss function, is set to 1 . The targeted unemployment level (t> > 0) indicates 
that the labor union is already attacliing a relatively higher weight on the wage income of its 
union members compared to unemployment among its union members.
Table 1 : Parameter Values
a $low $high Klow R-high ~lou' igh 3
0 .8 0.033 0.268 59f lOVi 0.1 1 1
With respect to the parameters A, /t. that represent the preferences of the central bank 
and the government, we know that A < /t because the government attaches more weight on 
unemployment than the central bank (or the common CB in the post-Ml* era). Lippi (1998) in 
his study for 22 OECD countries, estimated the weight attached on inflation to be on average 
719b Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2001) consider two extreme cases for the weight attached on
w ill lead  to  a fa ll in th e  u n em p lo y m en t r a te  b y  a b o u t  1.65 p e rce n ta g e  p o in ts .  In  a d d itio n , regression  e stim a te 's  
p re s e n te d  in IM F 's  W E O  (200.4) in d ic a te  t h a t  s t r i c te r  E P L  in c re ases  u n em p lo y m en t r a te  by 1.165 p e rc e n ta g e  
p o in ts  (T ab le  4 .3 , m o d e l 3 ), w h ile  an  in c re a se  in  u n io n  den sity  in c reases  u n e m p lo y m en t by 0 .1 8  p e rce n ta g e  p o in ts . 
H ow ever, th e ir  in te ra c t io n  p ro d u c es  a  r e d u c tio n  in  unem p lo y m en t ra te  by  0 .0 3 2  p e rce n ta g e  p o in ts . A s th e  IM F  
re p o r t  c la im s E P L  d a m p e n s  sh o rt te rm  u n e m p lo y m e n t, b ecause  o f  firing  re s tr ic tio n s , w hile  it in creases long  te rm  
u n e m p lo y m en t d u e  to  re lu c ta n c e  on th e  p a r t  o f  e m p lo y e rs  to  h ire  w orkers in  a  h igh ly  re g u la te d  la b o u r  m a rk e t. As 
th e  re p o rt  p o s tu la te s , g r e a te r  u n io n iz a tio n  (w h ich  p ro x ie s  union p o w er) m ak e s  “m ore  effective  a n d  m o re  w id e sp rea d  
th e  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  th e  E P L  m easures, m a g n ify in g  th e  first e ffec t" . T h o u g h  a s  th e  rep o rt n o te s  th e  “u n d e s irab le
lo n g  te rm  effect d o m in a te s  in  13 out o f 20  O E C D  c o u n tr ie s  s tu d ie d , in c lu d in g  a ll 0 7  eco n o m ies" .
" 'W e  u se  th e  O E C D  a v e ra g e  unem p lo y m en t r a te  in s te a d  o f th e  E M F  o r  E u ro p ea n  F n io n  av erag e  b e ca u se  th e  
a b o v e  m en tio n ed  s tu d ie s  w ere  based  on  O E C D  c o u n tr ie s .
mmppfinniwrr*™
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inflation in the*  social welfare function (parameter b in their model), a low one which is 10%. and 
high one which is 90%; in the latter case the economy is inflation averse, whereas in the former 
it is inflation prone. In the context of our paper A =  L=± for the central bank. Furthermore, 
in the Saint-Faul and Benlolila (2001) framework the weights on the government's loss function 
would have been, for example. ^  for inflation, k for reform, and (1 — ^ — k) for unemployment; 
thus in our framework ft. =  ^ and 7  =  Moreover, b >  ^  i.e. the CB attaches a bigger
weight on inflation compared to the government, which implies that A < ft. In addition. 7 should 
be bigger or smaller but not equal to A for b > y (while 7  <  A if b < y?). Therefore, we shall 
consider four cases; (i) A < // =  7  (ii) A <// <", (¡ii) A < 7  <  ft (iv) 7 < A < //.. In the first case 
the weight attached on reform is equal to the weight attached on unemployment, in the second 
case more weight is attached on reform. These two cases and especially the second one resemble 
to a situation where the political cost of reform is very high, because labor unions are strong 
enough to affect political developments. The political cost of reform refers to strikes and public 
protests on the part of the labor union members. The third case implies that the political costs 
of reform are important, though not so much as the cost of high unemployment. Finally, in the 
last case the unions do not have much "say" in the political life and cannot oppose reform in ail 
cflicient manner, this could be the case when union density is low. We will consider the following 
possibilities:
Case (i) : A < p= -. Case (ii) ; A<//<-,
A R *7 A R }
variant 1 A =0.01 ft=0 .055 7=0.055 A=0.01 /¿=0.04 7=0.07
variant 2 A=0.11 //.=(). 175 7=0.175 A=0.11 //=0.15 7 = 0.2
variant 3 A=().ll y ¿=0.5 7=0.5 A=0.11 //=0.4 7 = 0.6
A =  0.01 implies that the weight on inflation by the central hank is 99% (in the framework 
of Saint-Paul and Bentolila. 2001). while A =  0.11 corresponds to 90% weight on inflation, i.e. 
in both cases the central bank is mort1 averse to inflation compared to the estimated aversion 
to inflation parameter (74 % ) in Lippi (1998)";\ ft =  7  =  0.055 corresponds to 90% weight 
on inflation and 5%, respectively, on reform and unemployment, ft =  7 =  0.175 implies that 
the weight on inflation is 74% (as reported by Lippi 1998) while the weight on reform and 
unemployment is Ki% for each, ft =  7  =  0.5 corresponds to 50% weight on inflation (inflation 
prone* case), and 25% respectively on reform and unemployment“^ .
* A \e  d o  not c o n s id e r  a  ease w h e re  th e  c e n tr a l  b an k  is in fla tio n  p ro n e , b ecau se  in th e  run  u p  to  th e  E M E  t h e  
c e n tra l b a n k s  o f  a ll m em b e r s ta te s  w ere  in d e p e n d e n t  by law. w ere  a lre a d y  p a r tic ip a tin g  in  th e  E u ro p e a n  M o n e ta r y  
S ystem  (E M S ) . w h ile  th e  m em ber s la te s  h a d  ach iev ed  a low a n d  s ta b le  in fla tio n  in th e  ru n -u p  to  th e  E M I'.
* 'A  v a lu e  o f  / /  (o r  ' )  - 0.01 c o rre sp o n d s  to  M.7l/< weight o n  u n e m p lo y m en t (or re fo rm ), w h ile  a v a lu e  o f // ( o r  
" ) -- 0 .0 7  c o r re s p o n d s  to  (i.3%. w eight on u n em p lo y m en t (o r  re fo rm ). A  v a lu e  of ft (o r  " ) -  0.1 û im p lies w e ig h t
'5? ! ?? * r.’*.*! ?*" T!” ?*-r !TT?" 5T
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Case (iii) : a < - k /j ______________ C ase (iv) : - ¡ < a <//
A ft A 1
variant 1 A=0.01 7 —0.04 (t={).07 A=0.01 7= 0 .005 p.=0.105
varian t 2 A=0 .11 7 = 0 .15 (t= 0.2 A=0.11 7 = 0 .0 5 «— II c d
variant 3
©II-< dII<-
tad11 A =0.I1 7 = 0 .0 5 //.=0.95
Notice th a t  the  first two rows in  each box represent a s itu a tio n  w here bo th  th e  cen tral b an k  and 
th e  government are  inflation averse (w ith  the central bank  hav ing  a bigger aversion to  inflation 
though), whereas th e  last row refers to  a case where the cen tra l bank is inflation averse but 
th e  government is inflation prone i.e cares less for inflation (m uch less (50%) th an  th e  average 
estim ated  value (74%) in OECD countries as reported  by Lippi. 1998)2'.
E v a lu a te  t h e  in s id e  a n d  o u t s id e  t h e  M U  o u tc o m e s
T he values chosen for the param eters im ply  th a t we have to  exam ine eight different m odel specifi­
cations'2*. In  add ition , the a lternative  o rderings of the  preference param eters  for the cen tra l bank 
an d  the governm ent produce four cases to  consider, w ith  th ree  varian ts on each based  on how 
inflation-averse is th e  central bank  an d  th e  government. However, all these different specifications 
can be categorized in to  two groups based  on the conditions: i  >  s (  1 +  a'2A) a n d  S >  ^ V aSa^ o /)^ 
th a t dot on nil 10 w h e th e r labor un ions set wages as an  increasing function o f reform  (strateg ic 
com plem ents) pre a n d  post-M lT, respectively. Therefore, wages a n d  reform are “s tra teg ic  com ­
plem ents" only in m odels 1 an d  3, w here S =  0.268 an d  e =  0.1 i.e. the labor unions face a 
molt* favorable wage'-unemployment tra d e  off. because reform  reduces unem ploym ent to  a greater 
ex ten t th a n  it affects union pow er in wage setting. In all o th e r cases labor unions set nom inal 
wages as a decreasing function o f lal>or m arket reform , because reform  reduces their bargain ing  
pow er m ore than  it affects unem ploym ent, i.e. wages an d  reform  are  "strateg ic su b s titu te s" .
Under all possible specifications reform  increases inside th e  M U2y. This reflects th e  fact th a t 
labo r m arket in stitu tio n s in each cou n try  are “strateg ic  com plem ents", as well as, th a t  home *27
eq u al lo  11 .2%  u n em ploym en t (or re fo rm ), w h e re a s  (i (o r ~) =  0.2 c o rre sp o n d s  to  14.?%  w eight re sp ec tiv e ly  on 
u n em p lo y m en t (o r re fo rm ). W hile /i (o r  y ) =  0 .4  (a n d  (o r  h  =  0.6) im p ly  th a t  th e  w eigh t on u n em p lo y m en t 
a n d  reform  is  re sp ec tiv e ly  20 %.
T h e  values for a n d  ft in  case  (iv) a re  t r a n s la te d  to  th e  follow ing w e ig h ts  on  re fo rm  an d  u n e m p lo y m en t: ■*, =  0.005 
(0 .05) co rre sp o n d s  to  0 .45  % (3.7% w h en  in f la tio n  weight is 74%  and  2.5%  w h en  in fla tio n  w eight is 50% ). W hile
w hen  /< -  0 .105  (0.3 a n d  0.95) the  w eight on u n em p lo y m en t is 9 .55  % (22.3%. a n d  47.5% . re sp ec tiv e ly ).
27W e d o  no t co n sid e r th e  ex trem e  ca se  o f  10% w eight on in fla tio n  as in  S a in t-P a u l  a n d  lie n lo li la  (2001). b ecause
as a lread y  m en tio n ed  in  th e  ru n -u p  to  F.MV all c o u n tr ie s  h ad  ach iev ed  a  low  a n d  s ta b le  in fla tio n .
3S T hese are: 1) k= 5 . ¿ = 0 .2 6 ? , r = 0.1 2) * = 5 ,  <5=0.268. <r=l 3) * = 10. <5=0.268. = = 0.1 4) * = 1 0  .<5=0.268. f = l  5)
* = 5 .  <5=0.033. = = 0 .I 6 ) * = 5 .  <5=0.033. s = \  7) * = 1 0 . <5=0,033, = =0.1  8 ) * = 1 0 .  <5=0.033. r = l .
•’ ‘T h e  n u m erica l so lu tio n s  a re  p re se n te d  in  A p p e n d ix  1.5.3.
fiery■
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governm ents re sp o n d  in an aggressive m aim er to  wage se ttin g  by hom e unions. A s a re s u lt ,  
inflation an d  unem ploym ent en d  up  in a  sm aller level inside th e  Ml*. M oreover, nom inal and r e a l  
wages fall for rem ain  approxim ately  th e  sam e) in all cases w here  wages an ti reform  a re  s tra te g ic  
su b s titu te s*0 fi.e. when union power is su b stan tia lly  reduced following the  labo r m arket re fo rm ), 
which generates p a r t of the fall in unem ploym ent a n d  the  in fla tion  rate. T herefore, the  m o d e l 
implies th a t  th e re  will be significant wage m odera tion  (desp ite  th e  fact that m ore ag en ts  in te ra c t  
inside th e  M l’), as well as, acceleration  o f th e  reform  efforts*1. However, if wages and  re fo rm  
are s tra teg ic  com plem ents (m odel specification  1 a n d  3). no m in al and real wages will be a t  a  
higher level inside th e  M lT. N evertheless, th is  does no t in h ib it inflation an d  unem ploym ent f r o m  
falling, because th e  effect of reform  on unem ploym ent is v e ry  strong. Hence, a b igger a m o u n t 
of reform  leads to  less strict E P L . w hich can  lead to  lower unem ploym ent b u t does not a f fe c t  
much union pow er on wage setting , allow ing labo r unions to  reap  benefits from a “p a r tiz a n "  
type o f wage se ttin g  behavior (because a bigger am ount o f reform  makes m ore favorable t h e  
wage-unem ploym ent trade off th a t  th ey  face).
W elfare im plications on th e  usefulness of reform  o r the decision to  form of a m onetary  u n io n  
cannot no t be d raw n from th is  fram ew ork, however, using each  agent's loss function  wo c o u ld  
categorize the d ifferent outcom es32. In  all possible specifications the com m on cen tra l b a n k ’s  
loss is lower com pared  to  w hat the n a tio n a l cen tral banks ach ieved  in the  pre-M U  era. In e a s e  
o f s tra teg ic  su b s titu tab ility  of wages a n d  reform  on  unions wage setting  decisions th e  n a t io n a l  
government en d s u p  w ith lower losses in side  the  M U; w hereas th e  labor unions h av in g  lost p a r t  
of their s tren g th  since wage co n trac ts  hav e  becom e less rigid (due to  less s tric t K PL an d  re d u c e d  
bargaining pow er in wage setting ) face a less profitable o u tco m e inside th a n  outside th e  M U * °. 
T he outcom es achieved by la b o r un ions a n d  governm ents a re  in  the opposite d irec tion , w h e n  
wages an d  reform  are strategic com plem ents on unions' wage se ttin g  decisions, i.e. lab o r u n io n s  
are b e t te r  o i l  w hile  governm ents a re  w orse off inside th e  M U  (T able 2)*4*". 31*
“ ’M odel sp e c if ic a tio n s  2 . 4. 5. C. 7, a n d  S.
31 H erto la  a n d  B o e r i  (2002) d o c u m e n t th a t  t h e  p a c e  o f  la b o u r  m ark e t d e re g u la t io n  a c c e le ra te d  in  t h e  bu ild  u p  t o  
th e  E M U . T ak in g  a lso  in to  account th a t  th e re  is a  re m a rk a b le  w age  m o d e ra t io n  in  th e  E u ro -a re a  (C 'alm for* 2 0 0 1 a ) .  
we co n c lu d e  th a t  th e  p re d ic tio n s  o f  th e  m o d e l a re  verified .
3'K e e p  in  m in d  th a t  th e  benefits  a n d  c o s ts  o f  fo rm in g  a  M U  are  fa r  fro m  b e in g  an a ly ze d  in d e ta i l  in  tl u- s i m p l e  
fram ew ork  we em ploy , h en ce  we are  v e ry  c a u t io u s  a b o u t  d ra w in g  h a s ty  c o n c lu s io n s  ab o u t M U  m em b e rsh ip , t h e r e f o r e  
we im p o se  it ex o g en o u sly .
33T lris is a t t r i b u te d  to  tlie  d ec rease  in  real w a g es  w hich  is n o t c o m p e n s a te d  by th e  fall in  u n e m p lo y m en t b e c a u s e  
i ts  ta rg e te d  level fa lls  a s  well. W ith  re sp ec t lo  th e  g o v e rn m e n t, th e  in crea .se  in reform  g e n e ra te s  sm a lle r  l o s s e s  
c o m p ared  to  th e  b e n e f i ts  from a  low er level o f  u n e m p lo y m en t a n d  in f la tio n .
31 L a b o u r  u n io n s  a re  b e t te r  off b e ca u se  of t h e  in c re a se  in real w ages a m i th e  fall in u n em p lo y m en t (d e sp ite  th e  f a c t  
th a t th e  d ec lin e  in  u n em p lo y m en t is  m o d e ra te d  b y  th e  fall in  i t s  ta rg e te d  lev e l). G o v e rn m en ts  a re  w o rse  o lT b e c a u se -  
th e  p o litic a l cost o f  in c re a se d  reform  o u tw e ig h  th e  b e n efits  o f  low er u n e m p lo y m e n t an d  in fla tio n . In a d d itio n , t h o
u n em p lo y m en t d e c re a s e  is sm alle r in  th e  c o m p le m e n ta r i ty  c a se  b e ca u se  re a l w ages increase .
-1’T h ese  a l te rn a t iv e  sp ec ifica tio n s p ro v id e  u s  a lso  w ith  th e  fo llow ing re s u l t :  a  reel»ction on th e  w eight a ttach e» « !
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Overall, national governments have more incentives to undertake costly reform in the context 
rather than outside a MU. because it can moderate the wage demands of lx>th the home anti 
the foreign labor union, as well as in order to counterbalance the “negative spill-over effect" of 
the reform undertaken in the foreign country. However, this "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy can 
stimulate a “race to the bottom*' regarding labor market reform30 inside the MU. Cooperation 
of the national governments in setting reform replicates the pre-MU outcome (i.e. less reform). 
On the other hand, cooperation on the part of the two labor unions will not change things, the 
solutions coincide with those under non-cooperative Nash play inside the Mil* 3'. Furthermore, 
if we consider an inter-government coalition deciding reform in each country and an inter-labor 
union coalition setting nominal wages the solutions obtained are similar to those prior to the MU. 
Therefore, the deregulation decisions taken by the national governments (and particularly the 
strategic complementarity of labor market institutions) are essential in determining the achieved 
outcome and drive the mechanics of our simple model; hence when governments internalize the 
efFoots of their actions on each others by engaging in cooperation the pre-MU outcome is achieved. 
Whereas, if this externality is still present a cooperation on the part of the labor unions, due to 
the symmetry of the problem, will lead to the same outcome as under a non-cooperative Nash 
play because the wage setting behavior of labor unions will still be influenced heavily by the way 
reform is set by the national governments
Notice though that the incentives for cooperation depend on whether wages and reform are 
strategic complements or supplements. More specifically, when wages and reform are strategic 
complements with governments being worse off ami labor unions better off. the governments can 
improve on that outcome by cooperating and achieving the superior pre-MU outcome, though
to  reform  (a low er *)) o r  a  b ig g er w eigh t on u n e m p lo y m en t (h ig h e r fi) le a d s  to  h igher level o f  re fo rm  a n d  lower 
u n em p lo y m en t in  all m o d e l sp ec ifica tio n . It a lso  le a d s  to  lower n o m in a l a n d  real w ages in  th e  eases w h e re  wages 
an d  reform  a re  s tra te g ic  c o m p le m e n ts  o n  th e  u n io n s ' w age  se ttin g  decisions. In th e  rest o f  th e  cases (m o d e ls  1 and
3) n o m in a l a n d  real w ag es increase  w ith  th e  re d u c tio n  o f ').
-il1 In te rn a tio n a l  c o o rd in a tio n  could  d e a l  w ith  th is  p ro b lem  if re g u la tio n s  a re  desirab le. O n th e  o th e r  h a n d  if  regu­
la tio n s  a re  excessive  th is  c o m p e titio n  c o u ld  b e  b e n e fic ia l, a n d  g o v e rn m e n ts ' incen tives for re fo rm  will b e  increased  
(A n d e rsen  e t a l 2000. B e r to la  a n d  B o e ri 2002 e tc ) .
3 ’G o v e rn m en ts  m in im ize  G =  5 IG 1 -t- G 2) w ith  re sp ec t to  r i a n d  V2 , a n d  p lay  N ash ag a in s t th e  u n io n s ,  while 
th e  u n io n s p lay  N ash  a g a in s t th e  in te r-g o v e rn m e n t co a litio n  a n d  a g a in s t each  o th er. L a b o u r  u n io n s  m inim ize 
L ~  ^ (L 1 -r L 2 ) w ith  re sp e c t  to  u 'la n d  U’2 . a n d  p la y  N a sh  against th e  govern  m e  n ts . w hile th e  g o v e rn m e n ts  p lay  N ash 
ag a in s t th e  in te r - la b o u r  u n io n  co a litio n  a n d  a g a in s t each  o th e r . T h e  a b o v e  s ta te d  specifi c a t ions o f th e  co a litio n s ' 
loss fu n c tio n  c a n  m atch  th e  re su lts  o b ta in e d  in  a  N a sh  b a rg a in in g  c o n te x t, b e ca u se  of th e  sy m m e try  o f  th e  tw o loss 
fu n c tio n s  u se d  re sp ec tiv e ly  in  each case , a n d  th e  fact th e y  have a  co m m o n  re fe ren ce  po in t w h ich  is th e  lo ss achieved 
u n d e r  a  non-coo]»era tive  N a sh  p lay (Z e rv o y ia n n i. 1997). T h e  m a th e m a tic a l  expressions a re  not re p o r te d  d u e  to  
sp a c e  l im ita tio n s , an d  b e c a u se  th e  s y m m e try  o f  th e  p ro b lem  (a n d  th e  n a tu r e  o f th e  com m o n  loss fu n c tio n s  used) 
m ak e  s tra ig h t fo rw ard  th e  e q u a lity  o f  t h e  p re -M U  N ash  an d  p o s t-M U  o u tc o m e  u n d e r g o v ernm en t c o o p e ra tio n , as 
well as th e  e q u a lity  o f th e  p o sl-M U  N a sh  o u tc o m e  w ith  th e  p o st-M U  o u tc o m e  u n d er unions* c o o p e ra tio n .
d m m tm m m rm m m m
in th a t  case th e  la b o r  unions will en d  u p  being worse off. W hen wages and reform  a re  s tra te ­
gic su b stitu tes , a n d  governm ents a re  b e t te r  off while unions are  worse off inside th e  M l ',  the 
governm ents have n o  incentives to  engage in  cooperation because th is  will give th em  a n  inferior 
pay-ofT, w hereas th e  lab o r unions cannot d o  anyth ing  to  im prove th e ir  pay-off. H ence, th e  gov­
ernm ents u n d er c e rta in  circum stances can im prove their pay-off by cooperating , w hile th is  is not 
possible for th e  lab o r unions because w hat drives the m echanics of th e  m odel is th e  s tra teg ic  
com plem entarity  o f reform  which is perceived as a  negative ex terna lity  by the g o v ern m en ts  when 
wages and  reform  a re  also strateg ic  com plem ents, h i th a t case it serves as positive e x te rn a lity  for 
th e  labor unions, b ecau se  it eases th e  w age-unem ploym ent trad e  off th ey  face. W hen  w ages and  
reform a ie  su b s titu te s , th e  strategic com plem entarity  of reform  in th e  two coun tries serves as a 
positive ex tern a lity  for th e  governments ( th a t  is why the d o n 't  have incentives to  co o p e ra te ) and 
a negative one for th e  labo r unions because it worsens th e ir w age-unem ploym ent t ra d ì4 ( 1  able 2 ).
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l a b i o  2
Move from:
(G.L) (G.L)
pre-MU->Nash-MU NashMU->Govts* Coop
(w-r) substitutes 
(w-r) complements
(Better off. Worse off) 
(Worse off. Better off)
(Worse off. Better off) = >  No incentive's for cooporat ion 
(Better off. Worse off) = >  3  incentives for cooperation
Asymmetric Case
T he next s tep  w ould b e  to  allow for asym m etries in th e  two coun tries '1*. It is ex p e c ted  th a t 
countries behave d ifferen tly  depending on  w hether they form  a M U w ith  coun tries th a t  a re  m ore 
o r less d is to rted  th a n  them selves. A b strac tin g  from coun try  size differences an d  choosing  to  focus 
on labor m arket d ifferentials, we assum e th a t  country 1 is m ore d is to rted  th an  co u n try  2 . T he 
labo r union is assu m ed  to  have bigger bargain ing  power in wage se ttin g  in co u n try  1 . which is 
m odeled by se ttin g  h'\ =  10ST while4 s'2 =  5'X. Furtherm ore, it is assum ed th a t re fo rm  is much 
less effective in c o u n try  1 due to public  d iscontent and  strong  opposition  by un ion  m em bers. 
T h is  is m odeled  by  se ttin g  s i =  0.1. while £% =  1 . In  add ition , th e  po litical cost o f reform  
(e.g, due to  strikes w hen unions have a s tro n g  say in th e  design of labor m arket in s titu tio n s ) 
would be h igher in  th e  country  w ith  s tro n g er labor unions (higher un ion density  an d  coverage), 
hence we assum e th a t  y j >  y 2* For sim plicity  we allow for the  sam e p a ram ete r a =  U.8 . and  
8 =  0.268. though  we will exam ine w h e th e r th e  result changes w hen we consider a low er value 
of 8 (=  0.0;l3),i:i. B ased  on what we d isc u ssa l above, when 8 =  0.268 wages an d  reform  will
3 sT h e  n u m e ric a l s o lu t io n s  a re  p re sen te d  in A p p e n d ic e s  1 .5 .1.
3 ’T h e  p a ra m e te r s  a a n d  S w ere  a ssu m e d  to  ta k e  th e  sam e  va lues, since  b o th  c o u n tr ie s  a re  m o d e le d  a s  h a v in g  a  
s im ila r  la b o u r  m ark e t s t r u c tu r e ,  i.e. a m o n o p o lis tic  la b o u r  un ion . H en ce , we d o  no t allow  fo r d ilfe ren t a, i .e . a h igh  
(r ig id )  an d  a  low (flex ib le )  la b o u r  m a rk e t, b e ca u se  th e  presence o f  la b o u r  u n io n s  a n d  s tr ic t K P L  g e n e r a te s  r ig id
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be strategic complements on trnions wage setting decisions in country 1 (distorted economy) 
while they will be strategic substitutes in country 2 (less distorted economy). When S =  0.033 
wages and reform will be strategic substitutes on unions wage setting decisions in both countries. 
Therefore the combination of parameters (when <5 = 0.268). sj = 0 .1. kj = 10%. relative to 
S2 =  1 . k-2 =  5%.. implies that the union in country 1 is more powerful in wage setting and that 
reform reduces effectively union power in the second country. On the contrary, when we assume 
<5 =  0.033 the labor union in country 1 has still more power in wage setting, though reform is 
effective in reducing union power in both countries. We allow for a case where both national 
governments averse inflation to the same degree (high or low), as well as for a case where the 
government in the more distorted economy is inflation-prone, while the government in the less 
distorted economy is inflation-averse4041.
Case with: $ =  0.268. We are going to examine twelve different cases, in the first eight 
national governments will averse inflation to the same degree, while in the last four the national 
government in the more distorted economy will be inflation-prone, whereas in the less distorted 
economy it will be inflation-averse'* 4“. Case 1 depicts a MU of a distorted and less distorted
l a b o u r  c o n tra c ts  in  b o th  econom ies; w hile  it is o n ly  lab o u r unions* b a rg a in in g  p o w er in m a in ta in in g  th e s e  r ig id  
l a b o u r  c o n tra c ts  llia t  d iffe rs  am o n g  co u n trie s . A d d itio n a lly , we w ou ld  not w a n t to  force any  resu lt by a ssu m in g  
th a t  re fo rm  g e n e ra te s  a  b ig g e r fall in u n e m p lo y m e n t in one co u n try  th a n  th e  o th e r  (d ifferen t S). For e x a m p le , 
u n em ploym en t- m igh t be  re d u c e d  m ore in  t h e  eco n o m y  w h ere  th e  la b o u r  u n io n  h a s  m o re  pow er (w hich  a lso  su ffers 
f ro m  h ig h e r  u n em p lo y m en t a s  su ggested  b y  se v e ra l e m p irica l stud ies , see  fo o tn o te  C) i f  reform  is red u cin g  e ffec tiv e ly  
l a b o u r  u n io n  b a rg a in in g  p o w er. However, i f  l a b o u r  u n io n  pow er is u n affec ted  to  a  la rg e  e x te n t, th e n  re fo rm  m igh t
n o t m a n a g e  to  re d u ce  u n em p lo y m en t m ore  th a n  in  th e  less d is to r te d  econom y.
'* °T h is  m akes u se s  o f  th e  p re su m p tio n  th a t  in f la tio n  m ight be h ig h e r  in a n  econom y w h ere  u n ions b a rg a in in g
p o w e r  in  w age s e t t in g  is g re a te r .
"*1 In all cases th e  n a tio n a l c e n tra l  b a n k s  w ill b e  e q u a lly  averse to  in fla tio n , b e c a u se  a s  we know  th ey  w ere  m ad e  
in d e p e n d e n t  by law . p a r t ic ip a te d  in th e  E M S . w h ile  th e  m em ber s ta te s  w ere  o b lig ed  to  ach ieve a  low a n d  s ta b le  
in f la t io n  ra te  a s  a  p re re q u is i te  fo r EM U  p a r t ic ip a t io n .
4“ In  m o d el sp ec if ica tio n s  1, 2 , 5 . 6 b o th  g o v e rn m e n ts  a re  in fla tion  av erse  (v a ria n t 2: see  sec tio n  2 .3 .1 ). T h e s e  c ases 
c o r re s p o n d  to  a "C o n se rv a tiv e ” (in fla tion  a v e rse  g o v e rn m e n t, low in fluence  o f  la b o u r  un ions) v e rsu s  a " C h r is t ia n  
D e m o c ra t"  reg im e (in fla tio n  av erse  and  h ig h  in f lu e n ce  o f  un ions) acco rd in g  to  S a in t-P a u l  a n d  lle n to lila  (2 0 0 1 ). In 
sp e c if ic a tio n s  3. -4, 7, 8 b o th  g o v e rn m en ts  a re  in f la t io n  p ro n e  (v a rian t 3 ). in t u r n  th e s e  cases co rre sp o n d  to  a  "N ew  
L a b o u r "  ( tr-p ro n e  governm ent- a n d  low in f lu e n ce  o f  la b o u r  un ions) v e rsu s  a  "S o c ia lis t"  regim e ( tt-p ro n e  g o v e rn m en t 
a n d  h ig h  in fluence  o f  la b o u r  u n io n s) In c a s e s  9-12 th e  governm ent in co u n try  o n e  is  in fla tio n -av erse  (v a rian t 2) a n d  
t h a t  in  c o u n try  tw o  in fla tio n  p ro n e  (v a rian t 3 ): i.e . w e  a re  co n sid erin g  a  “C o n se rv a tiv e"  versus a  “Socialist"  reg im e. 
In  m o d e ls  1-4 a n d  9-10 th e  g o v ernm en t in  c o u n try  1 a tta c h e s  th e  sa m e  w eight o n  re fo rm  a n d  u n e m p lo y m en t (case  
i; see  sec tio n  2 .3 .1 ). In  sp e c if ica tio n s  5-S a n d  11-12 c o u n try  1 a tta c h e s  m ore w eigh t t o  reform  th a n  u n em p lo y m en t 
(c a s e  ii) . In  sp ec if ica tio n s  1, 3 , 5. 7. 9 . 11 th e  g o v e rn m e n t in co u n try  2 a t ta c h e s  m o re  w eight o n  u n em p lo y m en t 
t h a n  re fo rm  (case  iii) . w h ile  in  cases 2 . 1. 6 . 8 . 10 a n d  12. it s till a tta c h e s  b ig g er w eigh t on u n em p lo y m en t b u t  c a re s  
v e ry  l i t t le  ab o u t th e  p o lit ic a l  co st o f re fo rm  (c a se  iv  w h e re  ~  0 .0 5 ), or th e  p o lit ic a l  co s ts  o f  re fo rm  a re  m in im a] 
d u e  to  w eak la b o u r  u n io n s .T h e  n u m erica l s o lu t io n s  a re  not p re sen te d  d u e  to  sp a c e  lim ita tio n s  bu t a re  a v a ilab le  
u p o n  req u est.
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econom y w ith  governm ents in bo th  countries being  equally averse to  inflation. T h e  fo rm ation  of 
th e  Ml* loads to  g rea te r reform in b o th  coun tries as in th e  sym m etric  case4*1. However, nom inal 
wages fall in coun try  1 (as area-wide nom inal wages) anti increase in country 2 . w hich is exactly 
th e  opposite  of w hat we experienced in th e  sym m etric case. N otice, though th a t in fla tion  lias 
decreased  for coun try  1 while for co u n try  2 its  m uch higher th an  before, m oreover it is low er than  
th e  average inflation in  the  two countries because  area-w ide nom inal wages fall w hile a re  a-wide 
reform  increases. T h is  implies th a t real wages in th e  "d istorted" co u n try  increase slightly, desp ite  
th e  m od era tio n  of nom inal wage dem ands, w hile in the less d is to r te d  economy real wages fall (as 
a rea  wide real wages) desp ite  the increase in  th e  nom inal wages. U nem ploym ent decreases in b o th  
countries, in p a r tic u la r  in th e  more d is to r te d  econom y th e  h igher level of reform  coun terbalances 
th e  small increase in real wages.
T he com m on OB is b e tte r  off com pared  to  th e  average ou tcom e a tta in ed  by  th e  tw o  n a tional 
C Bs before the  MU. T h e  labor un ion  in co u n try  1 is b e t te r  o if because wages a n d  reform  
are com plem ents, hence real wages rise while ac tu a l unem ploym ent falls m ore th an  its  ta rg e t« !  
level. On th e  o th er h an d , the labo r union in country  2 is worse off because wages a n d  reform  
arc perceived as su b stitu tes; bo th  real wages an d  unem ploym ent ra te , but so does its  ta rg e t« !  
level, m o d era tin g  th e  beneficial effect of th e  decline in unem ploym ent. T ilings have changed  
w ith  respect to  th e  governm ents' payoffs co m p ared  to th e  sym m etric: case. T h e  government, in 
th e  more d is to rted  econom y becom es b e t te r  off inside th e  MU, since it is affron ted  w ith  lower 
unem ploym ent and  inflation despite th e  h ig h e r political cost of reform . On th e  o th e r h an d , th e  
governm ent in  coun try  2 is worse off inside th e  M U. because th e  losses incurred due to  th e  h igher 
inflation an d  the increased political cost of re fo rm  outw eigh the  benefits  of a lower unem ploym ent 
ra te 45.
C a s e  w i th  S =  0.033 W e now tu rn  to  ex am in e  what h ap p en s if S ~  0.033 i.e. if reform  is not 
reducing unem ploym ent as much as IM F a n d  O E C B  advocate. In  th a t case wages a n d  reform  
are  s tra teg ic  su b s titu te s  on labor un ions wage se tting  decisions in b o th  countries. T h e  resu lts *4
4 ‘A s a co n se q u en c e  o f  th e  a ssu m p tio n s  em p lo y e d , re fo rm , n om inal a n d  re a l w ages. u n e m p lo y m en t a n d  in fla tio n  
a re  h ig h e r  in  c o u n try  1. T h ere fo re  th e  la b o u r  u n io n  in  c o u n try  1 ach iev es a  b e t t e r  o u tco m e  th a n  th a t  in  c o u n try  
2 . w h ile  th e  o p p o s ite  is th e  ca se  w ith  re sp ee t to  t h e i r  n a tio n a l  g o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  c e n tra l  b an k s .
44T h c  r e s u l ts  d e sc rib e d  ab o v e  are s im ila r  in all m o d e l sp e c if ica tio n s  c o n s id e re d , excep t in c a se  fi w h e re  national
g o v e rn m e n ts  a t ta c h  th e  s a m e  weight o n  in fla tio n  b u t  th e  governm en t in  c o u n try  2 ca re s  m uch less for th e  p o lit ic a l  
c o s ts  o f  re fo rm  (o r c a re s  m ore  about u n e m p lo y m e n t) . In  th at c ase  re fo rm  fa lls  inside th e  M U fo r th e  m o re  
d is to r te d  c o u n tr y  ( ih o u g h . a rea -w ide  re fo rm  still in c re a se s  becau se  o f  c o u n try  2 ). M oreover, real w a g es  d e c re a se s  
s lig h tly  b e c a u se  th e  n o m in a l  w age increase* d o es  n o t c o m p e n sa te  for th e  in fla tio n  decline  in th e  M l*. A s a  re su lt ,  
u n e m p lo y m en t in c re a se s  m arg in a lly  in s id e  th e  M l* fo r c o u n try  1. T h e  c o m b in e d  effect o f h ig h e r  u n e m p lo y m e n t 
( th a t  o u tw e ig h s  th e  in c re a s e  in i') and  low er real w a g es  ra ises  th e  lo sses (o r d e c re a se s  th e  b e n e fits )  in c u r re d  by th e  
h o m e  la b o u r  u n io n  in s id e  th e  m o n eta ry  u n io n , m a k in g  it  w orse off.
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are as follows: Reform increases inside the MIT in all cases. Nominal wage demands in country 
1 decrease. Though, in country 2 nominal wages are raised, because the response of the labor 
union to the nominal wage set in the other country outweigh the moderating effect induced by 
higher reform in both countries. On average reform increases and nominal wages fall reducing 
area-wide inflation relative to the average of the two countries before the MlT. Real wages decline 
in both countries, in country 1 the fall in nominal wages is bigger than the fall in inflation, while 
in country 2 the increase in nominal wages is smaller than the increase in prices. Unemployment 
falls in both countries since real wages fall and reform is raised. The common CB enjoys smaller 
losses than the average losses of the two national CBs before the formation of the MU. Both 
labor unions will enjoy lower benefits inside the MU as expected in case of substitutability of 
wages and reform on labor unions wage setting decisions (for the same reason described in the 
previous section). Furthermore, the government in the distorted economy will be benefited from 
the formation of the MU since it will face lower unemployment and inflation, despite the increase 
in the political cost due to higher reform effort. Finally, the government in the second country 
will be worse off for the reasons discussed in the previous section4,1.
Cooperation of Governments
Case with 6 = 0.268 Under all model specifications reform in the less distorted economy 
decreases below the pro-MU levels after a cooperation of two governments (keep in mind that the 
formation of tlic MU had a positive effect on reform). In the more distorted economy (country 
1 ) reform falls short of its levels under the non-cooperative Nash play inside the MU (or all 
Nash play), but is still higher relative to its pre-MU levels. Therefore, the cooperation among 
the two governments by taking account of the negative spill over effects leads, in most cases, to 
moderation of reform decisions in country 14<\  Nevertheless, the more distorted economy still 
ends up with more reform inside the MU. while the less distorted one. that does not "need" 
much reform, ends up at a lower level compart'd to the pre-MU outcome. In most cases area-wide
4S,Ilow ever. in  sp ec if ica tio n s  4 an d  8 w h e re  b o th  g o v e rn m en ts  a re  in f la t io n -p ro n e , th e  governm en t in t h e  seco n d  
c o u n tr y  th a t  cares  very l i t t le  a b o u t th e  p o litic a l cost o f  reform , w h ile  a t ta c h e s  a  b ig  weight on  u n e m p lo y m e n t.
m a n a g e s  to  benefit from th e  fo rm atio n  o f  th e  M U , by  facing  sm alle r losses.
4CH ow ever, in sp ec ifica tio n  2 w here b o th  governm en t a re  equally  averse  to  in fla tio n  (an d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t in
c o u n tr y  1 a tta c h e s  the sa m e  w eight on re fo rm  a n d  u n em p lo y m en t, w h ile  th e  gov ern m en t in c o u n try  2 c a re s  very  
l i t t l e  ab o u t re fo rm ), c o o p e ra tio n  am ong th e  g o v ern m en ts  ra ises th e  a m o u n t o f  re fo rm  in c o u n try  1.
In  sp ec ifica tion  G. w h ere  b o th  g o v e rn m en ts  a re  eq u ally  averse to  in f la tio n  ( a n d  th e  governm en t in c o u n try  1 
a t t a c h e s  bigger w eight on  re fo rm  th a n  em p lo y m en t u n em p lo y m en t, w h ile  th e  go v ern m en t in c o u n try  2 c a re s  very  
l i t t l e  a b o u t re fo rm ), r j in c re ases  w ith  re sp ec t to  th e  case  w h ere  all p lay e rs  w e re  in v o lv ed  in a  n o n -c o o p e ra tiv e  N ash  
p la y  in sid e  th e  M U . w h ereas it is s till low er c o m p ared  to  th e  pre-M U  case. In  c a se  12 th e  c o o p e ra tiv e  o u tc o m e  for 
V\ is  th e  sam e as th e  n o n -c o o p e ra tiv e  N ash  p lay  in s id e  th e  MU.
mmmsm
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reform and r-i a re  lower com pared  to  their all-N ash  play levels, as well as. their p rc -M F  levels4'.
Next we tu rn  to  exam ine  th e  im p lica tions regarding' th e  payoffs gained by th e  different agents 
an d  how they com pare w ith  the non-coopera tive  N ash play outcom es. A more de ta iled  discussion 
of the im plications w ith  respect to  nom inal an d  real wages, unem ploym ent an d  inflation can 
be found in th e  A ppend ix  1.5.1. F irst o f  all, th e  com m on c e n tra l bank  will find itse lf in a 
worse position in case o f cooperation  by th e  two governm ents, because  infiat ion will be  h igher 
com pared to  th e  non-cooperative N ash  p lay  inside th e  M l1, as a  consequence of an  average reform  
decline and an  average wage increase. T h is  effect is s tren g th en e d  by the increase in area-w ide 
unem ploym ent (because th e  real wage increases an d  reform  declines), though it holds oven when 
area-wide unem ploym ent is a t a lower level.
The labor union in  coun try  2. th e  loss d is to r te d  economy, will b e  b e tte r off after th e  eooj>- 
eration of th e  tw o governm ents: a lth o u g h  unem ploym ent increases, real wage's a n d  th e  ta rg e te d  
level of unem ploym ent increase» as well, i.e. lower reform  transla te 's  into g reater un ion pow er 
m aking m ore favorable th e  w age-unem ploym ent trad e  ofF faced by labor unions (w hen wage's 
and reform are tre a te d  as su b s titu te s  on u n io n s’ wage se ttin g  decisions). W hen considering th e  
labor union in coun try  1 we see1 th a t  in m o st cases the outcom e' is worse com pared to  th e  non- 
cooperative Nash p la y 5A A sm aller am oun t of reform  u n d er governm ents’ cooperation  w orsens 
the w age-unem ploym ent tra d e  off w hen  w ages an d  reform  are  com plem ents.
The governm ent is co u n try  2 (w here w ages and  reform  are substitu te 's, an d  reform  reduces 
effectively un ion  pow er) is clearly worse» ofF in  case of cooperation , its  payofrdeterio rates co m p ared  
to  the one o b ta in ed  u n d e r non-eoopera tive  Nash play. T h e  benefits  from a lower reform  level 
in term s of less public: tension a n d  strike's a re  outw eighed by the' losses a ttr ib u te d  to  h ig h er 
unem ploym ent an d  inflation. F u rth erm o re , in  th e  first p lace reform  was not perceived as in d u cin g  
a givat political cost in co u n try  2. T h ere fo re , th e  benefits from  reducing  it arc bo u n d  to  be  sm all, 
while a t the  sam e tim e  th is  generates an  ad v e rse  effect because  reform  was effectively d im in ish in g  
union power in wage se ttin g  due to  th e  su b s titu ta b ility  o f wages a n d  reform. A bsent th is  facto r, 
the  labor unions will ra ise  th e ir nom inal w age dem ands.
In most o f th e  cases considered, a co o p era tio n  o f th e  tw o governm ents generates ad d itio n a l 
losses to  th e  governm ent o f the co u n try  w ith  th e  m ost d is to r te d  la b o r m arket w ith  respect to  its  
non-cooperative N ash  p lay  payoff, th is  is d u e  to  higher inflation , because reform decreases w hile 
unem ploym ent can  b e  lower o r h ig h er th a n  b efo re .4"1 Hence, in these» c ases there are no incentives
4 l T h o u g h . jn sp e c if ic a tio n  refo rm  is  e q u a l  to  t h e  p re -M F  level a m i lo w er th a n  th e  case o f  an a ll N ash  p lav . 
N evertheless , in sp e c if ic a t io n s  1. .*{ an d  G a re a -w id e  refo rm  in  c ase  o f  c o o p e ra tio n  am ong th e  tw o g o v e rn m e n ts  is 
low er th a n  th e  c ase  o f  a n  a ll N ash  play, b u t  h ig h er t h a n  th e  p re -M F  level
4S1 hough , in  sp e c if ic a t io n s  2 a n d  G th e  p a y o tr  in  c a s e  o f  c o o p e ra tiv e  p lay  is  b e t te r  th an  u n d e r  a n o n -c o o p e ra tiv e  
o ne . w hile  in sp e c if ic a tio n  12 th e y  co in c id e .
4JS p ec ifica tio n s 1-2. 5 -0 . S-12.
[¡»isI!! iT.’
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for the government in country 1 to engage in a cooperative Nash play in a monetary union, or 
alternatively if already involved in coalition with the other government it will definitely break 
it to achieve the non-cooperative Nash outcome. It is noteworthy that in some of the model 
specifications that we have examined, the cooperative outcome is the first best solution for the 
government in country 1. where the labor unions have greater bargaining power. These are cases 
3-1 and 7; where both governments are equally inflation-prone. Nevertheless, cooperation is not 
going to be realized because it is not a preferable outcome for the government in country 2. If we 
impose it exogenously (as the MU membership), then there are some cases where the government 
that has to deal with the most powerful labor union could improve its pay-ofT by cooj>eratin£ 
with the foreign government. This could be accomplished by making the foreign government bear 
some of the losses that the home government incurs from its “fight" against the powerful home 
labor union. Nevertheless, if we assume that some or all of the governments of the EMU countries 
are inflation-averse (maybe not of the same degree, but this is modeled in cases 9-12 where we 
consider an inflation-averse and an inflation prone government), then it appears that the national 
governments will have no incentives to cooperate in deciding labor market institutions, instead 
they will prefer a non-cooperative Nash play that will deliver them a higher pay off inside the 
MU.
Case with 6 — 0.033 In this case reform is effective in reducing labor unions* bargaining power, 
because it worsens the wage-unemployment trade off faced by both labor unions. Under most 
specifications the pattern of reform is similar to that when S = 0.268 (where reform reduces 
effectively union power only in the second country), i.e. reform in country 1 falls in case of 
cooperation relative to the non-cooperative case (while it is above the pre-MIT levels in most 
cases)'-'0 In the second country reform efforts are also moderated after the coojjeration of the two 
governments/ ' 1 Furthermore, the average reform that affects the area-wide MU is reduced by so 
much that it reaches at each minimum level under cooperation52.
The common central bank and the government of the less distorted economy are made worse 
off, while the labor union in country 2  is always better off when governments cooperate compared 
to the non-cooperative case, for the same reason discussed in the previous section53. *1
00 E x c lu d in g  sp e c if ica tio n s  2. 5 . a n d  G.
&1T1ip new  reform  level a c h ie v e d  is a lso  low er w ith  re sp e c t to  i ts  p re-M l*  lev e l: how ever, ill sp ec ifica tio n s 2 , 5 an d  
fi it is ab o v e  th a t level.
J~ In  sp ec ifica tio n s 2. 5 a n d  G average re fo rm  in c a se  o f  co o p era tio n  is  ab o v e  t he  pre-M l*  o u tco m e , so  c o o p e ra tio n  
a v o id s  a race  to  th e  b o tto m  d e reg u la tio n  b u t still e n h a n c e s  reform  e ffo rts. T h o u g h , in  th is  case re fo rm  in c o u n try  1 
is a t i ts  lowest p o in t,  w h ich  is  c o n tra ry  to  th e  fact th a t  it has th e  m ost d is to r te d  econom y an d  “needs" th e  biggest 
a m o u n t o f  reform .
A m o re  d e ta ile d  d isc u ss io n  an d  c o m p a riso n  o f  t h e  n o m in a l a n d  re a l w ages, a s  well as th e  u n e m p lo y m en t a n d  
in f la t io n  values w ith  a n d  w i th o u t  g o v e rn m e n ts ' c o o p e ra tio n  can  b e  fo u n d  in  th e  A p p e n d ix  A .4.3.2.
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In most model-specifications the labor union in country 1 is better off when the two govern­
ments coordinate their reform decisions compared to the non-cooperative Nash play inside the 
MU'“5. Like in country 2  the increase in unemployment is outweighed by the increase in real wages 
and the targeted level of unemployment. Whereas, when both real wages and unemployment de­
crease (specifications 5. 9 and 11), the decrease in unemployment is bigger increasing tlie benefits 
enjoyed by the labor union. -
The government in country 1. (in most cases) is worse off under the cooperative outcome 
relative to the non-cooperative post-MU case. The benefits from a lower reform effort (smaller 
political cost) fall short of the losses generated by the increase in unemployment and inflation" 
(which are the result of more aggressive wage setting on the part of labor unions driven by the 
reform reduction). Nevertheless, in certain model specification (5 and 9) the cooperative outcome 
turns out to be the best one in terms of pay-off for the government in country 1 . This happens 
because unemployment is reduced (which occurs because real wages are reduced more' than the 
fall in the reform level), so that the benefits from lower unemployment and reform more1 than 
compensate for the losses generated by the increase in inflation.
Therefore, the government in country 1 in most cases will not opt for cooperation, though 
under certain parameter values it is possible to gain out of a cooperation. However, a cooperative 
outcome is difficult to realize since it does not emerge endogenously from the model. Although 
"race-to-the-bottom" deregulation might be a side-effect of the non-cooperative Nash play inside 
the MU. it cannot be dealt with cooperation; because reform is beneficial sine* it reduces effec­
tively labor unions* bargaining power on wage setting. Hence a reduction in reform will bring 
about a more aggressive wage setting on the part of the unions (which are made better off in the 
cooperative relative to the non-cooperative case) that aggravates the unemployment and inflation 
problems.
Overall, under most specification, and for both values of S, a cooperative outcome among 
the two governments is not feasible, since both of them incur greater losses (Tables 3 and 4). 
Hence, the race-to tlie-bottom is not avoided because it is consider beneficial, in some specific 
erases the government in country 1 is better off under cooperation, however, the government in 
country 2 is worse off. thus cooperation cannot be achieved endogenously. If in these specific 
cases cooperation was imposed exogenously (as was the case for MU membership), the "race- 
to-tlio-bottonf deregulation would be avoided, but this would not be a beneficial outcome for 
both governments. The cooperative outcome could be sustained in the specific cases that the 
government in country 1 is better off. if it makes a transfer to the government in country 2
1,14O nly in  c a se  10 ih e  c o o p e ra liv e  o u tc o m e  is w o rse  th a n  th e  n o n -c o o p e ra tiv e  case.
^JIn sp e c if ic a tio n  11, th e  g overnm en t is s till  w o rse  off u n d e r  t h e  c o o p e ra tiv e  o u tco m e  c o m p a re d  to  th e  n o n -  
c o o p era tiv e  p o s t-M U  c a se . B ecause, a lth o u g h  u n e m p lo y m en t a n d  reform  d e c re a se , lead in g  to  s m a lle r  losses, t h e  
inflation  r ise  is su ffic ien t to  w orsen  th e  c o o p e ra tiv e  o u tc o m e  re la tiv e  to  th e  a ll-X ash  play.
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whose position worsen after cooperation. In practice this strategy is not feasible because the 
extra benefits gained by the government in country 1 fall behind the extra losses incurred by the
government in country 2 .
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Table 3
Move from:
(Li.L2) (L1 .L2)
pre-MU->Nash-MU NashM U-> Govts’ Coop
6 =  0.268 5 =  0.033 S =  0.268 6 =  0.033
(w-r) substitutes 
(w-r) complements
L2 worse off 
Lj better off
(Lj ,L2) worse off L2 better off 
L* worse off
(LJ.L2) better off
t worse off in case 6 .'better off in cases 2 and 6 , indifferent in 1 2 . fworse off in case 1 0 .
Table 4
Move from:
(G1 .G2) (G1 .G2 )
pre-M t T- > Nash-M U NashMU->Govts* Coop
<5 =  0.268 S =  0.033 6 =  0.268 S =  0.033
(w-r) substitutes 
(w-r) complements
G2 worse off 
G1 bet t er off
G j : better off Gy: worse off G2 worse off 
G 1 worse ofF
G j: worse off1 G2: worse off
•better of in 3, 4. and 7, + better off in 5 and 9.
Cooperation of labor unions
Although labor unions’ coordination in wage setting is far from being a wide-spread phenomenon 
in Europe, it is interesting to examine what the model predicts in such a case. Two issues are 
raised in this section. First, whether the labor unions can gain a higher pay-off by cooperating 
relative to participating in a non-cooperative Nash play inside the MU (and how reform behaves 
in that case). Second, whether the governments have an incentive to cooperate in deciding 
reform when labor unions are cooperating already in setting nominal wages. Notice, that when 
an inter-labor union coalition plays Nash against an inter-government coalition, the achieved 
outcome coincides with the one under cooperative play on the part of the governments and non- 
cooperative play on the part of the labor unions. Therefore, labor unions' cooperation cannot 
alter the solution outcome (like in the symmetric case), because, what drives the mechanics of the 
model is the strategic complementarity of labor market institutions and the externality it imposes 
to the governments and the labor unions. If this externality is eliminated by a cooperative action 
on the part of national governments then the strategy of labor unions (whether they cooperate 
or not) is irrelevant.
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C a s e  w i th  6 =  0.268 In  most cases co n s id em ! reform  in co u n try  1 rem ains a t th e  sam e level 
as under a non-coopera tive  Nash play inside th e  M C ;,I\  M oreover, in case of an in te r-lab o r union 
coalition ?’i is above th e  levels ob tained  when governm ents a re  also en g ag in g  in cooperation '"  . The 
am ount of reform  in th e  second coun try  is alw ays bigger rela tive to  th a t  under inter-governm ent 
cooperation; while, in m ost cases, it coincides w ith  its levels u n d e r  an  all-Nash play;,v. As a 
results the am ount of area-w ide reform  u n d er u n ions ' cooperation  is alw ays bigger re la tive  to  the 
one when th e  two governm ents set reform  in  a cooperative m an n er, because in th e  la t te r  case 
they in ternalize the  ex te rn a lity  they im pose on  each o t h e r s
Given th a t labor un ions cooperate, a m ove to  a cooperative p lay  on the p art of governm ents 
worsens the position  of th e  com m on cen tra l b a n k , because inflation  a n d  unem ploym ent arc' higher 
due to  the lower reform  level00. However, th e  com m on central bank  is also  m ade worse off if unions 
diverge from an  non-cooperative play an d  dec ide coord ina te  th e ir w age setting. N evertheless, this 
does not app ly  to  all cases, thus in specifications 5 an d  (i it a t ta in s  th e  sam e losses, w hereas it is
b e tte r  ofi in specifications 2, -1. 0 a n d  7.
T he labo r union in co u n try  1 finds itself b e t te r  off when it co o p e ra te s  w ith th e  foreign labor 
union relative to  a case w here governm ents co o rd in a te  th e ir reform  decisions (real wages increase 
in all cases, except in specifications 1. th o u g h  in  th a t case th e  fall in  unem ploym ent outw eigh the 
decrease in real w ages)* 01; th is  is exp lained  by th e  fact th a t g o v ern m en ts’ cooperation  lowers reform  
and  the com plem entarity  effect leads to  lower wages; a lternative ly , th e  w age-unem ploym ent trad e  
oil worsens so the  un io n s have to  m o d e ra te  th e ir  nom inal wage d em an d s . M oreover, th e  labo r 
union enjoys the  sam e benefits, w ith  o r w ith o u t co o p era tin g  (a ll-N ash  play), because real wages 
art1 raised by the  sam e am ount th a t unem ploym en t increases0“.
1 he lab o r union in co u n try  2. c o n tra ry  to  th a t  in co u n try  1 is always worse off co m p ared  
to  the payoff it o b ta in s  w hen the  tw o governm en ts coo p era te  (unem ploym ent falls b u t s o  docs 
its ta rg e ted  level, therefo re  th e  decline' in th e  dev iation  betw een  th ese  two is not suffic ient to
’L x cep t in  sp e c if ica tio n s  1. 2, G, 7, 8 w h e re  it in c re a s e s  ab o v e  its  a ll-N a sh  p la y  levels.
H ow ever, in sp e c if ic a tio n s  2 anrl 6 re fo rm  is b e lo w , a n d  in sp ec ifica tio n  12 it co in c id es  w ith  i ts  in te r-g o v e rn m e n t 
co o p e ra tio n  levels.
In sp e c if ica tio n  2, 4 a n d  8 th e  o u tco m e  is s u p e r io r  to  th e  a ll-N ash  p lay , w h e r e a s  in sp ec ifica tio n  3 it is in fe rio r . 
In m ost c ases  averag e  re fo rm  in  th e  M P  e q u a ls  i t s  leve l u n d e r  a n  a ll-N ash  p la y , w hile  in sp e c if ica tio n s  1. 2. G-S 
it is above, a n d  in  sp e c if ic a tio n s  3 an d  9 it is b e lo w  i t s  a ll-N ash  p lay  levels.
A d e ta ile d  d iscu ss io n  on  how  w ages, u n e m p lo y m e n t a n d  in fla tio n  u n d e r  u n io n s ' c o o p e ra tio n  c o m p a re  to  th e i r
levels u n d e r a n  a ll-N ash  p la y  a n d  au  in te r-g o v e rn m e n t c o a litio n  is p re se n te d  in  t h e  A p p en d ix  1.5.1.
In  sp e c if ic a tio n s  2 a n d  6  th e  la b o u r  u n io n  is w o rse  off, w h ile  in sp e c if ic a tio n  12 it o b ta in s  th e  sam e  pav-off,
1 h o u g h , in sp e c if ic a tio n s  1. 2, 6 . i .  a n d  8 th e  u u io n  is s lig h tly  b e t t e r  off. B e c a u se , th e  in crease  in re a l w ages i 
acco m p an ied  by  a re d u c tio n  in th e  d e v ia tio n  o f  u » e m p lo y » m e rit  from  i t s  t a r g e te d  level (case  7. w h e re  u n en ip to y m e i 
tails) o r  a  sm a lle r  in c re a s e  o r  th e  d e v ia tio n  o f u n e m p lo y n m e t from  i t s  ta r g e te d  leve l (case  1, w h ere  u n e m p lo y m e i 
increases). Jn c ases  2. G a n d  8 real w ages d o  not c h a n g e , th o u g h  th e  d e v ia t io n  o f  u n em p lo y m en t from  i ts  ta rg e te  
k v c l decieas<‘> ( th e  u n e m p lo y m e n t d e c re a se s  in c a s e s  2 a n d  (i an d  in c re a se s  in  c a s e  S. th o u g h  by  a sm a lle r  amoui 
th a n  th e  d e c re a se  o f  i ts  t a r g e te d  level).
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compensate for the fall in real wages). The explanation is that refonn is lower when governments 
play cooperatively which implies that wages should be higher due to the substitutability effect, 
i.e. the wage-unemployment trade off becomes more favorable for the labor union. Its pay-off 
under an all-Nash play is equal to the one obtained when the two labor unions cooperate^4.
The pay-off obtained by the government in the first country is higher in most cases when unions 
cooperate relative to a case where governments also cooperate among themselves; '^ which is due 
to the fact that inflation is lower when unions cooperate, wliile in most cases unemployment and 
reform are higher. Although, higher reform implies bigger political cost, it is beneficial because 
it forces labor unions to moderate their nominal wage demands. However, in specifications 3, i, 
7, 8 , where both governments are inflation-prone, the government in country 1 becomes worse 
off. Moreover, in most cases, it finds itself in a worse position compared to the non-cooperative 
play (because both unemployment and refonn are at a higher level)6-*. Though, it is better off 
in specification 2, since unemployment falls more than the increase in refonn (inflation docs not 
changes). - - i:
The government in country 2 is better off when the two labor unions cooperate in setting 
nominal wages compared to the outcome achieved in case of inter-government coalition. The 
explanation is that inflation and unemployment are lower, because of the decline in real and 
nominal wages and the increase in reform. Notice that the losses incurred by the higher reform 
level are not so important, since the government in country 2 is always attaching bigger weight 
to unemployment than reform, which is an implication of our assumption that the labor union 
has less power than in country 1 in affecting labor market institutions. Comparing the all-Nash 
play and the unions' cooperation outcomes we do not obtain uniform results across the different 
cast's^*. -
As we saw before there are cases where the two unions gain higher payoffs when cooperating.
specifications .lj. 6, 7, 9-12. In particular, in cases 5. 7. 9-10 the increase in real wages erjuals the increase in 
tlie deviation of unemployment from its targeted level. In cases 11-12 real wages fall by the same amount as the 
deviation of unemployment, from its targeted level. Finally, in specification 6. unemployment and real wages are at 
the same level as under the all-Nash play.
M Not ice that in specification 3 the pay-off is slightly improved because the increase in real wages out-weiglit the 
increase in the deviation of unemployment rate from its targeted value (both «2 «ltd t ’2 increase). However, in 
specifications 2. 4 and 8 the outcome is worse when the two unions cooperate, because the fall in real wages more 
than compensates the change in the deviation of line m ploy men t from its targeted level, i.e. unemployment is lower
but 1 ' is also lower (since reform has a bigger value under unions' cooperations).
00This holds for specifications 1. 2, 5. 6. 9-12.
'‘In specifications 3. 4. and S the government in country 1 enjoys the same payoff as in the non-cooperative Nash 
play.
'"In model specifications 1. 2, 4, 10. II the government in country 1 is better ofi when the two labour unions 
cooperate, it is indifferent in case 8. In all other model specifications (3. 5. 7. 8. 9. 12) the government is made 
worse off if the two labour unions decide to cooperate in wage setting.
tilil L iiiliiiiilh ii ^  Viji if |{ ^ ^  iLl « *-• ■»*
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tlioii l^i the extra benefits are small. In particular, the labor union in country 1 lias incentives to 
cooperate with the union in country 2 . because it will enjoy a slightly higher pay-off in specifi­
cations 1, 2. G. 7. and 8; however, the labor union in country 2 is indifferent about cooperating 
in cases 1 . 3. 6 and 7 because it enjoys the same pay-ofT with and without cooperation, while in 
cases 2 and 8 it will be worse off if it cooperates. Whereas, it is made better ofi if cooperating 
in specification 3, while in that case the labor union in country 1 is indifferent about engaging in 
cooperation. Therefore, the cooperative outcome is feasible because the labor union in country 1 
can make a transfer to the labor union in the second country in specifications 1, G. and 7. while 
the opposite would be the case in specification 3f,fi.
The next step is to see whether the governments have incentives or not to form a coalition 
when the unions are already coordinating their wage decisions. The government in country 
1 obtains a higher pay-ofi under governments' cooperation than under unions' cooperat ion in 
model specifications 3. 4. 7 and 8. However, a cooperation of the two labor unions can be realized 
only in specifications 1 . 3, 0 and 7. thus cases 1 and 8 are not considered, while in specifications 1 
and G where a cooperation between the two unions is possible the government in country 1 is also 
in a better position and has no incentive to cooperate with the foreign government. Therefore 
in specilication 3 and 7, the government in country 1 could improve its pav-ofT if the second 
government- agrees to cooperate in deciding labor market institutions. Nevertheless, as we saw. 
the government in country 2 is always better off when unions cooperate among each other and 
has no incentive to form a coalition with the other government, because it enjoys lower inflation 
and unemployment, while reform is higher. However, cooperation could still be1 feasible' if the 
government in country 1 was gaining so much it terms of extra pay-off that it could cover the 
extra losses of the government in country 2 by means of a transfer: though, this is not the* c ase.
Case with 6 = 0.033 As was the case1 in the previous section (where reform was more effective 
in reducing union power in country 2 ). reform is higher in both countries in case of cooperation 
among the two unions compared to a situation where governments cooperate as well, because in 
the latter case the two governments internalize the negative effects of their actions, so beggar-thy- 
neighbor policies are absent. Moreover. r\ in most case's coincides to its all-Nash play valuef In
' s 1 lieretoro, in all model specifications, except 1. 3, G. 7. reform will be determined in a game where governments 
ami unions play Nash against each other. In specifications 1, 3. G amt 7 the labour unions can form a coalition. 
Hence, n  will be above its value under the all-Nash play in cases 1. G. and 7. whereas in case' 3 its value will not 
change, r? will be equal to its all-Nash play value in specifications 1. G. and 7 and below that in specification 3. 
Area-wide reform will be higher than its all-Nash play levels in models 1. 0. and 7 and below them in specification 
•’». In all cases reform will be above its pre-Ml levels (except in case 6 for i'i).
Iliis holds in specifications 1. 3. 4, 5-7. Though, in cases 2. 9. 10 it is above, while in cases 8. 11. 12 it is below 
the all-Nash levels.
MUimi. mmmmm
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country 2 reform is lower or equal to its non-cooperative Nash play levels'0,1.
The common central bank is better off when unions cooperate relative to the case of an inter- 
government and an inter-union coalition, because both inflation and unemployment are lower. 
Comparing its pay-off under union cooperation with that under non-cooperative Nash play, we 
see that under most specifications it will be worse off in the former case. ’ 2 since the average 
area-wide unemployment is higher.
Both labor unions enjoy a lower pay-off if they cooperate with respect to the case of a co­
ordinated decision on reform by the two governments (for the reasons already explained when
=  0.268).|J Moreover the labor union in country 1 is indifferent between cooperating with the 
foreign union and taking part in an non-cooperative Nash play; except in cases 8, 11 and 12 where 
it will be bettor off if it engages in cooperation. Similarly, in certain cases, the labor union in 
country 2 will enjoy a higher pay-ofT when cooperating relative to participating iri an all-Nasli 
play (Table 5)74.
As in the previous section the two governments will find themselves bettor ofT when unions' 
cooperate relative to a case where an inter-union coalition plays Nash against an inter-government 
coalition, because both the unemployment rate and inflation are lower due to wage moderation 
on the part of the unions since reform is higher (substitutability effect). In country 1 despite 
the fact that the higher reform level under unions' cooperation imposes greater losses on the 
government, it induces also wage moderation on the unions. Though, in model-specifications 5 
and 9 the government in country 1 is better ofT if it decides to cooperate with the other government. 
Moreover, in the first country the outcome under unions' cooperation is in most cases similar or 
worse than the one achieved in a non-cooperative Nash play."' The government of the second 
country is in most cases worse ofF when the unions engage in a cooperative game compared to the 
non-cooperative Nash play by all agents (Table 6 ) ,r'. The way unemployment compares in case of
70In mode) specifications 2, 3. 6, 7. 10. 11 it is below, while in models 1. 4, 5. 9, 12 it coincides with the all-Nash
play levels. It is above its all-Nash play value only in specification 8.
■1 A detailed discussion on how wages, unemployment and inflation under unions*  cooperation compare to their
levels under an all-Nash play and An inter-government coalition is presented in the Appendix A. 1.1.2.
•2T he pay-olf obtained is the same in both cases in specification 5, while the central bank is better off if unions
cooperate in specifications 4 and 8.
13 However in specification 9. the labour union in country 1 is better off if it cooperates with the union in country
2.
4The labour union is better off under cooperation compared to all-Nash play in specifications 2, 3. 6. 7, 10. 12, 
it enjoys the same pay-off in both cases in specifications 1. 5. 9. 11. whereas it is worse off under cooperative play 
in specification 4 and 8.
* JIn specifications 1, 2. 7. 9. 10. 11 the pay-off when unions cooperate is worse, while in specifications 3. 5, G. 12 
the two payoffs coincide. In specifications 4. 8. the pay-off achieved when the two labour unions cooperate is above 
the one under the all-Nash play.
^However, there are three exceptions. The government in country 2 is made better off after unions' cooperation 
compared to the all Nash play in specifications 4 and 8. In specification 5. the pay off obtained by the government
L i fWHiv* f* nrm*TT!
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unions“ cooperation with its level under non-cooperativo Nash play, determines the governments' 
payoffs in these two cases.
Overall, the labor union in country 1 is marginally better off if it engages in cooperation with 
the foreign labor union rather than by taking part in a non-cooperative Nash play in specifications
8. 11 , 12. The labor union in country 2 is willing to form a coalition with the other labor union in 
specifications 2. 3. G. 7. 10. and 12. Hence, in model specification 12 both labor unions gain extra 
benefits by abandoning the non-cooperative Nash play and setting wages in a cooperative manner, 
thus cooperation will be realized. In specifications. 2. 3. 0. and 7 the labor union in country 1 
is indifferent about cooperating or playing Nash, which implies that the etxiporativo outcome is 
feasible if the labor union in country 2 makes a transfer to the union in country 1. Similarly, in 
case 11 the union in the second country is indifferent about cooperating, thus the cooperative 
outcome is feasible in case the labor union in country 1 makes a transfer. In specification 8. the 
labor union in country 2 is worse off and its extra, loss outweighs the extra benefit of the labor 
union in country 1. hence cooperation is not attainable. However, cooperation is possible in case 
Iff where the labor union in country 1 is worse off“but its extra losses lag behind the extra benefits 
that accrue to the union in country 2.’ '
Notice that when unions' cooperation is feasible (in specifications 2. 3. G. 7. 10, 11 and 12). 
the two governments have no incentives to coordinate their reform decisions because they will 
incur higher losses. This happens because under unions' coordination nominal wage demands are 
moderated as a result of the substitutability effect between wages and reform, which is stronger 
because reform is higher when governments play Nash against each other. The government in 
country 1 could improve its position in specifications 5 and i) by cooperating with the other 
government, if the two labor unions have already form an inter-union coalition, though unions 
have no incentives to cooperate in these cases. Hence, a coordination of reform efforts does not 
('merge endogenously from the model, neither when 6 =  0.268 nor when S =  0.033. *2
is the same in both cases.
"In most specifications reform will be determined in a non-cooperative Nash play, though in cases 2, ,'J. G. 7. 10. 
II. 12 labour unions can cooperate in deciding nominal wages, rj will be above the all-Nash play levels in cases
2 and 10. while it will be below in cases 11 and 12: in cases 3. 6. and 7 it has the same value whether the unions 
cooperate or not. 1'? will be below its all-Nash play levels in 2. 3. G. 7. 10 and 12. whereas in case 11 its value will be 
the same whether unions* cooperate or not. As a result in most cases average reform is below its non-cooperative 
Nash play levels, except in case 2 where it is above. Moreover, in all eases reform in both countries is above the 
pre-Ml levels.
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Table 5
Move from:
(w-r) substitutes 
(w-r) complements
(Li ,L2)
Nash-MI T->  U nions-Coop
S =  0.268
indifferent
+
*1LI*" indifferent
6 =  0.033
Lp indifferent, L2 : better off
(Li .L2)
Unions Coop->(Govts-Ooop. Unions-Coop)
S =  0.268
L2 better off
LJ worse ofT
S =  0.033
: better off L2: better off
+ better off in 1. 2, 6, 7, 8 xbetter off in 3, worse off in 2, 4, 8. ""better off in 8, 11. 12. “ indifferent in 1. 5, 9. 11 
and worse off in 4, 8, i^ndifferent in 12, better off in 2, 6, 4 worse off in 9.
Table 6
Move from:
(Cm ,G2) (G i .G2)
Nash-MU-> Unions- Coop l  nions Coop->{Govts-Coop. Unions-Coop)
S -  0.268 6 =  0.033 S =  0.268 S =  0.033
(w-r) substitute« 
(w-r) complements
worse off 
Cl j” worse off
Gj ¡worse off, G :^ worse off G2 worse off 
Clj worse off
(!]": worse off G2: worse off
+ indifferent in 3, 4, 6, better off in 2. a: bet ter off in 1, 2, 4, 10-11, indifferent in 6. i^ndifferent in 3. 5. 6. 12. 
and better off in 4. 8.^ better off in 4, 8, indifferent in 5.""better off in 3, 4, 7, 8, 4 better off in 5, 9.
1.3 Conclusions
In this paper we have been able to merge the literature on the effects of a MU on labor market 
reform, with the literature examining the effects of a MU on inflation and unemployment under 
different wage bargaining structures. We have analyzed the effect of unions' behavior on govern­
ments' incentives for labor market reform before and after a monetary union has been imposed; 
with national labor markets characterized by centralized wage bargaining. First we examined a 
benchmark specification of a two-country monetary union, with symmetric countries and labor 
unions. Next, we allowed for asymmetric countries and labor unions. Specifically, in country 1 
the labor union has greater bargaining power than the labor union in country 2, i.e country 1 is 
more distorted than country 2. The different solutions obtained are evaluated after calibrating 
the model parameters.
Under all specifications considered incentives for reform are enhanced when governments and 
labor unions engage in non-cooperative Nasli play inside the M l7. This is attributed to two fac­
tors. First, that the home government responds aggressively to higher nominal wages set by the 
home-labor union, and second that governments engage in a ”beggar-tliy-neighbour'' deregula­
tion. because labor market institutions are perceived by the two governments as being strategic
[if:!
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complements. Moreover, in the symmetric case there is significant wage moderation (for nominal 
and real wages) inside the M l: when wages and reform are perceived as strategic substitutes on 
labor unions wage setting decisions, whereas nominal and real wages increase when wages and re­
form are thought of being complements, because in that case a higher level of reform improves the 
wage-unemployment trade off faced by the labor unions. In the asymmetric case, nominal wages 
are reduced in the more distorted economy and raised in the less distorted economy, Though, real 
wages increase when nominal wages and reform are substitutes and fall when they are substitutes 
(i.e. when the wage-unemployment trade off worsens).
The establishment of the M lT that increased incentives for reform for the two governments, 
is beneficial for the labor unions when they are very powerful, and a bigger amount of reform 
reduces unemployment more than it affects unions power (wages and reform are complements). 
The results an1 in the opposite direction when reform is very effective in mincing the bargaining 
power of labor unions (i.e. when wages and reform are substitutes).
In the symmetric case governments are better off when wages and reform are considered as 
substitutes by labor unions because this implies lower unemployment. They are worse off when 
wages and reform are complements, because they have to bear greater political cost without 
reform being effective in avoiding an aggressive wage setting on the part of labor unions. In 
the asymmetric case, the government in the more distorted economy is always better off inside 
the MU, because it can pass part of the losses it incurs from its "fight" against the powerful 
home-labor union to the foreign government, thus it will enjoy higher benefits coming from the 
decrease in unemployment and inflation, relative to the losses generated by the greater reform 
effort inside the MU. Therefore, the government of the country with the less distorted economy 
is always worse off inside the MU, because it will have to hear greater losses coming from the 
higher inflation and the bigger amount of reform it undertakes due to the ”race-to-tlie-1 >ot tom” 
deregulation effect.
The "race to the bottom" problem could be dealt with if the two national governments co­
operate in setting reform. In the symmetric cast', a cooperation among tin* two governments 
replicate's the pre-MU outcome by removing all the distortions coming from the strategic com­
plementarity of reform in the two countries. Both in the symmetric and the asymmetric case, 
the labor unions will he better off when wages and reform are substitutes, and worse oil when 
they are complements. The results for the two governments point to the opposite direction in the 
symmetric model specification. However, the two governments will have an incentive to engage 
in cooperation only when wages and reform are complements in order to improve their pay-off. 
In an "asymmetric MU", the two governments are worst' off under most model specifications in­
dependently of the substitutability or complementarity of wages anti reform. Therefore, there are 
no incentive for cooperation and "race-to the-bottom* deregulation cannot be avoided (or could
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be considered beneficial). However, there are certain cases where the government of the most 
distorted economy can be benefited by engaging in cooperation. l>oth when wages and reform are 
strategic complements and substitutes. Nevertheless, even in these cases the cooperative outcome 
does not emerges endogenously, because the extra benefits gained by the government in country 
1 are outweighed by the extra losses incurred by the foreign government.
The benchmark model was also extended to allow for cooperation among the two labor unions 
in setting nominal wages inside the MU. While in the symmetric case the labor unions have no 
incentives to engage in cooperation, in the “asymmetric MU", under several parameter values, 
labor unions arc better off if they cooperate relative to participating in a non-cooperative play. 
In these specific cases area-wide reform would be either above or below but not equal to its all- 
Nash play levels. Nevertheless, it will still be above its pre-MU levels. When labor unions play 
cooperatively, the national governments have no incentive to set reform in cooperative manner, 
because this would lead to lower reform levels and much less wage moderation on the part of the 
unions. However, in some model specifications the government in country 1 can attain a higher 
payoff by cooperating with the foreign government; though, this is not feasible because the foreign 
government always incurs losses (which are much bigger than the extra benefits gained by the 
first government inhibiting the possibility of a transfer that could improve the position of both).
Based on a model specification that adopts the IMF's and OECD's belief that strict labor 
market institutions are related with the high unemployment problem in continental Europe, as 
well as the proposed solutions that involve reduction of labor market rigidities by means of 
structural reform, we managed to show that incentives for reform will increase inside the M lT 
anti that on average there will be moderation of real-wage demands. Moreover, these model- 
predictions are confirmed because studies like Bertola and Boeri (2002) report that deregulation 
was accelerated in the run-up to EMU,?, while real-wage moderation is a wide-spread phenomenon 
in the Euro-area as reported by Calmfors (2001a).
Despite the fact that the shift in the monetary regime is only captured by the establishment 
of the c-ommon central bank which decides on common inflation rate, without altering unions' be­
havior, we were able to describe real-life situation that could lead to increased incentives for labor 
market reform in the MU context. More elaborate arguments have been used in the literature 
ill order to produce a similar result. Sibert (1999) argues that in the presence of coordination of 
monetary policy before the MU. that takes the form of sidt paymx nts to the countries suffering 
from high inflation bias, incentive for reform will be higher inside the M U,y. Moreover. Calmfors
,s Though Van Poeck and Borghijs (2001) by evaluating tlie progress in labour market reform for EMI1 and a 
number of EMI' countries in the recent past, conclude that “EMU countries have not been more diligent in labour
market reform than countries outside the EMU. despite tlir worse situation in the labour market"
Ti)Sibert (1999). argues, in a similar setting with Sutherland k  Siliert (2000). that the negative externalities 
of inflation before the MU. are addressed by coordination of the monetary policy, with high regulated markets.
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(1998) si lows that there will lie more labor market reform within a MU if national governments 
have a precautionary motive for reform and there is no inflation-bias problem.
Several aspects of this issue are not studied here, and are left for future research. The 
most important being a common evaluation of the effects of economic integration (increased 
product market competition) on incentives for labor market reform, which raises political economy 
questions regarding the advocates and opponents of labor market deregulation inside the MU.
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 O utside th e  M U case
Tlie equilibrium solutions are as follows:
w = (,Ì7 +  2nur) +  T//A2 -I- 2n2/3A-y +  4a 3/v A 7  +  2an fi.S2 +  a4ßX2^  _|_ 2a5a-A27 +  a2 ßX2ö 2 +  2a3KA2A2) ‘
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27 +  2 fids +  2a'2 A7 +  2a2X2bs
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1.5.2 Inside the M U : Symmetric case
Stage 1: The Governments’ problem
The governments' reaction functions are:
. ___ Af-f- nn~ tri t(y ~ N  n fiaòr-j+ U1“'! 4-1 ___
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in order for > 0 we should have Aecb  >  /¿(2 + a 2AEcs). but a2XECB > 0 and XEcb  <  }i 
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> U because //(2 +  a2AEC£f) >  Xe c b • Respectively for the reaction function of the second 
government.
Stage 1: The Labor Unions’ problem
The labor unions* reaction functions are:
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1.5.3 Numerical solutions: Symmetric case
The numerical solutions presented in this section correspond to section 2.3.2 of the paper*0.
M o d e l  1 : k  =  5 ,  6  =  0.268, s  — 0.1  
C a s e  ( i ) :A < / t= 7
In s id e  MU r \v 7T u W-7T V B L G
v arian t 1 1.4G44 7.3826 0.04382 5.4780 7.3388 4.8536 0.30207 -G. 9182 1.7707
v arian t 2 1.4507 7.8181 0.48223 5.4799 7.3359 4.8549 3.5358 -6 .9453 5.856
v a r ia n t 3 1.4315 7.8143 0.4824 5 .4819 7.3319 4.8569 3.5383 -6 .9112 16.283
O u ts id e  MU r w 7T u W-7T V B L G
v aria n t 1 1.4607 7.3818 0.04383 5.4789 7.3380 4.8539 0.30211 -6.9474 1.7703
varian t 2 1.433 2 7.8146 0 .48239 5.4817 7.3322 4.8567 3.5381 -6 .9416 5.8507
v a ria n t 3 1.394 7 7.8069 0.48273 5.485 5 7.324 1 4.8005 3.543 -6 .9335 16.251
C a s e  (ii):A < /f .< 7  80
In s id e  MU r \v 7r u \V-7T V B L G
varian t 1 0.84644 7.2533 0.044323 5.5404 7.209 4.9154 0.30892 -6.8184 1.2799
varian t 2 1.0988 7.7473 0.48533 5.5151 7.2G2 4.901 3.5814 -6.8714 5 .0 3 9 5
variant. 3 1.4315 7.8143 0.4824 5.4819 7.3319 4.8569 3,5383 -6.9412 16.283
O u tsid e  MU r w 7T u W-TT t! B L G
varian t 1 0.84445 7.2529 0.044324 5.5406 7.2086 4.915 0 0.30894 -6 .8180 1 .2798
varian t 2 1.0893 7.7454 0.485 41 5,5161 7.2600 4.8911 3,5826 -6 .8694 5 .0 3 7 0
varian t 3 0.94107 7.7156 0.48672 5.5309 7.2289 4.9059 3.0019 -0 .8382 13.00-5
80T1ip calculations were done in Scientific workplace 5.0 (Maple).
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C ase f i i i ) :A < 7 < //
Inside M l' r \v 77 u YV-7T B L G
variant 1 2.5131 7.002 0.012980 5.3737 7.5501 4.7487 0.20061 -7.1681 2.2750
variant 2 1.0120 7.0111 0.47817 5.4337 7.4330 4.8087 3.4764 -7 .0423 6 .6826
variant 3 2.1177 7.9323 0.47636 5.4132 7.1760 4.7882 3.4503 -7.0853 19.603
__________________________________________________________________  _______________________________________
Outside Ml* r \v 7T u 1V-7T t> B L G
variant 1 2 .5 0 0 8 7.6007 0.042093 5.3743 7.5577 4.740  3 0.20068 - 7.167 1 2.275
variant 2 1.8S51 7.00)5 0.47841 5.4365 7.4271 4.811 5 3.4800 -7.036 5 6.673
variant 3 2.061-1 7.0410 0.47686 5 .4189 7.4641 4 .7 0 3 0  3.4574 -7.073 5 19.546
C ase (iv):7<A<//.
Inside Ml* r V t: u W-TT V B L G
variant 1 20.220 11.300 0.02882 3 .6 0 3 11.277 2 .078 0.1306 -10.887 3.1081
variant 2 7.051 8 0 .0658 0.42766 1 .8508 8 .6 3 8 1 4 .234  8 2.7800 -8 .2 4 7 5 10.106
variant 3 18 .000 11.27 0.33124 3. 7641 10.030 3 .1 3 0  1 1.6682 -10.510 30.885
O utside MC r \v 7T u W-TT ti B L G
variant 1 20.182 11.298 0.02885 3 .6 0 6 8 11.270 2.0818 0.1300 -10.87!) 3.4031
variant 2 7.5108 9.0371 0.4289 4 .8 7 3 9 8 .608  5 4 .2 4 8 9 2.707 -8 .2170 10.1.31
variant 3 18.233 11.105 0.334 55 3 .8 0 1 7 10. 86 3 .1 7 6 7 1.7018 -10.109 30.161
Model 2 : k =  5, S =  0.268, s =  1 
C ase (i):A < //= -y
Inside Ml* r w n u W-TT r B L G
variant 1 1.186 4 5 .9 8 1 2 0.035-508 4 .4 3 8 6 5. 9457 3 .8 1 3 6 0.19827 -5 .5 5 5 1.1622
variant 2 1 .1774 6 .3 4 5 3 0 .39139 4 .4 4 7 6 5.9.539 3 .8 2 2 6 2.320 1 -5 .5 6 3  3 3.8575
variant 3 1 .104 7 (5.3581 0.39251 4. 4603 5.9656 3 .8 3 5 3 2.312 4 -5 .574  9 10.770
O utside M l' r t.’ G
variant 1 1 .1840 5 .9834 0.035528 4.441 5 .0470 3 .8 1 6 0.10840 -5. 557 3 1.1631
variant 2 1.105 9 0.350 9 0.302  1 4.4501 5 .0615 3. 83 11 2.3412 -5 .5 7 3  9 3.8715
variant 3 1.1403 6.382 6 0.301 66 4 .4 8 4 7 5 .0870 3. 8507 2. 3682 -5 .5 9 7 3 10.862
m m
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Case (ii):A</i<-7
Inside MU r w 7T u VV-7T B L G
variant 1 0.74548 6.3882 0.039036 4.8795 6.3491 4.254 5 0.23962 -5.9585 0.9928
variant 2 0.93452 6.5889 0.412 76 4.6905 6.1762 4.0655 2.5904 -5.7855 3.645 1
variant 3 0.8353.5 G. 6884 0.42149 4.7897 6.2669 4.164 7 2.7011 -5.8763 9,7726
Outside MU r w 7T u W-TT B L G
variant I 0.74394 6.3896 0.039049 4.8811 6.3505 4.2561 0.23977 -5.9599 0.9932
variant 2 0.92761 6.5959 0.41337 4.6974 6.1825 4.0724 2.5981 -5. 7919 3.6528
variant 3 0.81791 6.7059 0.42302 4.8071 6.2829 4.1821 2.7208 -5.8922 9. 8236
Case (iii):A<7 </t
Inside MU r vv 7r u w-7r V B L G
variant 1 1.7925 5.4217 0.030660 3.8325 5.3911 3.2075 0.14782 -5.0005 1.1576
variant 2 1.4646 6.0572 0.36611 4.1604 5.6911 3.5354 2.0380 -5.3005 3.9175
variant 3 1.5817 5.9398 0.355 81 4.0433 5.5840 3.4183 1.9249 -5.933 10.936
Outside MU r vv 7r u W-7T r B L G
variant 1 1.7892 5.424 8 0.030686 3.8358 5.3941 3.2108 0.14808 -5.0035 1.158 9
variant 2 1.4483 6.0736 0.36755 4.176 7 5. 7001 3.5517 2.054 -5.3154 3.938 7
variant 3 1.5.501 5.9715 0.35859 4.0749 5.6129 3.4499 1.9551 -5.2223 11.053
Case (¡v):^<A<//.
Inside MU r vv 7T u VV-7T r B L G
SCU2dcl 4.7742 2.6696 0.0680 0.8.5075 2.6628 0.22575 0.0728 -2.272 0.1900
SCU2dc2 3.4401 4.0758 0.1922 2.1849 3.8835 1.5599 0.5620 -3.492 2.060
SCU2dLl 4.0787 2.8336 0.0832 0.94634 2.7503 0.32134 0.1054 -2.359 1.952
Outside MU r vv 7T u VV-7T V B L G
variant 1
4
4.7722 2.6715 0.0682 0.85284 2.6647 0.22784 0.0731 -2.274 0.1902
variant 2 < 3.4113 4.1047 0.1948 2.2137 3.9099 1.5887 0.5769 -3.519 2.089
variant 3 4.6545 2.8578 0.0854 0.97052 2.7724 0.31552 0.1109 -2.381 1.985
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Model 3: h. =  1 0 , S =  0.268, £ = 0.1
Case (i)
Inside MU r w 7r h W-77 B L G
variant 1 2.706 2 13.045 0.08 2787 10.348 13.802 0. 723 4 1.0777 -13.472 0.3170
variant 2 2.7402 14.768 0.01080 10.351 13.857 9. 720 0 12.615 -13.400 20.891
variant 3 2. 703 0 14.76 0.01121 10. 355 13,840 0. 720 0 12.024 -13.458 58.095
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  --------------------- ---- --------------- -—
Outside MU r ly 7r u W-7T B L G
variant 1 2, 750 1 13.013 0.08 2703 10.340 13.801 0.7241 1.0779 -13.47 0.3103
variant 2 2. 707 2 14.701 0.01118 10.354 13.8408 0.7203 12.023 -13.459 20.8 i a
variant 3 2.034 4 14.740 0.01182 10.302 13.834 0. 7300 12.041 -13.444 57.9S2
Case fii):A<//,<7
Inside MU r V 7r u W*7T v B L G
variant 1 1.5988 13.701 0.083721 10.4053 13.017 9.8401 1.1022 -13.2204 4,5007
variant 2 2.0755 14,034 0.01074 10.417 13.717 9.7924 12.778 -13,320 17.08
variant 3 1.8213 14.583 0.01807 10.443 13.004 0.8179 12.84 -13.273 40.450
Outside MU r \v 7T u tJ B L G
variant 1 1.5051 13.700 0.083724 10.4055 13.010 9.8405 1.1023 -13.2251 4,5002
variant 2 2.0575 14.03 0.01080 10,119 13.713 9.7942 12.782 -13,323 17.971
variant 3 1.7770 14.574 0.01030 10.447 13.055 9.8222 12.851 -13.201 40,399
Case (m):A<7 <//
Inside MU r w 7T n W-7T r B L G
variant 1 4.7475 14.359 0.081202 10.1499 14.278 9.5253 1.0309 -13.888 8.1201
variant 2 3. 0133 14.943 0.0032 10. 204 14.04 9. 0387 12.404 -13.049 23.843
variant 3 4.0001 15.021 0.809 80 10.225 14. 121 9. 0000 12. 31 -13.731 09.94
Outside MU r w 77 u w-77 7’ B L G
variant 1 4.7351 14,357 0.081212 10.1510 14.270 9.5205 1.0371 -13. 885 8.1171
variant 2 3.5008 14.933 0.00300 10.209 14.029 9.0439 12,110 -13.038 23. 809
variant 3 3.8037 15.000 0.0(X)74 10.230 14.000 9.0100 12.330 -13, 708 00.737
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Case (iv):7 <À</i
Inside MU r vv 7T u VV-7T tr B L a
variant 1 38.193 21.356 0.054446 6.805 7 21.302 6.1807 0.46615 -20.911 12.160
variant 2 14.453 17.124 0.80781 9.179 7 16.316 8.554 7 9. 921 8 -15.926 36.377
variant 3 35.151 21.289 0.62567 7.1099 20.663 6.484 9 5.952 -20.272 110.19
Outside MU r vv 7r u W-ÏT r B L G
variant 1 38.122 21.341 0.054502 6.8128 21.287 6.1878 0.46711 -20.896 12.143
variant 2 14.187 17.071 0.81015 9.2063 16.261 8.5813 9.9795 -15.876 36.147
variant 3 34.439 21.145 0.631 93 7.1811 20.514 6.5561 6.0718 -20.123 108.69
Model 4: k = 10,6  = 0.268, £ = 1
Case (i):A<//.=7
Inside MU r vv 7T u VV-7T B L G
variant 1 2.2411 11.298 0.06 7072 8.3839 11.231 7.758 9 0.7074 -10.840 4.146
variant 2 2.2240 11.986 0.73929 8.401 11.246 7.776 8.31 -10. 85G 13. 763
variant 3 2.2000 12.010 0.7414 8.425 11.268 7.8 8.3576 -10.878 38.46
Ovitside MU r vv 77 u VV-7T t> B L G
variant 1 2. 236 4 11.302 0.067108 8.3886 11.235 7.7630 0.70818 -10.841 4.149
variant 2 2.2022 12.007 0.74121 8.4228 11.266 7.797 8 8.3532 -10.876 13.813
variant 3 2.153 8 12.056 0.74540 8.4712 11.311 7.8462 8.4494 -10.920 38.756
Case (ii):A<;t< 7
Inside MU r vv 77 u W-77 r B L G
variant 1 1.40S 1 12.067 0.073735 9.2169 11.993 8.591 9 0.854 94 -11.602 3.5423
variant 2 1.7652 12.446 0.77966 8.8598 11.666 8.234 8 9.2424 -11.275 13.005
variant 3 1.5779 12.634 0.79615 9.047 1 11.837 8.422 1 9.6374 -11.447 34.808
Outside MU r vv 7T u VV-7T r B L G
variant 1 1.405 2 12.069 0.073758 9.2198 11.995 8.5918 0.855 49 -11 .(>05 3.5438
variant 2 1.7522 12.459 0.78081 8.8728 11.678 8.2178 9.269 7 -11.287 13,033
variant 3 1.544 9 12.667 0.79904 9.0801 11.868 8.455 1 9.7077 -11.477 35.050
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Case ( ii i) :A <7<//.
Inside Ml' r V  7T u W-77 V B L G
variant 1 3.3859 10.241 0.057913 7. 239 1 10.183 6.614 1 0,5274 -9.792 5 4.1303
variant 2 2. 700 5 11.441 0.09154 7. 858 5 10. 750 7. 233 5 7.271 3 -10.359 13.977
variant 3 2.987 7 11.220 0.07208 7.6373 10.517 7.012 3 0. 867 8 -10.157 39.019
Outside Ml* r V  7Ï u W-77 B L G
variant 1 3.3796 10.247 0.05796 7.245 4 10.189 6.020 4 0.528 32 -9.798 3 4.1350
variant 2 2. 735 7 11.472 0.09126 7.889 3 10. 778 7. 204 3 7.3285 -10.387 14.053
variant 3 2.9280 11.279 0.07734 7.697 10.002 7.072 0.9750 -10.212 39.431
ase (iv):7 <A</i
Inside Ml* r w  ~ u W-77 B L G
\ariant 1 9.018 5.0120 0.01285 1.0070 5.029 8 0.98197 0.025989 -4.0391 0.0779
variant 2 0.498 7.0988 0.30318 4.1270 7.335 (i 3.5020 2. 005 4 -6.9150 7.3527
variant 3 8.8375 5.3523 0.1573 1.7875 5.1950 1.1025 0.37623 -1.8013 0.9653
Outside Ml' r \V 77 u W-77 V B 1. G
variant 1 9.0111 5.0163 0.01288 1.0109 5.033 4 0.98592 0.026117 -1.0127 0.0789
variant 2 0.443 0 7.7533 0.30796 4.1814 7.385 3 3.5504 2.0586 -6.99 1 7 7.4560
variant 3 8.791 8 5.3981 0.10132 1.833 2 5. 230 8 1.2082 0.39509 -1.8101 7.0831
Model 5: k =  5, 6 =  0.033, £ =  0.1
Case (i):A<//-=7
Inside M l: r V TT u W-7T B L G
variant 1 0.18453 7.0006 0.044852 5.6005 7.0157 4.9815 0.31631 -6.02517 1.73209
variant 2 0.18276 7.5093 0.49339 5.0067 7.0159 4.9817 3.7013 -0.0253 5.7505
variant 3 0.18028 7.5096 0.49341 5.0070 7.0102 4.9820 3.7017 -6.0255 15.979
Outside MU r w 77 u W-77 r B L G
variant 1 0.18405 7.0607 0.044853 5.0000 7.0158 4.9816 0.31635 -6.02525 1.73271
variant 2 0.18051 7..509 5 0.49341 5.0009 7.0161 4.9819 3.7016 -0.6255 5.7508
variant 3 0.17555 7.51 0.19340 5.0074 7.0165 1.9824 3.7023 -0.6259 15.981
i
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Case (ii):A<//<7
Inside Ml’ r w 7T u w-rr i> B L Cl
triant 1 0.10562 7.06729 0.04491 5.01443 7.0223 4.9894 0.317230 -0.6317 1.203071
variant 2 0.1376G 7.5135 0.49379 5.6112 7.0197 4.9862 3.7073 -6.0291 4.9705
variant 3 0.12051 7.5151 0.49394 5.0129 7.0212 4.9879 3.7095 -6.0305 12.855
~ ' —-----------  _ ~
Outside MU r w 7T u W -7 T B L G
variant 1 0.10537 7.00730 0.04491 5.G1444 7.0-224 4.9895 0.31723¡7 -6.0318 1.203075
variant 2 0.13043 7.5130 0.49380 5.6114 7.0198 4.9804 3.7074 -0.0292 4.9707
variant 3 0.1170 7.5154 0.49397 5.6132 7.0214 4.9882 3.7099 -0.0308 12.850
Case (iii):A<7 </i
*
Ì
Inside MU r w 7r u W -7 T V B L G
variant 1 0.3221 7.049 0.044742 5.5928 7.0042 4.9678 0.31479 -6.0136 2.19509
variant 2 0.24278 7.5038 0.49286 5.0007 7.0109 4.9757 3.6934 -6.0203 6.5251
variant 3 0.26906 7.5013 0.49203 5.598 7.0087 4.973 3.6899 -6.018 19.075
Outside MU r w 77 u \v-~ r B L G
variant 1 0.32123 7.0491 0.044743 5.5929 7.0043 4.9079 0.3148 -0.0137 2.19575
va ria nt 2 0.23915 7.5041 0.49290 5.0011 7.0112 4.9701 3.6939 -0.0200 6.5200
variant 3 0.20225 7.5020 0.49209 5.5988 7.0093 4.9738 3.6908 -0.0187 19.078
Case (iv):7 <A</t
Inside MU r YV 77 u YV-7T B L G
variant 1 3.0357 0.7689 0.04 2091 5.2614 6.7208 4.636 4 0.27860 -0.3301 2.9745
variant 2 1.0698 7.4272 0.48559 5.518 6.9417 4.893 3.5851 -6.551 9. 1270
variant 3 3.2278 7.2275 0.46000 5.3022 0.7009 4. 0772 3.3102 -0.3703 27.446
— - ___ :____________________~
Outside MU r w 7T u YV-7T it B h G
variant 1 3.0259 0. 7097 0.04 2099 5.2024 0.7276 4.6374 0.2787 -0.3370 2.9753
variant 2 1.0475 7.4293 0.48578 5.5203 0.9435 4.8953 3.588 -0.5529 9.4328
variant 3 3.1305 7.2300 0.40740 5.3113 0.7080 4.0803 3.3210 -0.3779 27.51
I
I
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I
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Model 6: k — 5, ò =  0.0,33, 5 =  1
Case (i):A</i=-v
Inside Ml’ r \v 77 u V-TT î7 B L G
variant 1 0.17921 0.8582 0.013500 5,4 158 0.8110 4. 8208 0.29810 -0, 1240 1.0348
variant 2 0.17757 7.29G0 0.47937 5. 1474 0.8100 4,8224 3. 4940 -0.1200 5.4284
variant 3 0.17523 7.299 0,17958 5.4498 0.8194 4.824S 3.4970 -0.1288 15.095
___________________________________________________ : ------------------------------------ -— -
O utside M l' r w 7r u W-7T V u L G
variant 1 0.17879 0.8587 0.013570 5. 4402 0.8151 4.8212 0.29851 -0. 4215 1.035
variant 2 0.17544 7. 2987 0.47950 5.4490 0.8192 4.8240 3.4907 -0. 4280 5.4325
variant 3 0.17070 7.3048 0.47997 5. 4542 0.8248 4.8292 3.5027 -(>.4312 15.119
Case (ii):A</f.<"y
Inside Ml1 r \v TT U w-77 1’ B l G
variant 1 0.10380 0.9499 0.041109 5.5211 0. 9057 4.8901 0.30078 -0,5151 1.2220.3
variant 2 0.13409 7.3510 0.48315 5.4903 0. 8084 4.8053 3. 5492 -0. 4778 4.7580
variant 3 0.11820 7.3729 0.18159 5.5007 0. 888 4. 8817 3. 5705 -0. 4977 12.373
Outside MU r \v n U \x-~ v B L G
variant 1 0.10302 0. 9502 0.014171 5.5214 0.9000 4.8904 0.30081 -0.5151 1.22213
variant 2 0.13353 7.3531 0.483 25 5.4915 0.809S 4.8005 3.5507 -0. 1792 4.7005
variant 3 0.11543 7.3700 0.184 84 5.5090 0.8917 4.8840 3.5742 -0. 5011 12.385
Case (iii):A<7 <//
Inside MC r V TT u w-rr r  B L G
variant 1 0.30032 0. 7035 0.012549 5.3187 0.0010 4.0937 0.28409 -0.2701 1.9858
variant 2 0.23371 7.2232 0.474 43 5. 3913 G.71S8 4. 7003 3. 422 1 -0.3581 0.0465
variant 3 0.258 51 7. 191 0.47225 5. 3605 6. 7188 4.74 1 5 3.3909 -0.32S2 17.529
Outside MC r V 77 u V-7T r  B L G
variant 1 0.305 53 0. 7045 0.012555 5.3195 . 0.0019 1.0945 0.28478 -0.2713 1.9803
variant 2 0.23034 7. 2270 0.47473 5. 3947 0. 7528 4.7097 3.4200 - 0 .3022 fi. 0538
variant 3 0.25109 7.1999 0.47285 5.3733 0.727 4.7183 3.3990 -0.330 1 17.572
(WWHWWWW.
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Case (iv):7 <A<//.
Inside MU r w 7r u VV-7T 13 L G
variant 1 2.20S 6 4.2795 0.026611 3.3264 4.2528 2. 701 4 0.11136 -3.8622 1.1890
variant 2 0.913 46 6.3417 0.41462 4.7115 5.9271 4.0865 2.613 8 -5.5365 6.8732
variant 3 2.1285 4.7661 0.30769 3.496 5 4.4584 2. 871 5 1.439 5 -4.0678 11.935
_______ ~ ------------------------------------------------------------------ :----- ---- -----------
Outside MU r w 7r u W-7T B L G
variant 1 2. 2947 4.2842 0.026643 3.3303 4.2576 2.7053 0.11162 -3.8670 1.1916
variant 2 0.89713 6.3629 0.41605 4.7279 5.9468 4.1029 2.6319 -5.5562 6.9192
variant 3 2.0885 4.818 0.31122 3.5365 4.5068 2.9115 1.4726 -4.1162 12. 197
M odel 7: k =  10, 6 =  0.033, 5 =  0.1 
Case (i):A</i= 7
Inside MIT r w 77 n VY-7T tf B L G
variant 1 0.34857 13.3369 0.084721 10.5902 13.2521 9.9651 1.12871 -12.8614 6.1822
variant 2 0.34522 14.184 0.93196 10.5902 13.252 9.9655 13.206 -12.8617 20.517
variant 3 0.34054 14.185 0.932 10.591 13.253 9.9659 13.07 -12.862 57.012
1” " ■ r.'L"!.™---------------- _ . —~~ _____________ ;___
Outside MU r \v n u vv-rr r B L G
variant 1 0.34766 13.337 0.084722 10.5903 13.2522 9.9652 1.12873 -12.8615 6.1823
variant 2 0.34096 14.185 0.93200 10.5911 13.253 9.9659 13.207 -12.8620 20.519
variant 3 0.33160 14.186 0.93208 10.592 13.2539 9.9668 13.209 -12.863 57.021
Case (ii):A<//.<7
Inside MU r w 77 u W-7T B L G
variant 1 0.1995 13.3489 0.08484 10.6046 13.2640 9.98 1.1317 -12.8739 4-5083
variant 2 0.26002 14.1917 0.93271 10.5986 13.259 9.9740 13.227 -12.8688 17.734
variant 3 0.22769 14.195 0.93.300 10.602 13.262 9.9772 13.235 -12.8716 45.865
Outside MU r vv 7T u VV-7T V B L G
variant 1 0.19903 13.349 0.084811 10.6017 13.2641 9.9801 1.1318 -12.874 4.5084
variant 2 0.25773 14.1927 0.93273 10.5989 13,260 9.9742 13.228 -12.869 17.735
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Case (iii):A<^<//,
Inside MU r w 7T u YV-7T r B L C
\ariant 1 0.60842 13.3151 0.084513 10.5043 13.2305 9.9392 1.12320 -12.8397 7.8314
variant 2 0.45859 14.1741 0.93096 10.5793 13.24314 9.9541 13.1782 -12.8522 23/282
variant .3 0.50930 14.109 0.930-52 10.574 13.239 9.9491 13.165 -12.848 68.05G
Outside MU r w 7T u w-7r V B L G
variant 1 0.60076 13.3152 0.084515 10.5645 13.2300 9.9393 1.12323 -12.8398 7.834'
variant 2 0.45173 14.1742 0.93102 10.5790 13.24318 9.9548 13.1789 -12.8528 23.281
variant 3 0.49537 14.17 0.93004 10.575 13.240 9.9505 13.109 -12.849 <38.069
Case (iv):-y<A<//.
Inside MU r \Y 7T u W-7T r B L G
va riant 1 6.8074 12.780 0.079506 9. 9383 12.700 9.3133 0.99401 -12.315 10.013
variant 2 2.0208 14.029 0.91722 10. 423 13.112 9.7979 12.791 -12. 721 33.037
variant 3 0.097 13.052 0.88135 10.015 12.771 9.3903 11.81 -12.38 97.920
Outside MU r V 7T u W-7T r B L G
variant 1 0. 8489 12.787 0.079521 9. 940 1 12.708 9.3151 0.99438 -12.317 10.615
variant 2 1.9780 14.033 0.91759 10.427 13.110 9.8021 12.802 -12. 725 33.055
variant 3 5. 9210 13.008 0.88280 10.033 12.785 9.4075 11,851 -12.394 98.151
Model 8: k =  10, & =  0.033, £ =  1 
Case (i):A</i=*/
Inside MU r V 7T u W-77 r B L G
variant 1 0.3385 12.954 0.0822 10.280 12.8’72 9.661 1.0019 -12.481 5.8327
variant 2 0.3354 13.781 0.9054 10.290 12.8'70 9.064 12.400 -12.485 19,308
variant 3 0.3309 13.787 0.9058 10.294 12.881 9.009 12.477 -12.491 53.859
Outside MlT r w 77 u w-77 r B L G
variant 1 0.33771 12.955 0.082298 10.287 12.873 9.6023 1.0651 -12.482 5.8330
variant 2 0.33139 13.787 0.90584 10.294 12.881 9.0080 12.470 -12.49 19.382
variant 3 0.32251 13.7'98 0.9(X>02 10.302 12.891 9,6775 12.497 -12.501 53.944
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Case (ii) :A</t< 7
Inside MU r \v 7T u W-7T V B L G
triant 1 Ü.19G19 13.1274 0.08343 10.4287 13.044 9.8038 1.094 6 ■12.653 4.360 1
variant 2 0.25-142 13.88G 0.91261 10.371 12.974 9.7456 12.CG3 -12.583 16.978
variant 3 0.223 38 13.927 0.91534 10.402 13.011 9.7766 12.739 -12.621 44.145
Outside MU r w 77 u W-7T V B L g
variant 1 0.10573 13.1284 0.083434 10. 4295 13,015 9.8013 1.094 7' -12.654 4.3604
variant 2 0.23222 13.889 0.9128 10.373 12.976 9.7478 12.669 -12.586 16.985
variant 3 0.21804 13.934 0.91581 10.407 13.018 9.7820 12.752 -12.627 44.189
Case (iii) ;Â<7 <fi
Inside MU r w 7T u \Y-7T B L G
variant 1 0.578 GO 12.662 0.080371 10.016 12.582 9.4214 1.0158 -12.191 7.0850
variant 2 0.44145 13.644 0.89615 10.184 12.748 9.5586 12.211 -12.357 21.573
variant 3 0.488 29 13.583 0.89203 10.137 12.691 9.5117 12.099 -12.3 62.543
Outside MU r \v 77 u W-7T V B L G
variant 1 0.5771 12.664 0.080383 10.018 12.584 9.4229 1.0161 -12.193 7.0870
variant 2 0.43509 13.652 0.89671 10.190 12.755 9.5649 12.226 -12.365 21.599
variant 3 0.47512 13.600 0.89316 10.150 12.707 9.5246 12.129 -12.316 62.697
Case (iv) :7 <A<//.
Inside MU r w 7T u W-7T îj B L G
variant 1 4.3418 8.0834 0.050266 6.2832 8.0331 5.6582 0.39732 -7.6425 4.2421
variant 2 1.7254 11.979 0.78316 8.8996 11.196 8.2746 9.3256 -10.805 24.523
variant 3 4.0200 9.0026 0.58119 6.604 4 8.4214 5.9794 5.1358 -8.030 8 42.584
Outside MU r w 77 u W-7T t? B L G
variant 1 4.334 3 8.0924 0.050325 6.2907 8.0421 5.665 7 0.39826 -7.6515 4.2516
va riant 2 1.694 6 12.019 0.785 88 8.9304 11.233 8.3054 9.3904 -10.842 24.687
variant 3 3.9449 9.1007 0.587 85 G.6801 8.5129 6.0551 5.254 2 -8.1223 43.517
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1.5.4 A sym m etric Case 
Numerical solutions when 6 = 0.208
The numerical solutions displayed in the current section correspond to sections 2.3.5.1. 2.3.1.1.
and 2.3.5.1 of the paper.
Case 1 : Distorted (M 3Clv2) versus Less Distorted (M2C3v2) M3clv2 corresponds to 
mo<lel 3, case 1. variant 2 anti refers to the model specification in the previous section1*1. Similarly 
for the cases presented below. In this case, both governments have the same inflation aversion 
parameter. While the government in country one attaches the saint' weight to costs from reform 
and unemployment; moreover it attaches bigger weight on reform than country two. the opposite 
holds for unemployment. More specifically we have 7 2 = 0 .1 7 5 . 7^= 0 .15. //.j =0.175, fi2= 0.2,
In the tables below L-C stands for cooperation of the two labor unions inside the MU. G- 
C stands for cooperation among the two governments inside the Ml’. Xash-MU means non- 
cooperative Nash play inside the Ml1, finally pre-MU stands for the outside the Ml’ outcomes.
Cl C r-2 V ii’i U'2 w " l u-i u
L-C 2.7231 1.4795 2.1015 11.191 0.3155 10.1032 10.35259 4.14555 7.24907
G-C 2.7217 1. 135-1 2.078 5 11.493 0.3577 10.4125 10.35308 4.18957 7.27133
Nash-MU 2. 7233 1. 1795 2.1011 14.49 0.3155 10.4027 10.35184 4.11558 7.21871
pre-MU 2.7072 1. 1183 2.0778 11.701 0.0730 10.417 10.35432 1.17009 7.20551
- ~ _ —  ■ - - - —■ " "
Cl w 'l-" « '2 -- W — 7T 7T " l ~-2 Vi V-2
L-C 13.85308 5.67758 9.76533 0.63792 9.72700 3.5205
G-C’ 13.85313 5.71783 9.78548 0.C39 87 9.72783 3.5040
Nasli-MU 13.85211 5.67701 9.70J486 0.03789 9.72707 3.5205
pre-MC 13.81982 5.70005 9.77793 0.03937 0.91118 0.30755 9.72928 3.5517
Cl l i B i B-2 L\ L'2 Oi O2
L-C (i. 18731 -13.402539 -5.280882 20.10073 4.i;rjiio
G-C (i. 22538 -13.402181 -5.327233 20.40339 4.2:’9000
Nasli-MU 0.18072 -13.402517 -5.280882 20.15788 4.11'2111
pre-MU 7.33879 12.023 2.054 -13.459137 -5.315430 20.87192 3.938080
s1T1h* numerical solutions for the asymmetric eases where evaluated up to the sixth decimal point. The calcula­
tions were done in Scientific Workplace j.O (Maple) and Kxcel (when more precision was required). Small ditrerences 
between the pre-MU values in this section and those of the symmetric case are attributed to the rounding up doue 
in Maple (SWP 5.0). This, of course, does no1 aifeet the comparisons of the ditfereut model specifications in each
seel ion.
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Case 2: Distorted (M3clv2) versus Less Distorted (M2c4v2) Both governments have 
the same inflation aversion parameter. While the government in country one attaches the same 
weight to costs from reform and unemployment, as well as, it attaches bigger weight on reform 
than country two, the opposite holds for unemployment. Country two in this case attaches a 
very small weight on political costs of reform, i.e, we have '72—0.05, /¿2=0.3 and '7 1 = 0.175 and 
/¿j = 0.175.
C2 n r2 r w 2 ■w «1 «2 u
L-C 2.7181 3.471 3.09455 14.402 4.4056 9.4038 10.35289 2.15399 6.25344
G-C 2. 7191 3.394 3.0567 14.40C 4.479 4 9.4427 10.35301 2.2309C 6.29200
Nash-MU 2. 7179 3.4709 3.0944 14.402 4.405 7 9. 4039 10.35294 2.15410 0.25352
pre-MU 2.7072 3.4113 3.0593 14.7C1 4.104 7 9.4329 10.35132 2.21369 6.28400
C2 U'l — 7T W'2 — n W — 7T 7r 7Tl 7T2 V-2
L-C 13.8516 3.8552 8.8534 0.55032 9.72819 1.529
G-C 13.8523 3.9257 8.889 0.553 70 9.72806 1.606
Nash-MU 13.8516 3.8553 8.8535 0.55032 9.72821 1.5291
pre-MU 13.8498 3.9099 8.8798 0.55299 0.91118 0.1918 9.72928 1.5887
C2 B B i b 2 h l l Cl c 2
L-C 4.60446 -13.401425 -3.46166 20.352683 2.297153
G-C 4.66140 -13.461699 -3.53511 20.358180 2.375710
Nash-MU 4.60457 -13.461383 -3.46475 20.352687 2.297257
pre-MU 0.0002S 12.623 0.576 -13.459137 -3.51928 20.874925 2.089924
Case 3: Distorted (M3clv3) versus Less Distorted (M2c3v3) Both governments have 
the same inflation aversion parameter, though now they case less about inflation (inflation-prone). 
The government in country one attaches the same weight to costs from reform and unemploy­
ment. as well as it attaches bigger weight on reform than country two, the opposite holds for
unemployment. i.e. we have 72=0.4. /¿2= 0.6, 7j = 0.5, /¿j =0,,5.
C3 n V2 r «7 « ’2 w "1 «2 u
L-C 2.6979 1.5872 2.14255 14.481 6.2122 10.346 10.3551 4.03775 7.1964
G-C 2.6693 1.5178 2.0935 14.478 6.2790 10.379 10.3578 4.10725 7.2325
Nash-MU 2.6979 1.5873 2.1126 14.481 6.2121 10.347 10.3551 4.03765 7.1963
pre-MU 2. 6344 1.5501 2.0923 14.746 5.9715 10.359 10.3613 4.07490 7.2181
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C3 « ’1 77 W!2 —~ U' — ~ 7i 7Ti 772 Vy V2
L-C 13.8477 5.5780 0.71331 0.63320 0.73021 3.4128
G-C 13.8415 5.6425 9.74203 0.63647 0.73307 3.4822
Nash-MV 13.8477 5.5788 0.71326 0.63320 0.73021 3.4127
pre-MV 13.8341 5.6120 9.72354 0.03521 0.91182 0.35859 0.73656 3.4400
C3 B By B-2 Ly Li Gy C 2
L-C 0.007825 -13.457183 -5.188336 57.6547 11.1908
G-C CM 50173 -13.451177 -5.251837 57.6102 11.4183
Nash-MU 6.007741 -13.457183 -5.188245 57.6547 11.1904
pre-ît 1V 7.207904 12.640 1.055 -13.443848 -5.222283 57.9799 11.0526
Case 4: Distorted (M 3clv3 ) versus Less Distorted (M2c4v3) Both governments have 
the same inflation aversion parameter, though they case less about inflation (inflation-prone). The 
government in country one attaches the same weight to costs from reform and unemployment, as 
well as it attaches bigger weight on reform than country two, the opposite holds for unemployment. 
In addition country two attaches a very small weight on political costs of reform, i.o. we haw
—0.05, fi2= 0.95. 7 j  = 0.5, f t y = 0 .5.
Cl n r-2 r W y •{(*2 W Uy “ 2 u
L-C 2.605 4.694 3.6915 14.341 3.2328 8.7884 10.35566 0.93006 5.04331
G-C 2.6885 4.5589 3.6237 14.348 3.3621 8.8554 10.35581 1.06607 5.7100
Nash-MV 2.605 4.6030 3.6045 14.344 3.2330 8. 7885 10.355C4 0.93113 5.61330
pre-MV 2.6341 4.6545 3.6115 14.746 2.8578 8.8019 10.36132 0.07050 5.66501
('4 U'y -77 u '2 —- w  —7T 7r X y ~ 2 ■V] 1’2
L-C 13.8474 2.7362 8.2018 0.4066 9.7305 0.306
G-C 13.84542 2.85982 8.35262 0.502 58 0.73115 0.4111
Nash-MV 13.81738 2.73638 8.20188 0.49662 9.7305 0.3061
]ire-MV 13.83418 2.772301 8.303287 0.49861 0,01182 8.540 6 X10-2 9.73656 0,3155
Cl B By B i Ly L i Cy c 2
L-C 3.719780 -13.456574 -2.345614 57.1979 2.1716
G-C 3.840224 -13.455209 -2.469231 57.4880 2.3714
Nash-MU 3.719896 -13.456574 -2.345706 57.1978 2.1719
pre-MV 6.375796 12.610 0.110 -13.113818 -2.381757 57.9709 1.0853
Case 5: Distorted (M3c2v2) versus Less Distorted (M2c3v2) Both governments have 
the same inflation aversion parameter. The government in country one attaches more weight on
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reform than unemployment, the opposite in country two, i.e. we have 7 j= 0.2. 72= 0.15 . /¿]=0.15.
//.2=0.2.
Co n r-2 r tri u«2 t v  U  J «2 u
L-C 2.CXÎ06 1.4796 1.7701 14.355 6.3182 10.336 10.419095 1.14536 7.282229
G-C 2.0593 1. 4465 1.7529 14.356 6.3-500 10.353 10.419075 4.17850 7.298791
Nash-MU 2.0000 1.4796 1.7701 14.355 6.3182 10.33C 10.419087 4.14535 7.282221
pre-MU 2.0575 1.4483 1.7529 14.63 6.0730 10.352 10.419078 4.17669 7.297887
C5 7T W ’2 —7T W  — 77 77 77\ ~2 V\ i»2
L-C 13.71417 5.C7737 9.69577 0.64083 9.79391 3.5204
G-C 13.71371 5.70771 9.71071 0.64229 9.79407 3,5535
Nash-MU 13.71410 5.67736 9.C9576 0.64084 9.79394 3.5204
pre-MU 13.71311 5.70605 9.70958 0.G4222 0.91689 0.36755 9.79425 3,5517
C5 B to £ C-i
L-C 6.2440 -13.323350 -5.286790 17.5435 4.1758527
G-C 0.2724 -13.323078 -5.317077 17.5412 4.2183732
Nash-MU 0.2440 -13.323350 -5.286790 17.5434 4.1758522
pre-MIT 7.4179 12.781 2.0540 -13.322699 -5.315130 17.9709 3.9386801
Case 6: Distorted (M3c2v3) versus Less Distorted (M2c3v3) Both governments have 
the same inflation aversion parameter. The government in country one attaches more weight 
on reform than unemployment. The opposite in country two. where the government cares little 
about the political cost of reform, i.e. we have 7j= 0.2, 72=0.05, /¿j=0.15. /¿2=0.3.
CO n î'2 1' l I f ’2 w «1 U-2 u
L-C 2.0559 3.4712 2.76355 14.266 4.4083 9.33715 10.41924 2.15378 2.15378
G-C 2.0574 3.4116 2.7345 14.269 4.4655 9.3673 10,11914 2.21341 6.31628
Nash-MU 2.0558 3.4712 2.7635 14.266 4.4083 9.3315 10.41926 2.15378 6.28652
pre-MU 2.0575 3.4113 2.7344 14.63 4.1047 9.364 10.41907 2.21369 6.31638
C6 W  J —7T W  — 77 77 *4 ~ 2 v i V2
L-C 13.71278 3.8550 8.78393 0.55322 9.79441 1.5288
G-C 13.71316 3.9096 8.81141 0,5558 9.79426 1.5884
Nash-MU 13.71278 3.8550 8.78393 0,5532 9.79112 1,5288
pre-MU 13.71311 3.9000 8.811505 0.555 8 0.910 80 0.19-18 9.70125 1.5887
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CO B  Bi B-2 Lx Li G \ G ‘2
L-C 4.05327 -13.322363 -3.404477 17.4351 2.3001
G-C -1.09745 -13.322078 -3.519011 17.4393 2.3000
Nash-MC 4.05329 -13.322342 -3.404477 17.4354 2.3001
pre-MC 0.07948 12.781 0.570 -13.322099 -3.519285 17.9709 2.0899
Case 7: Distorted (M3c2v3) versus Less Distorted (M2c4v3) Both governments have 
the same inflation aversion parameter, though they care less about inflation than before (inflation- 
prone). The government in country one attaches more weight on reform than unemployment, the
opposite in country two ^=0.6, II c //]=0.4. /*2= 0.6.
C7 n n r «3 W-2 w u l it-2 u
L-C 1.8102 1.5873 1.70175 14.3 0.210 10.258 10.44352 4,03700 7.21059
G-C 1.7921 1.5338 1.0031 14.297 0.2075 10.282 10.44553 4.09123 7.20838
Nash-MV 1.8101 1.5873 1.7017 14.300 0.210 10.258 10.44354 4.03705 7.24000
pre-MC 1,7770 1.5501 1.0039 14.574 5.9715 10.273 10.44731 4.07490 7.20110
C7 if1! —TT W’2~ ~ W  —  1r  7T TT] 7T2 1'2
L-C 13.06283 5.57883 9.62083 0.03717 9.81838 3.1127
G-C1 13.05737 5.02787 9.04262 0.039 03 9.82070 3.1002
Nash-MC 13.00282 5.57882 9.02082 0.03718 9.81839 3.1127
pre-MC 13.05104 5.61291 9.033775 0.038 98 0.919 30 0.35859 9.82221 3.4499
C7 B Bx b 2 Lx L i c ,
L-C 0.17286 -13.272020 -5.188245 40.01199 11.19541
G-C 0.22030 -13.207028 -5.237197 45.98040 11.39307
Nash-MC 0.17289 -13.272005 -5.188215 46.01195 11.19542
pre-MC 7.40322 12.851 1.955 -13.203920 -5.222283 46.39909 11.05200
Case 8: Distorted (M3c2v3) versus Less Distorted (M2c4v3) Both governments have 
the same inflation aversion parameter, though they care less about inflation (inflation-prone). The 
government in country one attaches more weight on reform than unemployment, the opposite in 
country two where the government care little about reform, i.c .^— 0.6. ^¿=0.05. //, —0,1, p.2=0.h5.
C8 r  i r-2 ?’ « ’1 {(’2 w «1 U-2 u
L-C 1.8138 4.0912 3.251 14.103 3.2300 8.0998 10.14392 0.930 5.0873
G-C 1.8087 1.588 3.198 8 14.100 3. 337 8. 751 10.44390 1.030 5.7400
Nash-MC 1.813 7 1.09] 3.2539 14.102 3.236 8.699 10.14315 0.931 5.0871
pre-MC 1.7770 4.651 3.210 1 14.574 2.857 8.715 10.44732 0.970 5.7089
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C8 ît’l  —7T W 2 - n I f  — 7T 7r 7Tj 7T2 I ’ l v '2
L-0 13.00252 2.73G12 8.19932 0.50048 9.81862 0.3058
G-C 13.60087 2.83247 8.24607 0.505 13 9.81913 0.4112
Nash-MU 13.00153 2.73633 8.19893 0.50047 9.81803 0.300
pre-MU 13.65461 2.772391 8.21351 0.502 38 0.91936 0.08540 6 9.82224 0.3455
C8 B th B-2 L\ l 2 Ci g 2
L-C 3.8085 -13.271522 -2.3454 45.854 2.1754
G-C 3.8794 -13.270451 -2.4418 45.848 2.3279
Nash-MU 3.8082 -13.271501 -2.3456 45.847 2.1757
pre-MU 0.4811 12.851 0.110 -13.263920 -2.3817 40.399 1.9853
Case 9: Distorted and tt—prone (M3clv3) versus Less Distorted and rr—averse (M2c3v2) 
The government in country one is inflat ion-prone while that in country two inflation averse. More­
over. the government in country one cares more both about reform and unemployment (attaches 
the same weight on r  and «), i.e. y^O.S, 72=0-15, /ij^O.5. ft2=0.2.
C9 n V'2 r  ttij U>2 W U\ «2 u
L-C 2.098 1.4795 2.08875 14.480 6.3156 10.4008 10.35531 4.1455 7.2504
G-C 2.0972 1.2891 1.9931 14.494 6.4981 10.196 10.35522 4.3358 7.3155
Nash-MU 2.098 1.479 5 2.0888 14.486 6.3155 10.401 10.35530 4.1451 7.2503
pre-MU 2.0344 1.4483 2.0114 14.746 6.0736 10.410 10.36132 4.1706 7.2690
C9 '«)] — 7T U'2 — 7T W — 77 7T T l  ~2 V l V-2
L-C 13.84797 5.67757 9.76277 0.63803 9.7302 3.5205
G-C 13.81759 5.85169 9.81964 0.64641 9.73028 3.7109
Nash-MU 13.84790 5.67746 9.76271 0.63804 9.7302 3.5205
pre-MU 13.83418 5.70605 9.770115 0.639 69 0.91182 0.3G755 9.73656 3.5517
C9 B B \ B-i L\ L<i G \ C-2
L-C 0.1890 -13.457204 -5.286882 57.6629 4.1725
G-C 0.3531 -13.457037 -5.461098 57.6706 4.4270
Nash-MU 0.1895 -13.457204 -5.286882 57.6628 1.1724
pre-MU 7.3473 12.610 2.051 -13.443848 -5.315430 57.9799 3.9386
Case 10; Distorted and ir-prone (M3clv3) versus Less Distorted and -^—averse 
(M2c4v2) The government in country one is inflation-prone while that in country two inflation 
avers«1. Moreover, the government in country one cares more both about reform and unemploy­
ment (attaches the same weight in r and m), in addition the government in country two attaches
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minimum weight on political costs from reform i.e. -7] =0.5, //|=0.5. //2=0.3
CIO n »’2 r U'i W-2 w «1 «2 u
L-C 2. COGI 3,171 3.0836 1-1.398 4,1057 9,1019 10,35551 2.1540 0.25470
G-C 2. 095 s 3. 163 6 2.929 7 14.411 4. 700 5 9.555 9 10.35517 2.4611 0.4082S
Nash-MC 2.6961 3. 171 3.0830 14.398 4.405 7 9.4019 10,35550 2.1539 0.25175
pre-MC 2.63-1 1 3. ill 3 3.022 9 14.740 4.104 7 9.425 4 10.36132 2.2130 0.28750
CIO •«*1 ira -T T W  — 7T 77 ^2 ’ ’I *»2
L-C 13.81759 3.85529 8.85144 0.55041 9.73039 1,529
G-C 13.84700 4.13050 8.99181 0.50394 9.73012 1.8304
Nash-MC 13.81758 3.85528 8.85143 0.55042 9.73039 1.529
pre-MC 13.83418 3.9099 8.87204 0,553 31 0.911 82 0.194 8 9.73050 1.5887
CIO B /it B-i Li L-l Ox
L-C 4.00037 -13,150805 -3,16400 57.55579 2.2972031
G-C 4.83530 -13,150742 -3.745931 57.50050 2.03599S2
Nash-MC 4.60637 -13,150805 -3.40160 57.55572 2.2972038
pre-MU 0.00884 12.040 0,570 -13,143848 -3,519285 57.97997 2.0899245
Case 1 1 : Distorted and " —prone (M3c2v3) versus Less Distorted and ;r—averse 
(M2c3v2) 'J'he government in country one is inflation-prone while that in country two inflation 
averse. Moreover, the government in country one cares more both about reform and unemploy­
ment. though it attaches more weight, to reform than unemployment: '•y1= 0.0. >¿=0.15.
//.2= 0 .2 .
Ctl ri r-2 r « ’2 w (U w-2 u
L-C 1.8103 1.4797 1.048 14.305 0,3192 10,3121 10,1137 4.145280 7.2944
G-C1 1.815 7 1.333 1.574 4 14.311 0.4599 10.385 10.4435 4.291988 7.3077
Nash-MC 1.816 3 1.479 7 1.048 14.301 0.3192 10.312 10.4129 4.145288 7.2911
pre-ML 1.777 0 1.448 3 1.0130 11.574 0.0730 10.321 10.4173 U 70095 7,3120
Cll «'1 —TT «*2— ~ W — TT 77 ~i "2 V\ ?'2
L-C 13.0031 5.6773 9,0702 0.0119 9.81837 3,5203
G-C 13.0020 5.8115 9.7370 0.64830 9.81843 3.007
Nadi-MC 13.0021 5.0773 9.0097 0.04189 9.81837 3,5203
pre-MC 13.0540 5.7000 9.0803 0.043 40 0.91930 0,307 55 9.82224 3.5517
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C ll B Bí B i Li L i Gi C ’i
L-C 6.265 -13.272047 -5.286699 46.019 4.1771323
G-C 6.391 -13.271921 -5.42093 46.025 4.37113G2
Nasli-MU 6.264 -13.272047 -5.286699 46.013 4.1771327
pre-MU 7.452 12.851 2.054 -13.263920 -5.315430 46.399 3.9386861
Case 12: Distorted and tt—prone (M3c2v3) versus Less Distorted and tt—averse 
(M2c4v2) The government in country one is inflation-prone while that in country two in­
flation averse. Moreover, the government in country one cares more both about reform and 
unemployment, though it attaches more weight to reform than unemployment. Furthermore, the 
government of country two cares little about the political cost of reform, i.e. 7 ! =0.0. 72=(J.05.
//!=().4, /¿2=0.3.
CT2 »‘1 r-2 r W \ W 2 tr til U i u
L-C 1.8147 3.4713 2.643 14.217 4.4093 9.3131 10.4438 2.15370 6.2987
G-C 1.8147 3.232 8 2.5238 14.227 4.638 9.4326 10.4434 2.39219 6.4178
Nasli-MU 1.814 7 3.4713 2.643 14.216 4.4093 9.3127 10.4430 2.15372 6.2983
pre-MU 1. 777 6 3.4113 2.594 5 14.574 4.104 7 9.3394 10.4173 2.21369 6.3305
Cl 2 iCj — IT U '2-7T W  —  IT 7r 7Tl t ’l V-2
L-C 13.6627 3.85502 8. i 088 i 0.55428 9.81853 1.5287
G-C 13.6622 4.07323 8.86773 0.56477 9.81853 1.7672
Nasli-MU 13.6617 3.85501 8.75839 0.554 26 9.81853 1.5287
pre-MU 13.6546 3.9099 8.78227 0.55708 0.91936 0.194 8 9.82224 1.5887
C12 B Bx B2 Lx L i Gj G*2
L-C 4.071 -13.271711 -3.46-1385 45.9125 2.301259
G-C 4.849 -13.271711 -3.682613 45.9210 2.558292
Nasli-MU 4.G70 -13.271711 -3.464385 45.9060 2.301257
pre-MU 6.714 12.851 0.576 -13.263920 -3.519285 46.3996 2.089924
Numerical solutions when $ = 0.033
The numerical solutions displayed in the current section correspond to sections 2.3.3.2. 2.3.4.2 
and 2.3.5.2 of the main paper.
C l: Distorted (M7clv2) versus Less Distorted (M6c3v2) The preference parameter 
values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are : 77 = 0.175. ->2 = 0.15. // j = 0.175. /*2 = 0.2.
mamMmmmammm nmRM)
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Cl r\ r-l r «■’I «'2 i/' « i «2 u
L-C 0.3-1345 0.23509 0.28957 13.950 7.4493 10.7027 10.591 5.3893 7.990
G-C 0.34222 0.22893 0.28557 13.956 7.4579 10.7'009 10.5907 5.3900 7.993
Nash-MU 0.34345 0.23569 0.28957 13.955 7.4494 10.7'022 10.5901 5.3892 7.989
pre-Ml: 0.34000 0.23034 0.28505 14.185 7.2270 10.7'063 10.5911 5.3947 7.992
Cl « ’i -T T W - 2 - Z W — 77 a ~l V i V 2
L-C 13.2328 6.74038 9.9996 0.70312 9.9650 4.704
G-C 13.2525 6.75448 10.003 0.70342 9.9657 4.771
Nasli-MU 13.2519 6.7463 9.9991 0.70310 9.9050 4.764
pre-MC 13.253 0.75287 10.002 0.7033 0.932 0.474 9.9659 4.709
Cl B B i Ö2 L i L-2 (7i G*
L-C 7.517 -12.861860 -6.355734 20.1445 6.3110
G-C 7.523 -12.801964 -0.303905 20.1440 6.3260
Nash-MU 7.510 -12.861860 -0.355734 20.1415 0.3115
pre-MU 8.317 13.207 3.426 -12.802069 -0.302201 20.5191 0.0538
C2: Distorted (M 7clv2 ) versus Less Distorted (M6c4v2) The preference parameter
values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: “?1 =  0.175. /eA =  0.175. =  0.05. //2 =  0.3.
C2 n r-2 r U'i « ’2 «1 U’i u
L-C 0.34322 0.91934 0.63128 13.920 0.593 10.2595 10.5910 4.7050 7.048
G-C 0.33967 0.90094 0.02031 13.927 0.0101 10.271 10.5913 4.2100 7.657
Nasli-MU 0.34321 0.91939 0.6313 13.925 6.5929 10,2589 10.5902 4.7053 7.617
pre-MC 0.34096 0.89713 0.61905 14.185 0.3629 10.274 10.5911 1.7278 7.059
C 2 tC ]—7T 'W '¿—7T 'll- — 7T 7T TTj 7T¿ t ’j
L-C 13.2529 5.9199 9.586 0.67304 9.905678 4.08000
G-C 13.2531 5.9422 9.597 0.67380 9.90003 4.09900
Nasli-MU 13.2519 5.9198 9.585 0.07303 9.905G79 4.08061
pro-MU 13.253 5.9108 9.599 0.67403 0.932 0.410 9.90590 4.10287
C2 B Bi Lx L i G i Ch
L-C 0.887 -12.801880 -5.529372 20.103 7.138
G-C 0.901 -12.862177 -5.551614 20.105 7.189
Nash-MU 0.880 -12.801880 -5.529312 20.100 7.137
pre-MU 7.919 13.207 2.031 -12.862069 -5.550219 20.519 6.919
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C3: Distorted (M7clv3) versus Less Distorted (M6c3v3) The preference parameter 
values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: 72 = 0-T /¿2 =  O.G. 7 i =  0.5. ¡.ix — 0.5.
C3 »"2 r «'I « ’2 tv Uj u2 u
L-C 0.33991 0.25925 0.29958 13.955 7.42 10.6875 10.5911 5.3657 7.9784
G-C 0.33184 0.24782 0.29133 13.95G 7.4343 10.695 10.5916 5.3771 7.9844
Nash-MU 0.33991 0.2592G 0.29959 13.955 7.4199 10.6874 10.5911 5.3650 7.9783
pre-MU 0.331 GO 0.25169 0.29165 14.186 7.1999 10.693 10.5921 5.3733 7.9827
C3 —77 W2-7T tv —7T 7r 7Ti "2 Vy t»2
L-C 13.2529 6.7179 9.9854 0.7021 9.9660 4.74075
G-C 13.2533 6.731 9.9925 0.7026 9.966-5 4.75218
Nash-MU 13.2529 6.717 9.9853 0.7021 9.96(50 4.74074
pre-MU 13.2539 6.727 9.9904 0.7024 0.932 0.472 9.9668 4.74831
C3 B By b 2 L i L l Gi C2
L-C 7.495 -12.862157 -6.327256 56.636 17.7946
G-C 7.506 -l:2.862582 -6.341072 56.641 17.8665
Nash-MU 7.494 -12.862157 -6.327244 56.636 17.7941
pre-MU 8.301 13.210 3.399 -12.862853 -6.336394 57.021 17.5725
C4: Distorted (M 7clv3) versus Less Distorted (M6c4v3) The preferonee parameter 
values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: 72 = 0.05, //2 =  0.95, ' ) l =  0.5, //] =  0.5.
C4 n r-2 r Wi tv2 w «1 «2 u
L-C 0.33969 2.1338 1.2367 13.872 5.0716 9.4718 10.5906 3.49118 7.04093
G-C 0.33408 2.0728 1.2034 13.876 5.1481 9.5118 10.5919 3.55221 7.07206
Nash-MU 0.339 69 2.133 7 1.2367 13.872 5.0716 9.4718 10.5907 3.49116 7.04094
pre-MU 0.33160 2.0885 1.2101 14.86 4.818 9.502 10.5921 3.53650 7.06134
C4 W\ —7T « ’2—" tv — ~ 7T 7T i 7T*2 Vl l'2
L-C 13.25238 4.45198 8.85218 0.C19G2 9.9660 2.8602
G-C 13.253G7 4.52577 8.88972 0.62233 9.9665 2.9272
Nash-MU 13.25239 4.45199 8.85219 0.619C1 9.9000 2.8663
pre-MU 13.25392 4.50G78 8.880:15 0.62165 0.932 0.311 9.9668 2.9115
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Cl B Bi L i L-2 el-2
L-C 5.8371-1 -12.862175 -4.061394 56.5230 12.19043
G-C 5.88884 -12.862645 -4.135128 56.5373 12.58943
Nasli-MU 5.83715 -12.862175 -4.061515 56.5231 12.19047
pre-MU 7.34130 13.210 1.472 -12.8G2853 -4.116150 57.0210 12.19646
C5: Distorted (M7c2v2) versus Less Distorted (M6c3v2) The1 preference parameter 
values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: 7 j =  0.2, y2 =  0.15, //.j =0.15, /t2 =  0.2.
05 n r>¿ r « ’2 ■w Ui «2 u
L-C 0.25847 0.23569 0.24708 13.963 7.4498 10.706 10.59907 5.3892 7.9941
G-C 0.25740 0.23077 0.24408 13.9G3 7.456 10.710 10.59893 5.3942 7.9965
Nash-MU 0.25847 0.23569 0.24708 13.963 7.4498 10.706 10.59907 5.3892 7.9911
pre-MU 0.25773 0.23034 0.24401 14.192 7.2276 10.710 10.59891 5.3946 7.9968
C5 Wi —  7T •U’2 - 7 7 W —  7T 7T TTj 7T2 i’2
L-C 13.25951 6.7463 10.002 0.70349 9.97415 4.7043
G-C 13.25929 6.7522 10.005 0.70371 9.97426 4.7092
Nasli-MU 13.25951 0.7463 10.002 0.70349 9.97415 4.7643
pre-MU 13.25927 0.7528 10.000 0.70373 0.932 0.474 9.97422 4.769«
C5 B ih Ih Lx ¿2 Gi Gì
L-C 7.5240 -12.808978 -6.355734 17.3593 0.3120
G-C 7.5291 -12.809007 -0.361081 17.3590 0.3227
Nasli-MU 7.5210 -12.808978 -0.355734 17.3593 0.3120
pre-MU 8.3208 13.227 3.420 -12.809040 -0.302201 17.7338 6.0538
C6: Distorted (M7c2v2) versus Less Distorted (M6c4v2) The ])reference parameter 
values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: 7i = 0.2. 7 2 =  0.05, f<i =0.15. //2 =  0.3.
CO ri r-2 r «'1 « ’2 il' Ul ti2 u
L-C 0.25827 0.91935 0.58881 13.933 6.5934 10.2632 10.5991 4.7056 7.6521
G-C 0.25517 0.90575 0.58016 13.934 6.6105 10.272 10.5995 4.7192 7.6591
Nash-MU 0.25827 0.91939 0.58883 13.933 0.593 3 10.2631 10.5991 4.7055 7.6523
pre-MU 0.25773 0.89713 0.57743 14.192 6.362 9 10.277 10.5989 4. (278 7.6633
w ggw pw pppw m m m
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CG « ']—7T U'2~ ~ w — ~ ~l ~i *1 Vi
L-C 13.2505 5.0199 9.58979 0.67341 9.9711 4.08065
G-C 13.2599 5.93G4 9.59823 0.67402 9.9711 4.09125
Nasli-MU 13.2505 5.9198 9.58974 0.67341 9.9711 1.08061
pre-MU 13.2592 5.9165 9.60306 0.67439 0.932 0.116 9.9742 4.10287
CG D Bx B i Lx L2 Ch Ch
L-C 6.89199 -12.868994 -5.529300 17,3181 7.1386
G-C 6.907G5 -12.869254 -5.515799 17,3199 7.1768
Nasli-MU 6.80103 -12.868994 -5.529312 17,3181 7.1381
pre-MU 7.92917 13.227 2.631 -12.869010 -5,556219 17.7338 6.9101
C7: Distorted (M7c2v3) versus Less Distorted (M6c3v3) The p re fere nor parameter 
values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: ^  =  0.6, =  0.4. f il =  0.1. ¡i2 =  0.0.
C7 n r-2 r « ’2 w i/] »2 u
L-C 0.22717 0.25925 0.24321 13.965 7.4205 10.692 10.60213 5.3657 7.9SH
G-C 0.22294 0.25055 0.23674 13.966 7.431 4 10.698 10.6030.5 5.3741 7.98S7
Nash-MU 0.22717 0.25926 0.24322 13.965 7.4204 10.69.3 10.60212 5.3656 7.9810
pre-MU 0.22214 0.25160 0.23692 14.106 7.1999 10.698 10.60302 5,3733 7.9881
C7 —7T 1C2 — 77 1C — 77 7T 771 77$ V] Vi
L-C 13.26241 6.7179 9.99016 0.70250 9.97728 4.71075
1 O 13.26301 6.7284 9.99571 0.70299 9.97770 4.71915
Nash-MU 13.2624 6.7178 9.9901 0.70260 9.97728 4.71074
pre-MU 13.26295 6.7275 9.995 0.70295 0.9.33 0.4’12 9.91118 1.74831
C7 B Bx Bi L i  L i Cm G*
L-C 7.50568 -12.871599 -6.327256 45.48922 17.79543
G-C 7,51441 -12.871953 -6,337772 45.49389 17.8502
Nash-MU 7,50561 -12.871599 -6.327211 45.48916 17.79487
pre-MU 8,31841 13.237 3,399 -12.872020 -6,336391 45.86988 17,57256
C8: Distorted (M7c2v3) versus Less Distorted (M6c4v3) The preference para met ri­
valries for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: -Vj =  0.0. --2 — 0.05. ft{ — 0.1. ¡t2 ~  0.05.
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C8 7] **2 r « ’l «'2 w u l "2 1
L-C 0.22098 2.1338 1.18039 13.882 5.0721 9.4771 10.002021 3.49117 7.0105
G-C 0.22232 2.0871 1.1547 13.885 5.1307 9.5078 10.002911 3.53793 7.0701
Nash-MU 0.22099 2.1337 1.18034 13.882 5.0721 9. 4771 10.002029 3.49118 7.0100
pre-MU 0.22214 2.0885 1.553 14.196 4.818 9.507 10.003029 3.53050 7.0097
C8 W\ — 7T 'M*2— 7T W —  7T 77 77 ]  77*¿ V\
L-C 13.2018 4.451 8.85094 0.02011 9.977302 2.8002
G-C 13.2028 4.508 8.88506 0.02219 9.977708 2.9129 j
Nash-MU 13.2G19 4.452 8.85095 0.0201 9.977301 2.8003 j
pre-MV 13.2029 4.500 8.88465 0.02214 0.933 0.31 9.977780 2.9115 j
C8 B B i B i l i Ei G i O 2 (
L-C 5.84053 -12.871015 -4.061394 45.3705 12.1910
G-C 5.88011 -12.872005 -4.117842 45.3854 12.4900
Nash-MU 5.81054 -12.871014 -4.001515 45.3766 12.1911
pre-MU 7.35193 13.237 1.472 -12.872020 -4.116150 45.8098 12.1904
C9: Distorted and 77-prone (M7clv3) versus Less Distorted and 77-averse (M6c3v2)
The preference parameter values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: ^  =  0.5.7  ^=  0.15. 
IH =  0-~). !h  =  °-2._________________
C9 ?•] r-2 r ti’l a ’á W  U \ «2 u
L-C 0.33992 0.23569 0.287805 13.950 7.4495 10.702 10.591078 5.3893 7.99019
G-C 0.33948 0.20507 0.27227 13.957 7.4879 10.723 10.590813 5.4199 8.(X)539
Nash-MU 0.33991 0.23509 0.2878 13.956 7.4494 10.703 10.591070 5.3892 7.99015
]>re-MU 0.33160 0.23034 0.28097 14.186 7.2276 10.707 10.592193 5.3910 7.99341
C9 W \  — 7T W ‘2 —" i r  — 7T 4Ì 77 J 7T2 *>1 V 2
L-C 13.25287 6.7463 9.9996 0.70313 9.900008 4.70431
G-C 13.25252 6.7834 10.017 0.70448 9.90005 4.794
Nash-MU 13.25286 6.7402 9.9995 0.70314 9.960009 4.704
pre-MU 13.25392 6.7528 10.003 0.70341 0.932 0.471 9.90084 4.709
C9 B B 1 B-2 L ì ¿2 £
L-C 7.5171 -12.802156 -0.355734 50.0370 0.3110
G-C 7.5457 -12.862193 -0.392746 56.6365 6.3778
Nash-MU 7.5170 -12.8C2157 -0.355734 50.6375 0.3114
pre-MU 8.3184 13.210 3.420 -12.802853 -0.302201 57.0210 6.0538
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CIO: Distorted and “ -prone (M7clv3) versus Less Distorted and “ -averse (M6c4v2)
The preference parameter values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: ^  — 0.5, 7  ^=  0,05. 
/tj =  0 .5 . =  0.3.
CIO n r -2 7' trj «’2 w «1 «2 u
L-C 0.33984 0.91934 0.62959 13.926 C.5931 10.2595 10.59114 4.7057 7.6484
G-C 0.33857 0.83837 0.58847 13.930 6.6945 10.312 10.59153 4.7866 7.689
Nash-MU 0,33983 0.91939 0.62961 13.926 6.5929 10.2594 10.59113 4.7055 7.648
pre-MU 0.33160 0.89713 0.61437 14,186 6.3629 10.274 10.59219 4.7278 7.660
CIO U ’ l  — 7T W 2 — X W  — 7T 7T n 7T2 V i V i
L-C 13.25295 5.920 9.5865 0.67305 9.96601 G 4.08066
G-C 13.25338 6.017 9.6356 0.67662 9.906143 4.16163
Nash-MU 13.25294 5.919 9.5864 0.67:30G 9.966017 4.08061
pre-MU 13.25392 5.946 9.6004 0.67407 0.932 0.416 9.96684 4.10287
CIO B Bi B2 L i Ci c 2
L-C 6.8878 -12.862163 -5.529372 56.590921 7.138344
G-C 6.9612 -12.862269 -5.627245 50.605395 7.306528
Nash-MU 6.8876 -12.862164 -5.529312 56.596849 7.137883
pre-MU 7.9210 13.210 2.631 -12.862853 -5.556219 57.021030 6.919179
C ll:  Distorted and “ -prone (M7c2v3) versus Less Distorted and “ -averse (M6c3v2)
The preference parameter values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: p-prone vs p-averse
=  0.6. >2 = 0.15. //•! =  OT. /¿2 =  0.2
C ll n i ' i 7’ ■if! «>2 XV 1*2 a
L-C 0.22717 0.23569 0.23143 13.966 7.45 10.708 10.60239 5.3893 7.99585
G-C 0.22681 0.21239 0.21960 13.967 7.4792 10.723 10.60238 5.4126 8.00750
Nash-MU 0.22718 0.23569 0.23144 13.966 7.4499 10.707 10.60239 5.3892 7.995851
pre-MU 0.22214 0.23034 0.22624 14.196 7.2276 10.712 10.60302 5.3916 7.99886
Cll i/'l-TT V'i — “ tr — “ “  7T1 7T2 * ’l Vi
L-C 13.26237 6.74637 10.00137 0.70363 9.977283 4.76431
G-C 13.26234 6.77454 10.01844 0.70466 9.977319 4.78761
Nash-MU 13.26237 6.74627 10.00432 0.70363 9.977282 4.76431
pre-MU 13.26295 6.75287 10.00791 0.70389 0.933 0.174 9.977786 4.76906
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C l 1 B  I h  B 2 L x l 2 0 \ ________ C j
DC 7.5278 “12.871569 -0.355731 45.49040S 0.312377
G-C 7.5497 -12.871G29 -0.383898 45.491057 0.302«)!)
Nash-MU 7.5277 -12.871598 -0.355731 45.490407 0.312205
pre-MU 8.3319 13.237 3.426 -12.872020 -0.302201 45.809882 0.053873
C12: D is to rted  and w-prone (M 7c2v3) ve rsu s  Less D is to rted  an d  w-averse (M6c4v2) 
The preference parameter values for the governments in country 1 and 2 are: ^  =  0.6. ~f2 =  0.05. 
=  0-1- f h  =  d.3.
Cl 2 n r-2 V t/’i w'2 W ƒƒ | it 2 a
DC 0.2271 0.91935 0.57322 13.930 6.5935 10.20475 10.002105 4.7050 7.05101
G-C1 0.22005 0.85750 0.54181 13.939 0.0709 10.305 10.002724 4.7071 7.08500
Nash-MU 0.22711 0.01940 0.57320 13.930 0.593 4 10,2047 10.002105 4.7055 7.05100
pre-MU 0.22214 0.89713 0.55904 14.190 0.302 9 10.2794 10.003029 4.7278 7.00515
Cl 2 U'\— ~ K'2-« w  — rr 7T ~1 7T-2 '0\ V-2
DC 13.20245 5.91995 9.5912 0.07355 9.9772!) 4.08005
G-C 13.20273 5.99463 9.0280 0.07627 9.97738 4.14244
Nash-MU 13.20245 5.91985 9.5911 0.07355 9.97728 4.0800
pre-MU 13.20295 5.91085 9.0019 0.07455 0.933 10.410 9.97778 1.10287
Cl 2 B l h  D2 L , L i
DC 0.8979 -12.871005 -5.529300 45.449525 7.13879!
G-C1 0.9539 -12.871093 -5.004049 45.455105 7.312555
Nash-MU 0.8978 -12.871004 -5.529300 45.419525 7.138505
pre-MU 7.9315 13.237 2.031 -12.872020 -5.550219 45.809882 0.919179
C ooperation  of governm ents
Here we discuss the implications for nominal, real wages, unemployment and inflation when the 
two governments engage in cooperation and how they compare with their levels under a non- 
cooperative Nash play (or all-Nash play).
Case w ith  6 =  0.268 The nominal wage in country 2 increases above its level in case of 
a non-cooperative Nash play inside the MU. The reduction in home-country reform following 
governments' cooperation is the driving force for this result since wages and reform are perrei\'ed 
as being strategic substitutes on the wage sotting divisions of the labor union in the second
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country82. Furthermore, in most cases considered nominal wages in country 1 increase above 
their value under non-cooperative Nash play (but are still Ij c Io vv  their prc-Mt* levels!. The 
driving forces are the lower level of reform (t'2) and the higher level of wag«** (in/): there is also 
a moderating effect coming into play in the cooperative case. i.e. the lower value of r,. because 
wages and reform are strategic complements in the wage-setting devisions of the home labor 
union83. Overall, average wage in the MU are at their highest levels under the cooi>eraiive play 
(with its value being above the pre-MU case)*4 *.
Under all different specifications inflation is at its highest value inside tin* MU in the case 
of cooperation, because average reform decreases and average nominal wages increase tvlative to 
the all-Nasli play. Real wages in country 2 end up in a higher level after the ani] K-ration of the 
two governments, in particular they are above the case of an all-Nash play (as well as above* their 
before the Ml: levels).8* i.e. the increase in nominal wages outweighs the higher inflation level. 
Real wages in country 1 are bigger compared to the pre-MU outcome under all specifications 
examined. Though in some cases they can be above or Ix'low their non-coo]x'rntive Nash play 
levels.8* i
Unemployment in country 2 reaches its maximum level in the case «if coo|)erative play inside 
the MU. because real wages in country 2 attain their maximum value in that ease, while home 
reform is at its minimum level in the cooperative case8'. In most rases unemployment in country 
1 is higher under cooperative play than tinder non-cooperative Nash play (while it is below 
the pre-M lT outcome)88. On the one hand, reform is slightly lower (compared to the all-Nash 
play) because national governments internalize the effects of the "l>eggnr-thy-nrighbur‘\  while on 
the other hand, real wages (which are bigger compared to their pre-MU levels) either increase 
compared to the all-Nash play raising further unemployment or when they fall, their decline is
SJIn addition, the reduction in n compared to tlie Nash play inside the Ml’ will raise moreover. podlivc will 
also be the impact of a higher ti'j.
^Actuall.v this moderating effect is stronger ami makes nominal wage* attain their low»-*) value in 1 he coop-rat ive 
ease in the first country in specification 3 and 7. whore both governments are inflation prom* ami ihe government
in country one attaches the less or equal weight on reform compared to inflation (*t < /1,) while still *, i < "(2. 
s^ Though in case 6. the area wide nominal wages although higger than in the rasp of Nadi play inside the Ml .
they lag behind those obtained outside the Ml*, hence the strategic complementarity effect on the wage setting
decisions of the labour union in country 1 is cjuite strong.
SjNot in case G. where the cooperation outcome under cooperation is Ix-Iovv its pre-Ml* levels.
srln specifications 1. 2, 11 and 12. real wages end up in a higher level compared to Nadi play inside the Ml ,
similarly for the case G. though in that case real wages end up in a lower level inside the Ml compared to their 
levels outside the MV. In all the rest cases real wages are lower in the rouj>erative compand to the non-coop-rat iv«-
case ,
s' The only exception is specification G where unemployment following the pattern of real wage* i* above the case
of an all-Nash play inside the MV. but below the outcome achieved prior to Ml . 
ssThis holds for cases 1—1, 7-S and 11-12.
I IW U IF IW *
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not sufficient to improve the unemployment outcome*'.
Case with <5 =  0.033 Nominal wages in country 2 reach their maximum value after cooperation: 
wages and reform are perceived as substitutes, hence when reform is reduced and union bargaining 
power is raised, nominal wage demands are raised as well. Similarly, the nominal wages in country 
1 increase above the levels achieve«.I under non-cooperative Nash play inside the M l’ (though they 
are still below their pre-MU levels). Area-wide nominal wages increase above the levels under 
Nash play by all agents inside the MU, as well as their pre-MU levels1'1-1.
The inflation rate under cooperation increases above its all-Nash play anti pre-MU levels, 
because average reform reaches its lowest level under cooperation, while nominal wages increase 
compared to the all-Nash play case1'1. Real wages in country 2 increase after cooperation (i.e. the 
nominal wage increase more than compensates the inflation rise), and in most cases (excluding 
2, 5 and 6) they are above their pre-MU values. Real wages in country 1 increase above their 
non-cooperative Nash play inside the MU when governments cooperate, though they can he above 
or below their pre-MU levels92. Overall, in most cases area-wide real wages reach their maximum 
value1 iu the cooperative case93.
Unemployment in country 2 reaches its maximum value in the cooperative ease1 for the reasons 
described in the previous section.91 As we saw above, reform is lower in the cooperative1 erase, while 
ival wages in most cases increase compared to their non-cooperative levels, these1 developments 
lead to higher unemployment in country 1 when the two governments engage in cooperation. 
Though in the erasers (5, 9 and 11) where real wage's fall compared to the non-cooperative post- 
MU case, unemployment in country 1 falls as we'll, because1 the1 dc'crease in real wages out-weights 
the decrease in reform.
s'ln some of the eases unemployment decreases with respect to the non-cooperative Nash outcome, but is still 
above its pre-MU level. This is attributed to the decline in rral wages inside the Ml' that outweighs the fall in
reform effort (case ■’i) or to the increase in real wages that lags behind the fall in reform (case (i).
,0In specification 2. II. -1. 5. and G nominal wages in the cooperative outcome are below or equal their pre-Ml' 
levels.
'‘However, in cases 2. 5 and G the inflation rate under cooperation is below its pre-MT levels, because average
reform and nominal wages are. respectively, above and below their pre-Ml levels.
■'In specification k and 11 real wages in the more distorted economy fall when governments cooperate compared 
to the all-Nash play case.
1,3Except in eases 2. 5 and G where they are at a lower level compared to the pre-Ml’ case.
"Though, in specifications 2. and G the unemployment outcome is lower than the pre-Ml’ case, because real
wages and reform are. respectively, at a lower and higher value compared to the prior to Ml' model.
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C o o p e ra tio n  of labor unions
C a se  w ith  (5 =  0.268 In case of inter-union cooperation wj is lower relative to its value under 
governments' ccxjperation (with the exception of specifications 3 and 5). Furthermore, wages are 
at the same level as under the all-Nash play!J,J. Therefore, the cooperation of the two labor unions 
implies that when reform is at the same or higher levels relative those under the all-Nash play, 
li’i will also be at the same or higher levels compared to its all-Nash play value“ . Notice that 
when unions cooperate relative to a case where governments also cooperate, reform is higher in 
most cases while wages are lower; which occurs because reform is moderated when governments 
cooperate, instead wages are moderated when unions cooperate.
Under all specification w2 is at a lower level when unions cooperate rather than when govern­
ments cooperate as well (notice that there is substitutability effect at work because reform has 
increased). Comparing the inter-union cooperation with the all-Nash play game, wo see that the 
wage levels coincide in most cases (as reform does)“'. Area-wide nominal wages are lower when 
unions cooperate relative to an inter-government coalition (while reform is higher). In most cases 
unions' coalition results in higher average wages than the all-Nash play1'*.
Given that labor unions cooperate, a cooperation on the part of the governments in deciding 
labor market institutions will lead to higher inflation rate, because wages will he increased and 
reform will be reduced. Comparing the unions’ coalition outcome with that of an all-Nash play, 
we set' that the inflation outcome is not uniform across the different specifications“ .
Real wages in country 1 are in most cases above the governments' coalition outcome, because 
the fall in nominal wages is more than compensated by the fall in inflation (exactly the opposite 
holds is specifications 1. 2 and 6). Moreover, they are above their all-Nash play levels due to the 
fall in inflation while nominal wages are unchanged* 100. Hence, in most cases, the union in country 
1 (that treats wages and reform as complements) is benefited, both with respect to the all-Nasli 
play and governments’ cooperation case101 102. Contrary to country 1. real wages in country 2 are 
always above their levels under government cooperation10'1.
ljExcept in specifications 1. 8, 11-12 where w\ is above its all-Nash play levels.
4t’In specifications 1 and 8 an increase in reform implies higher wages, i.e. a complementarity effect is at work.
° 'However, wages are at a lower level when unions form a coalition in specifications 2, 4. and 8. because reform
increases (the substitutability effect), whereas in specifications 3 and 9 wages are at a higher level.
gsThough, ill specifications 2 and -1 the opposite is true, while in specification >7 and 10 the wage levels coincide.
gyIu some cases (1. 8. 11-12) inflation increases when unions cooperate, while in specifications 1, o. 7. 9. 10
inflation decreases. In model specifications 2. 3 and G inflation coincides in the two cast's.
100ln model specifications 2, 3 and 6 the real wages under unions" cooperation coincide with those under all-Nash
play.
t01ln specifications 2 and (i real wages are below their levels under governments' cooperation, while they coincide 
with those under an all-Nash play.
1021n addition, real wages in country 2 when unions form a coalition are in some cases (1-3, 8. 11.12) below their 
levels under all-Nash play, while in others (specification 3. o. 7. 9 and 10) they are above (in specification G their
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If the labor unions cooperate in setting nominal wages, the unemployment rate in count rv 
1 (in most cases) increases above its all-Xash play levels, because real wages rise while reform 
either does not change or is raised by a smaller amount10'1. Moreover, in specifications 5. 0. (M2 
unemployment is higher relative to the case where two governments cooperate, while it is below 
that level in specifications 1-4 and 7-8. If the two national governments engage in cooperation, 
when the labor unions already set wage in a cooperative manner, then the unemployment rate 
in country 2 will increase because reform and real wages will be at a lower and higher love], 
respectively* 104 *10.
Case w ith  ó =  0.033 Like in the previous section nominal wages in both countries are lower 
when unions cooperate relative to the case where governments also decide to coordinate their 
reform efforts10*’1. Comparing the wages when unions cooperate with those under non-cooperative 
Nash play (in country 1) we see that they are practically unchanged100. In country 2 nominal 
wage's increase in most cases.10, as a result average wages increase's as well (except in specification 
4 and 5).
The inflation rate is at a lower level when unions cooperate relative to a case' where the two 
governments are also setting reform in cooperative manner: as discussed previously the bigger 
amount of reform will lead to a higher nominal wage decline in case of unions* cooperation due 
to the substitutability effect. The comparison of the all-Nash play and the unions cooperation 
outcomes gives more ambiguous results10' .
Heal wages and consequently unemployment in country 1 have* a lower value when unions 
cooperate relative to a case where governments cooperate as welllul\ Heal wages and unemploy­
ment in case of an inter-union coalition are at the same levels with those under non-cooperative 
Nash play in specification 3. a. 6. 11 and 12; while they are at a bigger level when unions co­
operate in specification 1. 2. 7. 9 and It)11". Real wages and unemployment- in country 2 are 
lower under unions* cooperation relative to the case where an inter-union coalition plays Nash 
against an inter-government coalition (because the fall in wages is bigger than the dec-line in the
values coincide).
10:iJ[i specification 3, unemployment dots not change: whereas in .specifications 2. 0 and 7 it is at a lower level, 
because reform increases while real wages either don't changes or increase by a smaller amount.
104.Notice that the way unemployment compares under unions' cooperation with respect to the all-Xash play case.
corresponds exactly to the way real wages compare under unions' cooperation relative to the all-.NasIi p la y  cast1. 
10j 1ii country 1. in specifications 1 and 5. wages coincide when unions or governments cooperate.
10' In models 1 and 2 they increase above their non-cooperative .Nash values.
1 However, in specificat ions 1. 5. 8. nominal wages do not change.
‘ I^nflation is not altered in specifications 3. 5. (i. i. 11. 12. It is higher in the cooperative case in specifications 
1. 2. 1. 8 while it is lower in model sj»reifications 9 and 10.
10 t'l'hongh in specifications 1, .j. 9 and 11 real wages and unemployment are higher in the case of inter-union 
cooperation.
110The opposite is the case in specification 1 and 8.
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inflation rate, therefore real wages decrease; combining this with the bigger amount of reform 
generates a fall in unemployment). When unions cooperate, in most cases real wages, as well as 
unemployment are above their non-cooperative Nash play levels111.
t!
i
111Except in case 5, that are equal, and cases 4 and 8 that are below their all-Nash play levels.
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T h e  E f f e c t s  o f  M a c r o e c o n o m i c  P o l i c y  
S h o c k s  o n  t h e  U K  L a b o r  M a r k e t
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2.1 Introduction
This paper examines the effects of various macroeconomic policy shocks on the UK labor mar­
ket. In particular it analyzes the pattern of dynamic responses of employment, average hours 
per worker, and real wages to government spending, net taxes and monetary policy shocks. Fur­
thermore, it considers the effects that different government spending components have on labor 
market outcomes. The motivation for this study comes from the fact that the UK labor market is 
characterized by different outcomes both over time and compared to the US anti major Euro-area 
countries. This is attributed to the series of labor market reforms that it underwent in the 1980s 
that led to an improvement of its flexibility and performance. Therefore we shall investigate 
how the responsiveness of labor market variables has evolved over time, whether their dynamic 
responses are in line with what the economic theory would suggest and whether they resemble 
with previous empirical findings for the UK, the US and the Euro-area.
The structural reforms in the 1980s and beginning of 1990s have affected in a significant 
manner the performance of the UK labor market over time. Specifically, the measures that were
*1 am grateful to Roberto Perotti and Mike Artis for very useful comments and constant support. I also 
thank, Richard Barwell. Luca Denali, Guillermo Felices. Panagiotis T. Konstantinou, Emmanuel C. Mamatzakis. 
Katharine Neiss, Salvador Ortigueira, Gert Peers man. Jonathan Thomas for very helpful comments and suggestions 
on a previous version of the paper. Moreover, I would like to thank the participants of the Structural Economic 
Analysis Division Seminars of the Bank of England for their useful comments on a previous version of the paper. 
Any remaining errors are solely the author's responsibility.
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taken aimed at reducing hiring costs (the Employment Act of 1U88 ami 1989) and made easier 
the dismissal of workers by mincing firing costs (the I nfair Dismissal Variation of Qualifying 
Period Order of 1979 and 1985).2 Whereas, a series of legislative actions aimed at improving 
wage flexibility (especially earlier legislative actions that abolished Wage Councils, which were 
setting minimum wages) and weakening the power of labor unions.'1 As a result the proportion 
of workers covered by collective1 agreement fell from 71 percent in 1981 to 51 percent in 1990. 
Aggregate union membership fell from 13.2 million in 1980 to 9.9 million by 1990, and union 
density declined from 54 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 1990.4
As a consequence, the cyclical components of employment, total hours, real wages and average 
hours hate become much more volatile but less persistent (see Appendix, tables 1 and 2) since 
the beginning of the 1990s. The volatility of real wages increased above that of employment, 
while the volatility of average hours came much closer to the volatility of the cyclical compo­
nent of employment. The persistence of the cyclical component of average1 hours became larger 
than the one for employment. Hence, si net1 the beginning of the 1990s. while all labor market 
variables became more volatile to cyclical fluctuations, there lias been an increased role for real 
wage adjustment relative to employment adjustment following cyclical fluc tuations. Despite the 
fact that cyclical fluctuations became less persistent for all variables due to increased labor mar­
ket flexibility, average hours became relatively more persistent than employment over the cycle, 
strengthening the labor input adjustment along the extensive margin,
W hen comparing employment, average hours per worker, total hours and real wages in the 
UK with those in the US. and the three1 major Euro-area economies (i.c. Germany. Krai me and 
Italy) we set1 that overall the above mentioned variables are more volatile in the UK. adjusting in 
a flexible manner to cyclical variations in economic activity (see Appendix, figure 17). Moreover, 
in the UK there is an adjustment of the labor input, following cyclical fluctuations, both with 
respect to the intensive (average hours) and the extensive margin (employment) as is revealed by 
the volatility measures, while in the other countries this is not the case. Employment appears to
"S«- for example Millard (2000). Disney et al (1905). Mason and Bain (1993). Milhvard et al (1992). Gregg and 
Yates (1991). G reeii (1992).
3lor example, the Wages Act of 1986. the Employment Act and Social Security Ad of 1980. the Employment 
Act of 1982. 1988. 1990, the Trade Union Act of 1981 and the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights of 
1993, as well as. the Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertaking (Amendment) Regulations of 1995.
'I he specific measures were including, for example, deduction of strike pay from the benefit entitlement of striking 
workers. Moreover, any industrial action without a secret ballot was considered illegal, closed shop arrangements 
were also made illegal (i.o. to hire workers only if they are union or non-union members). Furthermore, any 
industrial action that was taken in order to enforce union membership was deemed illegal.
4Morcovrr, the proportion of enterprises which recognized labour unions for collective bargaining with respect 
tu wages and conditions of work fell from 67 percent in 1980 to 51 percent in 1990. lor a more detailed discussion 
see e.g. Milhvard et al (1992) and Disney et al (1995).
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be slightly more persistent (see Appendix, figure 18) than average hours over the business cycle 
in the UK. whereas in the rest of the countries considered average hours are equally persistent as 
employment (US and France) or more persistent (Germany and Italy).
Thus a t first glance, empirical evidence suggests that the UK labor market has become more 
flexible both over-time and with respect to the other countries considered due to the reforms 
th a t were introduced in the 1980s. Whereas, the labor input adjustment was found to take both 
the  form of employment and average hours adjustment. Hence, the decomposition of total labor 
input to  employment and average hours is crucial in understanding the effects and propagation of 
macroeconomic policy shocks in the UK economy. The analysis is carried out by means of a semi- 
structural VAR in the spirit of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), combining elements of Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Mojon and Peersman (2001) and Peersman and Smetts (2001).
Relevant studies using U.S. data (e.g. Christiano. Eichenbaum and Evans, 1990. 1999) and 
Euro-area data (e.g. Mojon and Peersman, 2001) suggest that aggregate output and employment 
decline following a hump-shaped pattern in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. 
Economic theoiy (Ilammermesh 1993. Cli. 6) suggests that following a shock the response of 
hours and employment will depend on two factors. First, the economic agents' perception of the 
permanence of the demand change caused by the shock, and second the relative cost of adjusting 
hours or employment. When the demand change induced by the shock is perceived as temporary 
and there exist adjustment costs to labor, economic agents will adjust along the* intensive margin; 
while when the effects of the shock are perceived as permanent profit maximization on the part 
of the firms implies adjustment along the extensive margin. We will test whether the UK data 
are in line with these points.
The typical Real Business Cycle model analyzing the effects of fiscal policy implies that a 
positive government spending shock in the present period that is to be matched by higher labor 
taxes in the current and future periods, generates a wealth effect that decreases consumption and 
increases labour supply. Both the intertemporal substitution effect (individuals prefer to supply 
more labor when labor taxes are low) and the intratemporal substitution effect (individuals prefer 
to supply more labor when the cost of work relative to 1015111*0 is low) reduce labor supply, while 
the intertemporal effect decreases consumption. In this case the effect on labour supply and real 
wages is ambiguous. If the elasticity of labour supply is big enough, labour could decrease while 
real wages increase. Introducing price stickiness and monopolistic competition (New Keynesian 
features) implies that firms meet the higher demand for their products by increasing their labour 
demand. The implications for employment and real wages, consumption and consequently output 
and investment will depend on the strength of the intertemporal and intratermporal substitution 
effects relative to the wealth effect and the severity of price rigidities, as well as the persistence 
of the government spending shock and the timing of taxation. Several papers using U.S. data on
the effects of a fiscal policy si lock (c.g Blanchard and Perot ti (2002). Fat as and Mi hoy (2001). ,
Burnside. Lichenbaum and Fisher (2003). Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004)) find that a gov­
ernment spending shock increases output, as well as, employment and total hours, with their 
responses having a hump-shaped pattern/' Perotti (2004). finds that the effect of a government 
spending shock on output in the V K , Canada and Germany is much smaller (even negative) and 
not persistent over the last twenty years. In addition, several studies (e.g. Finn 1008. Ardagna 
2001. Alesina et al 2002, Lane and Perotti 2003) have shown that the composition of the govern- < 
ment spending shock matters, with the wage and non-wage components having much different *
effects on labor market variables ami output. Our analysis builds on these papers and examines t
whether the responses of the FK labour market variables are in line with theory and previous 
empirical evidence.
The main implication of our analysis is that the response of employment and hours to a 
monetary policy shock is negative and follows a liumj>-shaped pattern generating an analogous | 
response for output. The adjustment of labor input is primarily along the extensive margin, 
although there is also significant adjustment along the intensive margin one year after the shock, 
contrary to the results reported by relevant I ’.S. studies. When considering the smaller sample 
1970 Q I-1990 Q 1. that covers the period where the legislative change took place, average hours 
are fount 1 to respond faster and in a more pronounced way compared to employment. Therefore, 
once the favorable legislative actions that improved labor market flexibility were in place, firms 
took advantage of them adjusting primarily along the extensive margin and to a lesser extent 
along the intensive margin following a shock, as we see from the whole sample erase. Labor 
market reform that was pursued during the 1980s in the I'K brought down the adjustment costs 
of labor input incurred by firms. The response of real wages to a monetary shock is negative (as 
expected) but insignificantly estimated.
A government spending shock leads to a negative response for employment, hours, output.and 
its components; real wages are affected positively for more than one and a half years following 
the shock. However, composition matters with respect to the effects of a government spending 
shock. Specifically, a "labor market channel" of fiscal policy as defined in Alesina et al (2002) is 
present; i.e. the wage bill component of government spending increases the wages in the private 
sector, reducing profits, which leads to a decrease in employment and business investment. This, 
in turn, contracts output, income and private expenditure. Changes in the non-wage component 
of government consumption or the government investment do not generate1 an increase in labor 
cost, thus they do not deteriorate* the competitive position of IT\ businesses, however, they 
also lail to boost private demand in a significant manner, so employment in the business sector
J Basil and Kimball (2003) slicm* that an increase in jioverniiieiit spending may even reduce output in the absence 
of adjustment costs to investment.
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is unaffected or increases only on impact. Nevertheless, average hours increase in a persistent 
manner generating a significant increase in total hours.
It appears that when the labour input declines, (i.e. mainly in cases of a wage government 
consumption), both employment and average hours decline. However, when the labour input 
increases, like in the case of a non-wage government consumption shock or a government invest­
ment shock, the adjustment takes place in the form of an increase in average hours per worker, 
with employment changes being insignificant over the five year horizon considered. Thus, when 
real wages increase and the competitive position of UK firms deteriorates, profit maximization 
(or cost minimization) induces them to reduce the number of workers they employ; while when 
the spending boost is not affecting their labour costs, firms adjust their labour input only along 
their intensive margin because they anticipate that the shock will have only temporary effects on 
private demand.
Notice that in an RBC model with distortionary taxation, a tax hike in the current period, 
when government spending is unchanged, will be matched by lower taxes in the future. In this case 
it generates an intertemporal and an intratemporal substitution effect that induce individuals to 
reduce labour supply and consumption in the current period. Moreover, an increased tax burden 
on the part of the firms (and consumers that decreases income and total demand) can lead them 
to cut back employment (reduction in the demand for labor), depending on the adjustment cost 
of labor and their perception about the permanence of the shock. Nevertheless, this will also 
depend on the extent of price rigidities. However, the net impact effect on employment and real 
wages might not be clear. The results obtained here indicate that the effect of a net taxes shock 
on employment, hours and real wages is negative on impact but it switches to positive one to two 
years after the shock. Whereas, output responds positively with a delay of two quarters. Similar 
output responses are presented in Perotti (2004) with respect to the UK. the US and Canada, 
for the period 1980 Q1-2001 Q2.
Section 2 discusses the identification conditions of the monetary (section 2.1.1) and fiscal policy 
shocks (section 2.1.2). Section 3 presents the results on the monetary (section 3.1). spending 
(sections 3.2) and net taxes shocks (sections 3.3). Finally, section 4 concludes.
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2.2 VAR Analysis
The benchmark estimated VAR includes in the following order: the log of real total government 
purchases (consumption and investment), the log of real net taxes (total revenues minus transfers), 
the log of real GDP. the log of the GDP deflator, the log of dependent employment in the 
business sector (excluding self-employed and government employment), the log of average hours 
per worker (on dependent employment), the log of real effective exchange rate and the short­
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term nominal interest rate which is considered to be the monetary policy instrument-'. The real 
effective exchange rate is included in the analysis to take into account the openness effects on the 
UK economy. Moreover, we use as exogenous variables the log of agricultural raw materials to 
deal with the so-called price puzzle. Both an intercept and a trend are includixl. whereas the lag 
length was set to two*. The estimation period is 1970:Ql-2U03:Ql. The VAR we estimateti is of 
the form:
Xt — A \X t—\ + A ‘2X t—2... A p X t-p  + C D t  + B z t  +  tq (2.1 )
where x t =  [g, i, y. p. E .  H .r e e r ,  /’] is the vector of endogenous variables included in the analysis. 
D t contains all regressors associated with deterministic terms, whereas c/ are the exogenous 
variables included in the analysis.
Notice that according to Dolado and Lutkepolil (1996) and Toda and Yamamoto (1995) if all 
variables in an unrestricted VAR are 1(1) and/or 1(0) and the lag order is greater or equal to 2 
then the usual tests (t. Chi-square, F) have their standard asymptotic properties. Moreover, by 
carrying out the analysis in levels we allow for implicit cointegrating relationships in the data 
(Hamilton 199-1. chl8).
2.2.1 Identifying monetary and fiscal policy shocks
M onetary  policy shock
In order to identify a monetary policy shock we assume following Christiano, Einchebaum and 
Evans (CEE, 1999) that the monetary authority responds in systematic way to economic devel­
opments by sidling a policy instrument (nominal interest rate). Hence, it follows a feedback rule 
of the fornr:
r, =  <!>(ƒ/)+^ '’ (2.2)
that relates policy-makers’ actions to the state of the economy. It stands for the information 
set, <I> is a lin e a r  ju n c tio n , and c™ is the monetary policy shock. The first crucial assumption 
that is made towards identification of the monetary policy shock is the linearity of the feedback 
rule, combined with the variables included in h  i.e the variables that the monetary authority
''All variables used in tlie* analysis are from the OECD Economic Outlook and tlu* IMF International Financial 
St atistics.
Lag length was chosen, in all cases, based on no autocorrelation and after the evaluation of the relevant 
information criteria (Ilauimu-Qiiinii).
s\Ve do not consider the possibility of equating the policy instrument to monetary aggregates like the base 
(MO). Ml and M'2. On the one hand, the demand for broad monetary aggregates is unstable in a very deregulated 
banking system. On the other hand, narrow money aggregates that are not affected by deregulation, have been 
strongly affected by technological innovation of the banking and financial system.
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is assumed to look at when it undertakes a policy action. Following these assumptions, we 
impose the so-called I't.cursivauss assumption, i.e. the monetary policy shock is orthogonal to 
the information set of the monetary authority. As CEE (1999) point out. "the recursiveness and 
linearity assumptions, allow us to estimate a policy shock by the fitted residuals in the ordinary 
least square's regression of the monetary authority's policy instrument on the variables included 
in its information set". This implies that at time t there is no contemporaneous response of the 
variables in h to the monetary policy shock. Notice that I t can contain values of current and 
past variables; e.g. if the current value of GDP is included, then it is assumed that this does not 
respond contemporaneously to the shock at time t, but that it responds at time t +  1.
The ordering of the variables adopted implies that: the monetary policy authority is assumed 
to see the fiscal variables, real output, prices and employment and average hours when deciding on 
the value of the policy instrument. In addition, we assume that the fiscal authority decides first 
on spending and taxation and then follows the monetary authority, which is realistic because the 
bulk of the spending and tax decisions are set by relevant legislative action once a year, w hereas 
monetary policy is adjusted more frequently. As CEE (1999) point out. even if quarterly data, as 
we use in our analysis, are known with a delay, the monetary authority has at its disposal monthly 
data on aggregate real economic activity and the price level. Alternatively, as CEE (1990) say. 
any contemporaneous correlation between the shock and the indicators of aggregate production 
activity reflects causation from the production side to the policy instrument, and not the other 
way around, i.e. output, prices and labor market variables arc* not affected in the impact period 
of a monetary policy shock.
In allowing the real effective exchange rate to be ordered before the policy instrument we 
assume that the monetary policy instrument responds contemporaneously to movements of the 
real exchange rate as is likely to be the case for a small open economy like the t'K. On the other 
hand, ordering the real effective exchange rate last, would imply that the monetary policy shock 
affects the exchange rate immediately, though, in that case the monetary policy instrument does 
not respond to contemporaneous changes in the effective exchange rate1. However, this assumption 
might be more appropriate for big closed economies like the VS.
We include as exogenous variable a proxy for the world commodity ])rices. which is the log 
of agricultural raw materials'1 This way we attempt to control for change's in world inllation and 
deal with the “price puzzle". By treating this variable as exogenous we assume that it has a 
contemporaneous effect on all endogenous variable's but it is not influenced by them.
J Alternatively we used an index of food and average crude oil price, but the results obtained were similar.
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F iscal policy shock
T h e  next stop in ou r analysis will bo to exam ine th e  effects of u n a n tic ip a te d  fiscal policy shocks. 
B u t w hat exactly  are su p p o sed  to  be th e  u n a n tic ip a ted  fiscal policy shocks? According to Blan­
c h a rd  an d  P ero lti (2002). they  correspond to  m id -y ear legislation a n d  executive decisions, so 
"decision lags in policy m ak ing  (more th a n  a q u a r te r)  help iden tify  th e  policy shocks, while, im­
p lem en ta tio n  lags m ake th em  predictable.“ It u sua lly  takes m ore th a n  a  q u a rte r  for policy makers 
a n d  legislators to  identify  an d  understand  the  effects o f a shock on th e  economy a n d  to decide 
on  d iscre tionary  fiscal policy  action. However, it is possible th a t  decisions on fiscal policy actions 
a re  im plem ented  w ith a delay  of more th a n  one q u a r te r . T his im plies th a t  w hat wo m easure as a 
po licy  shock is already  know n and people have a lre ad y  ad ju sted  th e ir  behav io r an tic ip a tin g  the 
im p lem en ta tion  o f th e  relevant policy m easure.
To achieve iden tification  we follow relevant w ork  by  B lanchard  a n d  Pero tti (2002) and  Pcr- 
o t t i  (2001) in assum ing th a t  fiscal policy variables a re  p red e term in ed  w ith  respect to  the  other 
variable's included in th e  VAR and by using in s titu tio n a l in fo rm a tio n  about the elastic ities of 
sp en d in g  and  net taxes to  economic ac tiv ity  (w hich reflect th e  a u to m a tic  response o f fiscal vari­
ab les to  econom ic activ ity)-10. Hence, any change's in fiscal policy  variab les are not considered to 
bo a contem poraneous (w ith in  the q u arte r) d isc re tio n ary  response to  th e  changing econom ic en­
v iro n m en t. b u t a re  considered  to  be exogenous. B lan ch ard  a n d  P o ro tti (2002) assume* th a t there 
is no automatic f( (Aback from  economic ac tiv ity  to  governm ent sp en d in g  w ithin th e  q u a rte r. In 
a d d itio n  any discnlionary change to fiscal policy  in  response to  ch ang ing  econom ic conditions 
w ith in  th e  q u a rte r  can hi climinatat by th e  use o f  q u a rte rly  d a ta . T h is  is based on  the assum ji- 
tio n  th a t  w ithin a q u a rte r , policy m akers canno t lea rn  about a G D P  shock and respond  to  it by 
im p lem en tin g  fiscal policy  actions. However, th e re  is autom atic: feedback from economic' activ ity  
w ith  respec t to net taxes; therefore by co n stru c tin g  e lastic ities o f net tax es  with respect to various 
econom ic variables we t ry  to  identify th e  net ta x  shock clean o f any contem poraneous responses 
to  econom ic activity.
T h e  reduced form  residuals tt( are assum ed to  be  re la ted  to  th e  m u tu a lly  m icon-elated economic 
shocks St in th e  following m anner:
U'f — Uypit-f "h fLgI\'U.f A  T  dgrf-er^t “I- (IgjUj (2 .ii)
_i_ i A  4. ? A  
^ P g l - t  +  agg-t
«•! =  «/»/«? +  «/P«? +  dtlAif A  aural1 +  atrecru,t<vr +  (2.-1)
1,1 See discussion in Perot ti (2001) on comparison with other identification schemes, as well as for a detailed 
discussion on the interpretation of fiscal shocks.
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Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) we construct the cyclically adjusted fiscal shock:
Ilf =  Uf (dgyltf +  agpu¥ “H +  agilut 4* 0-greerut +  Q.g¡Uf)
=  < v : + ^  (a-®)
ut'CA — u] -  {atyv^ +  atpUf +  atpuf +  atuu^ +  atreerurieeT 4- u^ttj)
= A#e{ +  / V ?  (2-6)
We consider both orderings, with spending first and assuming ¡3gt =  0, as well as having net 
taxes first and ¡3tg =  0. The results are invariant to the ordering used because the correlation 
between the shocks is low enough and insignificant. As in Perotti (2001) the two fiscal shocks are 
used as instruments in the third equation for output uf =  7ygUf +  7yJ.u¡ +  ^ y y et ant  ^ 80 011 f°r 
the rest of the equations. The construction of the elasticities Uj^.s is discussed in the Appendix.
2.3 Estimation Results
2.3.1 Monetary policy shock
First we consider the benchmark VAR specification with employment and average hours11. Fig­
ures 1 anti 2 present the effects of a monetary policy shock1". The responses of real government 
purchases and real net taxes are insignificantly estimated as can be seen13. The rest of the results 
are in accordance with relevant literature for the US (e.g CEE (1996, 1999), Trigari (2003)) and 
other European countries (e.g. Mojon and Poorsman (2001) and Peersman and Smets (2001)); 
they indicate that after a contractionary monetary policy shock the short term interest rate (trea­
sury bill rate) declines at a slow pace until the first quarter after the shock, thereafter it declines 
in an accelerating pace returning back to trend seven quarters after the shock. Second, after a 
delay of one-two quarters real GDP persistently declines in a hump-shaped pattern, reaching its 
maximal decline after four to five quarters; it returns back to trend after nine quarters. Third, the 
GDP deflator is relatively fiat for about six quarters after the shock, thereafter it declines, though
“ in this case agp -- —0.5. a9ff — agrffr = 0. atrerr 0. atu = 0.9977. dtp = 1.2996, atE = 1.5069, am ~ 1.1029.
12The graph legends correspond to the following variables: SIR_lTK: nominal interest rate. LRGP__UK:
real government purchases. LRNT__UIv: real net taxes. LrGDP_tTI\: real GDP. LGDPD_lTK: GDP deflator. 
LDEB_UI\: employment, LHRS_17K: average hours, LREER_PK: real effective exchange rate. LT11_VK: total 
hours, LRTCE_l*K: real wages, LRGC_l?K: real government consumption LRGI_UK: real government invest­
ment LR\VGC_UK: real wage government consumption LRN\VGC_lTK: real non-wage government consumption. 
LPCV_UK: real private consumption. LPFIV_UK: real private investment, LIBY_lTK: real business investment 
LIHV_lTK: real residential investment. LRIGS_FK: real imports LREGS_UK: real exports.
l3The dark grey dashed lines display the point estimates of the coefficients, whereas the light grey dashed lines 
represent the 93 % Hall percentile confidence intervals and have been generated by means of bootstrap analysis 
(1500 number of bootstrap replication).
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the response is not statistically significant, except after the 18th quarter following the shock14. 
The real effective exchange rate, as we see from figure 2. appreciates affecting in a contractionary 
manner real GDP; its maximum response is about two quarters after the shock. It remains above1 
trend for about seven quarters, like the impulse response of the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 1: g, t, y. p. reer. i. - responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock 
Following a contractionary monetary policy shock, employment declines in a significant man­
ner two to three quarters after the shock, and returns back to its previous value around twelve
14The slow response of price is in line with the so-called ‘price-puzzle*. The standard 1S-I.M model suggests that 
prices should decrease following a contractionary monetary policy shock, however, many empirical studies found 
that the GDP deflator, after an inertia of about 2-3 quarters, increases following a shock. According to Sims (1992) 
the price-puzzle’ rellects the fact lliat ihe monetary authority's reaction function incorporates some indicator of 
inflation, other than GDP deflator, which is absent from the VAN specification and is sensitive to the changing 
economic environment. Tins can be dealt with by introducing in the VAR a commodity price index that is sensitive 
to monetary policy changes. In several cases, even ihe introduction of a commodity price index generates a delayed 
decline in prices, for example in the t’S as CKT (1999) show the deflator declines after S-9 quarters, whereas in 
Germany it declines after aboiit 4-5 quarters as is shown by Mojon and Peersmaii (2001). In addition il should 
be noted that the sluggishness in the reaction of prices is in line with the sticky price literature, where firms in 
adjusting their prices have to incur a cost.
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quarters after the shock, reaching its maximal response seven quarters after the shock. Whereas, 
average hours start to decline three and a half quarters after the shock and reach their minimum 
value eight quarters after the shock, while they return back to trend at around the thirteenth 
quarter. Moreover, their response is more muted compared to that of employment: notice that 
th e  value attained at the point of their maximum decline is attained by employment one year 
after the shock.
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Figure 2: E. II, Til, RW, - responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock 
In order to evaluate whether the responsiveness of the variables of interest have changed over 
time, tlue to the introduction of reforms in the UK labor market we estimateti the benchmark 
VAR specification over the period 1970:Q1-1990:Q4. The results are displayed in figure 3 (see 
also Appendix, figure 19).15 Output declines immediately and its response is significant after 
one and a half quarters, moreover it returns to trend two and a half years after the shock, while 
in the whole sample case this happens one quarter earlier. Employment responds negatively 
more than two quartern after the shock, while average hours respond immediately following the 
shock (its response becomes significant one period after the shock). Furthermore, employment 
goes back to trend three and a half years after the shock, it takes one more semester compared 1
1-'The analysis is conducted with different elasticities this time, using institutional information and conducting 
regression analysis when needed up to 1990:Q1. Hence we have used: atv = 0.9414, i.e. the output elasticity of net 
taxes has increased over time (for the whole sample it was 0.9977). 0tp = 1.3772 on the contrary the price elasticity 
of net taxes has fallen over time (before it was 1.2993). au? = 1.3154. and am = 1.0742 i.e. the employment 
and average hours elasticities of net taxes have increased over time in line with aty (they were 1.5009 and 1.1029. 
respectively). Hence, it appears that the automatic response of real variables to net taxes has increased slightly 
over time, while that of prices has decreased. Therefore, we should take this into account when comparing how the 
responses of employment and hours to a monetary policy shock change over time.
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to the whole sample case. Though, average hours respond in a less persistent manner in the 
small sample, i.e they are back to trend at the tenth quarter (previously, this was happening 
at the twelfth quarter. Hence the labor market reform efforts that were initiated in the 1980s 
did not immediately reduce the adjustment costs of labor input. Therefore adjustment along the 
intensive margin was the first response of firms in the light of demand shock that was perceived 
to be temporary. Furthermore, notice that the initial fall in government spending is statistically 
significant in this smaller sample, moreover, the average size of the shock has declined slightly 
since the impact effect on the interest rate is closer to one in the smaller than the bigger sample 
(as for the Euro Area study by Peersman and Smetts, 2001)16. In addition, after the impact 
period the response of the interest rate declined faster in the smaller sample going back to trend 
after the fifth quarter; in the whole sample case it declines at a slower pace (crossing the zero line 
at the seventh quarter). Hence, this is an indication that interest rates adjust in a more sluggish 
fashion to own shocks over time (i.e. the monetary policy shock has become more persistent over 
time).
F ig u r e  3: y ,  E .  H . i - r é p o n s e s  t o  a c o n tr a c t io n a r y  M P  s h o c k  ( l ! '|7 0 :Q l- lÇ ,i ,0 :Q 4 )
Next, we turn to examine an alternative VAR specification including total hours and real 
wages instead of employment and average hours.1. We focus on the effect on total hours anti 
real wages (figure 1. second row). The response for total hours follows a similar pattern as 
employment and average hours. They start declining immediately after the shock; however, their 
response is statistically significant only after the first two quarters following the shock, in addition 
their response is more persistent (returns to trend after about sixteen and a half quarters and *1
1('We use a one standard deviation shock.
11 hi tins case ~ —0.5. agreer = 0. o„l(. = 0. aty -- 1.0023. atu. -  1.8532. ntrn — 1.4159, and atp = 1.2996.
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reaches its maximum after eight quarters) and of a bigger magnitude. Real wages appear to 
be affected negatively by the monetary policy shock (as reported for the U S  economy in CEE 
(2001)), however their response is statistically insignificant. When considering the smaller sample 
1970:Q1-1990:Q4 we still obtain an negative but insignificant response for real wages, while the 
response of total hours is similar to the one when using the whole sample, the only difference 
is that it is slightly less persistent this time, returning to trend after about fifteen and a half 
quarters.
Overall, after the contractionary monetary policy shock takes place the real effective exchange 
ra te  appreciates; both forces generate a negative and delayed response to output; employment 
and  average hours are affected in a negative manner, with an extra delay of one more and two 
more quarters for employment and average hours, respectively19. It seems that either economic 
agents perceive this shock as having permanent effects so they respond by firstly adjusting their 
labor input with respect to the extensive margin (employment) rather than the intensive margin 
(average hours), or that firms face smaller costs of adjusting employment relative to the costs 
of adjusting average hours (overtime wage) or a combination of these two. The results obtained 
in the smaller sample 1970:Ql-1990:Q4 indicate that the restructuring of the UK labor market 
in the 1980s improved flexibility and reduced the adjustment costs of labor input; so that while 
using the smaller sample, average hours respond faster than employment for about two quarters, 
when using the whole sample this result is overturned and employment's response is faster and 
more pronounced. Notice, that the response of total hours, employment and output is in line 
with relevant studies for the US (CEE 1999. Campbell 1997, Trigari 2003 etc) and Europe (Peers- 
man and Smets, Mojon and Peersman (2001)). While with respect to average hours the results 
obtained for the US by Trigari (2003) are similar in that average hours' fall is smaller compared 
to employment, they differ significantly, though, in that the decline in average hours in the US 
is found to be transitory (it lasts about 5 quarters),with the adjustment one-two years following 
a shock being mainly in employment rather than in hours per worker20. In the UK. as we have *
lsDue to space limitations these results are not- reported here, but are available upon request. Notice, that in 
this case we have re-calculated the elasticities using information concerning only this period, i.e. aty = 0.9414, 
otp = 1.3772, ttiTH -  1.2514, atu- 1.9572. As before the automatic response of output and total hours to net taxes 
has increased over time, while that of prices and real wages has decreased. Therefore, a change in the wage bill due 
to the total hours component, over time, generates a bigger increase on net taxes: whereas, a change in the wage 
component of the wage bill generates a smaller eiTect on net taxes over time. Alternatively, the contemporaneous 
effect on net taxes from the increase in the number of wage earners relative to the one coming from employers 
passing to a higher earnings bracket (due to higher wages) has increased over time.
*iJThis pattern of response reflects also the increased significance of part-time employment in the UK. especially 
in the 1980‘s. Part-time employees having "weaker" contracts are the ones to be "sacked" with no or limited costs 
bv firms in periods of bad economic conditions.
20 The response of employment is explained by the transitory decrease in job creation and the larger and persistent 
increase iii job destruction. Hence, these imply the presence of small firing costs, that can rationalize the smaller
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soon, there is significant adjustment of average hours until the twelfth quarter after the monetary 
policy shock, and comparing to the small sample response its persistence increased by more than 
a semester (while employment returns to trend a semester faster). This implies that compared 
to the US. the labor input in the UK adjusts in a significant manner both with respect to the 
extensive and the intensive margin over the medium term (2-3 years), a result that is in line with 
the stylized facts regarding cyclical fluctuations presented at the Introduction, which might he 
also attributed to factors other than the adjustment costs of labor.
2.3.2 Spending shock
Figures 1 and 5 display the results for the case of a government spending shock in the bench­
mark YAK specification with employment and average hours. Total government purchases rise 
significantly and persistently following tlie shock, they return back to trend after about eleven 
quarters. Heal net taxes increase marginally on impact (similarly to Fatas and Miliov (2001) and 
Clali Lopez-Salido and Valles or GLSV (2001)). however, their oiled is not significant, thereafter 
they decline in a significant and persistent manner (after the third quarter), reaching their lowest 
value ten quarters after the shock. The response of government purchases and real net taxes 
suggest that a government purchases shock generates a persistent increase in primary budged 
deficit. Real GDP reacts positively but insignificantly on impact, newt it become negative and 
significant after the second quarter. Its profile is very persistent, returning to trend seventeen 
quarters after the shock, whereas its maximal decline occurs eight quarters after the' shock. Prices 
jump on impact and follow a hump-shaped pattern returning to trend after 15 quarters. The re­
sponses of prices and output are analogous to those reported in Perot ti (2001) for the* period 
10G3:Q1-2001:Q2 (and in particular those for the period 1980:Ql-2001:Q2)."1 31 le nominal inter­
est rate responds in a negative and significant manner only after the fifth quarter*-. Moreover, 
the combined effect of the nominal interest rate and inflation ini]»lies that the real interest rate 
will decrease on impact (and thereafter as the ex-post and ex-ante real interest rates in Perot ti. 
2001). which implies that the return on holding UK bonds will fall increasing their price, which 
will reduce the* demand for UK bonds and consequently the demand for local currency (or it will 
increase the demand for foreign currency) generating a statistically significant real depreciation
and transitory response of hours per worker.
21 When considering agp — —1, the impact effect on prices is much bigger, it follows a similar pattern as before 
but it returns to trend four and a half years following the spending shock. Additionally, output's impact elfect 
is negative. In case where n9P = 0. prices* impact response is negative and turns positive thereafter, however, it 
is insignificantly estimated. Moreover, output's impact response is positive and significant, thereafter it becomes 
negative as before (see Appendix, figures 20 and 21).
"This pattern of reaction while it seems puzzling is in line with tin* results obtained in IVrotti (2001) for the 
UK (in the post 1980 period) and the VS.
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of the sterling on impact, that will turn out to be very persistent'1121. Notice that the real de­
preciation lias a beneficial effect on domestic demand by fostering exports relative to imports, 
therefore it should have muted the negative effect that we observe on real GDP following the 
government spending shock.
.HGP-UK — > [_RGP_UI LRoF_' r^' — ■ LFI,T_Ui
* 6 B 1C 12 M 16 18 20
LPGP_U'- -  ■ LGDPD-UK
15 12 14 16 >8 29
Ir-'GP^Ur — ■ LPEEr_UI \~_ ij, G!P_ 1J
4 6 B 10 12 14 16 16
F ig u r e  4: g. t. y, p , ree r, i - an  ex p a n s ion a ry  g  shock
Employment responds with a delay of one quarter but then it declines in an accelerating pace, 
reaching its minimum value at the 9th quarter, while it returns to trend after about 5 years. 
This response, is in stark contrast with the results of Fatas and Miliov (2001) using l TS data, 
where employment increases in a hump-shaped pattern, furthermore, it appears that the negative 
response of employment generates a negative output response after the first quarter. Average 
hours respond in an insignificant manner to the government spending shock, however they seem 
to have a marginally significant negative effect between the 7th and 10th quarter.
J J When considering (lie case with «Qr<.«.r = —0.00556, the real effective exchange rate does react immediately as 
before but to a smaller extent and not significantly, whereas output falls immediately (see Appendix, figure 22).
:i Alternatively, if the import content of government purchases is high enough, then it will lead to an immediate 
deterioration of the trade balance which would lead 1o a depreciation of sterling.
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When considering the smaller sample 1970:QI-1!)90:Q-1. in order to evaluate whether there is 
any significant change in the responsiveness of the labor market variables and output over time, 
we see that the response of employment is less persistent returning to trend around the 17th 
quarter, while average hours have the same response profile as before with the exception that 
they are significant for a bigger period (between filli and 10th quarter). The output response is 
much less persistent reaching its maximum two quarters after the shock and n’t urn to trend three 
years after the shoclV'. Overall, the variables' responses appear qualitatively the same, being 
slightly less persistent, except for average hours that are a hit more persistent. The fact that the 
responses of employment and average hours are no different in this smaller sample (contrary to the 
case of a monetary policy shock) could be attributed to the fact that firms perceive government 
spending changes as being more persistent, adjusting in a profit maximizing way (mainly along 
the extensive margin) their labor input decisions. It is noteworthy that the size of the spending 
shock was smaller in the sample 197U:Q1-1990:Q 1. as judged by the value of the impulse response 
of spending on impact"*"'. Moreover, it is less persistent crossing the zero line around the 10th 
quarter while in the whole sample case this happens only at the 12th quarter.
Next, we examine the effects of a spending shock on total hours and real wages (figure 5, 
second row). The response of total horns is a mixture of the responses of employment and average 
hours. After a delay of one to two quarters total 1 lours decline fast reaching their lowest value 
after eight to nine quarters, thereafter they return faster to trend (after 15 quarters) compared 
to employment. In the smaller sample case 197():Q1-1990:Q1 (figure G) the effec t comes along a
-’'See Appendix, figures; 23 and 24.
~l'Keep in mind dial we are consider a one standard deviation shock.
■nuu.anim iitiu.
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quarter faster but is less persistent, i.e. it returns to trend two quarters earlier (at the thirteenth 
quarter). These results are in contrast with the results of similar studies for the US economy. 
Fatas an d  Mihov (2001) find that employment increase in a hump-shaped pattern following a 
government spending shock, whereas, total hours do not deviate significantly from trend. GLSV 
(2003), as well as, and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) report a positive humi>-shaped 
pattern for total hours. On the other hand, the response of real wages is analogous to results 
obtained for the US economy (Fatas and Mihov 2001 and GLSV 2003) i.e. it is positive on impact 
and follows a hump-shaped pattern. In addition, it crosses the zero line at about the seventh 
quarter and  becomes negative and statistically significant after the 12th quarter, approaching 
back to  trend after five years from the impact period.2. In the small sample case, the response 
of real wages follows the same pattern but is more pronounced on impact and less persistent, 
crossing the zero line after the fifth quarter. Therefore, it appears that in the smaller sample the 
spending shock had a larger impact effect on the labor market variables, particularly real wages, 
despite the fact that it had a slightly smaller size. Moreover, the responses of the labor market 
variables were less persistent, because the spending response was also less persistent.
LRGF_ U!■ -  ■ L7H_U
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Overall, wo observe that on impact employment and consequently total hours do not respond 
for about one-two quarters, whereas real wages jump following the shock. Furthermore, at first 
glance, the response of the employment variables are perfectly consistent with the response of 
output, which is driven by them. To verify this we exclude the labor input and real wages variables 
from the VAR; still we get the same pattern of reaction for real GDP2*. This is in line with the *2
" If wo Allow for a9u- = 0.1757 real wages* impact response to the spending shock is still positive, though of a 
smaller magnitude and not significant on impact, thereafter it behaves as before except that it crosses the zero line 
a half a tpiarter earlier than before. Total hours follow a similar pattern as before, though their response returns
back to trend on the 1 Jth instead of the 15th quarter (Appendix, figure 25).
2SThe results are not presented here, but are available upon ret)nest.
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work by Porotti (2004) where he finds that the effect of government spending on output in the 
UK has been much lower compared to the US in terms of magnitude of impact effect, insistence 
and statistical significance, in particular in the period 1980:Ql-200l:Q2. This works through the 
employment channel, because in all previous empirical U.S. studies the response of employment 
or total hours has been positive and hump-shaped, i.e. persistent, generating an analogous output 
response. Therefore it seems that government spending in the UK has not been able to generate 
a positive and persistent response of employment and output.
G D P com ponents
These results are quite puzzling, so further investigation is required in order to understand what 
hinges behind the responses of real wages, labor input and output. Therefore we will discuss liow 
the GDP components are affected by a spending shock. We will consider real private consump­
tion expenditure, real private investment (residential and noil-residential), real import and real 
exports2“'. Each component is added before the real effective exchange rate i.e. assuming that 
each GDP component belongs to the information set of the monetary authority (while it can also 
affect the real effective exchange rate within the quarter). An increase in spending reduces the 
real private consumption expenditure in a statistically significant manner after the third quarter 
(figure 7); its pattern of response is analogous to the response of output. This resembles the 
result of Perotti (2004) for UK in his 1980:Q1-2001:Q2 sub-sample, but is contrary to the positive 
consumption response in relevant US studies, like Blanchard and Perot ti (2002). Patas and Mihov 
(2001). Furthermore, real non-residential investment respond in a negative and quite persistent 
manner following a spending shock (though on impact they increase but not significantly). In 
the Patas and Mihov (2001) study for the US economy, the response of business investment is 
positive but not significant, while in GLSV (2003) they have a negative but insignificant response. 
In a panel of OECD countries Alesina et al (2002) show that business investment are reduced 
following an increase in government spending, which is due to the government wage bill compo­
nent. because a higher government wage spending puts upward pressure on private sector wages 
increasing labor cost and reducing profits, reducing thus investment (this would be examined in 
more detail in the following section where composition effects of government spending will be 
taken into account). Residential investment fall on impact and remain below trend until the 15th 
quarter, while the non-residontial investment decline in a more persistent manner returning to 
trend around the 20th quarter. In Fatas and Mihov (2003), residential investment fall until the 
8th quarter, though their response is not significant. Interestingly, both the nominal interest rate 
and the net taxes do not increase on impact in a significant manner, whereas the real interest rate 
falls on impact (providing an incentive for an increase in borrowing), however residential invest-
L,'T.arli (¡DP component is deflated by its respective deflator.
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m ent decline to a large extent attaining their minimum value. Overall, total private investment 
are crowed out by government spending, with their responses following a hump-shaped pattern 
as those of output and consumption, though their value on impact is negative and insignificant. 
A similar response is reported in Perotti (2004) for the UK in the period 1980:Q 1-2001:Q2, while 
in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) private investment is crowed out following a spending shock in 
th e  US economy. ■*
The response pattern of real imports is similar to that of output, i.e. the decrease in output 
and  income leads to lower demand for imported goods. Real exports decrease as well, but to a 
smaller extend and their response is much less persistent compared to that for imports30. The 
combined effect of these two variables generates an increase in net exports, i.e. the trade balance 
of the economy improves in a horizon of five years after the shock which is in line with the real 
depreciation of sterling over the same horizon as a consequence of an increase in government 
spending. Though, the depreciation makes economic agents in the UK to substitute imported 
goods for locally produced, but it does not bolster export demand as a consequence local demand 
and output is not fostered31.
30An earlier version (2002) of Perotti (2004) presents Analogous evidence for imports, whereas exports decline on
impact but turn positive when considering the last twenty years.
31 When considering the smaller sample 1970:Q1- 1990:Q4 the responses of all variables are less persistent because
the spending response to own shock is also less persistent (these results are not presented here but Are available on 
request). Specifically, the response profile for consumption is analogous though it returns earlier to trend, i.e. four 
years after the shock. The response profile of private investment and its components is similar but less persistent 
crossing the zero line after 3 years. Business investment increase on impact in a significant manner, but thereafter 
they decline but their response is insignificant. Residential investments are crowed out following the spending 
shock; they return to trend around the 11th quarter. Exports” response is insignificant. Whereas imports have 
a bigger impact effect, though insignificant, and they return to trend much earlier (12tli quarter) relative to the 
whole sample case because the spending shock itself is less persistent and the response of the real effective exchange 
rate is insignificant (i.e. there is no expenditure switching effect in favor of the domestic relative to the imported 
goods).
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It appears that there is a "labor market channel" (as is cited in Alesina et al (2002). while 
in Lane and Perotti (2003) it is reported as the "cost channel" of fiscal policy) through which 
fiscal policy affects economic activity. More specifically, an unanticipated government spending 
shock by raising real wages in the private sector increases labor costs, this reduces profits as well 
as expectation about future profits, due to an decrease in the competitiveness of the business 
sec;tor. The implications are a cut back in hiring and an acceleration in firing, thus employment 
is reduced, moreover, investment projects are aborted due to a decrease in profitability as a 
result of higher labor cost. Hence, output and income are reduced, as a result consumption and 
investment are both crowed out by an increase in government spending. Moreover, the reduction 
in private demand discourages the demand for imports, while export activity is also diminished 
due to higher labor costs. Notice, that the real depreciation of sterling, through the increase in net 
exports, must have muted the negative output response which is attributed to the deterioration 
of the competitiveness of UK firms as a consequence of the higher labor costs. The workings of 
this "cost or labor market channel" of fiscal policy will be further investigated by considering the 
effects of the different spending components.
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Composition effects of government spending
The next step will be to examine the implications of decomposing real total government purchases 
into real government consumption and real government investment. Over the period 1970:Q1- 
2003: Ql real government consumption constitutes on average 92.4 percent of real government 
purchases, while the remaining 7.6 percent is the government investment share. Therefore, the 
implications of a unanticipated increase in real government consumption are of a great importance 
in understanding how government spending affects employment, hours and real wages, as well as 
output and its components. To this end we will further decompose real government consumption 
into real wage government consumption and real non-wage government consumption. Real wage 
government consumption constitutes on average 52.4 percent of real government purchases, while 
real non-wage government consumption’s share is about 40 percent. However, while the ratio of 
government consumption to total government purchases is relatively stable over the sample, e.g. 
it was 87.9 percent on the first quarter of 1970 and 91.8 percent on the first quarter of 2003, 
the share of the wage government consumption has declined substantially i.e. from around 67.8 
percent during the first quarter of 1970 to 34 percent over the first quarter of 2003. The opposite 
is the case for the non-wage government consumption which was 2 0 .1  percent of total government 
purchases when considering the first observation of the sample and became 57.8 percent over the 
first quarter of 2003.
Government consumption The response of government consumption to own shocks is more 
persistent relative to the case of government spending3', consequently both the labor market 
variables and the output respond in a more persistent manner to the shock (see Appendix, figure 
26).3'1. Employment drops immediately after the shock and declines in a persistent manner 
(figure 8 ). Average hours decline with a delay of two quarters, thereafter its response follows a 
hump-shaped pattern, with its maximal decline being around the 7th quarter, while it returns 
to trend after nineteen quarters. As a result total hours respond in a more persistent manner. 
Furthermore, the response of real wages is more pronounced and more persistent, returning to 
trend after the tenth than after the sixth quarter. Prices, real GDP and its components respond 
in a similar manner as before, with the exception of residential investment and exports (as well 
as the interest rate and the real effective exchange rate) that are insignificant (Appendix, figures *3
3*It goes back to  tren d  three a n d  a  half years a fte r  th e  shock, instead of eleven q u arte rs .
33T h e  re s u lts  correspond to  th e  benchm ark specification  w ith fl9p =  —0.5. a 9„ — a^ reer =  0. « 1 , ^ ,  - 0. 
=  0 .9977, o tp =  1.2990. ntE =  1.5069, atH =  1.1029.
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Wage government consumption When examining the responses of labor market vari­
ables to an innovation on the wage government consumption component we see that employment, 
average hours and total hours respond in a negative and significant manner, while real wages 
increase substantially on impact and thereafter (figure 9).3f"3, As a result the output response is 
negative and very persistent. The response of consumption is similar to that of output while pri­
vate investment docs not respond in a significant manner. Though the response of its components 
is significant ( Appendix, figures 33. 31), i.e. business investment decreases three quarters after 
the shock, while residential investment responds positively only after two and a half years follow­
ing the shock; notice that a bigger government wage bill implies a higher disposable income for 
a group of people which can serve as an explanation of the boost in residential investment. Both 
imports and exports fall, with the export decline being more pronounced two and a half years 
after the shock, i.e. net exports decrease and the real effective exchange rate appreciates. Notice.
14W hen  allowing (i.F¡ICrtl. — 0.225-5. the real wages im pact response is o f sm aller m agn itude  am i insignificant; 
m oreover, th e  response  becom es significant only  after th e  second q u arte r, an d  it re tu rn s  to  trend earlier i.e. in the
9 th  ra th e r  th an  th e  10th q u a rte r . T h e  to ta l h o u rs ' response is also half q u a r te r  de layed  (A ppendix , figure* 2$).
3'J W hen considering  the sm alle r sam ple (w here  Ihe governm ent consum ption response  to  own shock is less p e r­
s is ten t)  we find sim ila r resu lts , bu t th e  responses o f all lab o u r m arket variab les are m ore pronounced bu t less 
p e rs is ten t. T he sam e applies fo r o u tpu t and its  com ponents. T he only difference is th a t th e  nom inal in terest ra te  
increases in a significant m an n e r between the  second and th e  fourth  q u a rte r  following th e  governm ent consum ption  
shock (A ppend ix , figures 29-31).
■^‘P a p p a  (200.'t) rep o rts  analogous results for em ploym ent am i real wages in a b o u t 12 out of 41 I 'S  sta tes .
A llow ing for a -  0 .253? generates a  ze ro  im pact effect of real wage; its  response  is equally persisten t as 
before b u t significant only a f te r  th e  fourth q u a r te r  (A ppend ix , figure 32).
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that when considering the smaller sample (1970:Q1-1990:Q1), we see that the response of wage 
government consumption to own shocks is of a lower magnitude and less persistent. Nevertheless, 
both employment and output respond negatively and in a more pronounced way one semester 
after the shock takes place; while for total hours this happens three semesters after the shock 
(figure 10 and figures 35, 36 in Appendix).3* On the contrary the response of real wages is bigger 
until the first five quarters, however it is much less persistent returning to trend after seven quar­
ters. This could imply that when the share of wage government consumption was bigger (from 
G7.8 percent in 1970:Q1, to 47 percent in 1990:Q1, and finally to 31 percent in 2003:Ql) the 
negative effects on employment and output and the positive on real wages were bigger, whereas 
when its share in total government purchases started to decline these effects became more muted 
but remained equally persistent (except of the effect on real wages that became more persistent, 
in line with the response of wage government consumption to own shocks).
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Non-wage government consumption A non-wage government consumption shock gen­
erates a positive and significant impact effect on employment, however, thereof its response is 
insignificant (figure 1 1 ). On the contrary, the effect on average hours is more persistent and 
significant, following a hump-shaped pattern reaching its maximum four quarters after the shock: 
note that five years after the shock it is still above trend. Total hours respond in a positive man­
ner. however their response is significant only during the first year following the shock, as well 
as. around the end of the five year horizon. Real wages respond in an insignificant manner, but 
two years after the shock occurs their decline is significant and persistent.'*1 Like employment, 
output responds in a positive and significant way on impact, but thereafter it return to trend 
(Appendix, figures 38 and 39). Analogous is the response pattern of private consumption, though 
it declines significantly between the tenth and twelfth quarter. Private investment also decreases 
significantly, but only after the seventh quarter, however contrary to the case of a shock on the 
government wage bill component of spending, business investment are not affected while residen­
tial investment decline significantly (between the fifth and the sixteenth quarter). Notice that in 
this case the nominal interest rate increases on impact (it is significant between the second and 
fifth quarter). Furthermore, exports appear to be unaffected, while imports decline is statistically 
significant two years after the shock, which implies that net exports are positively affected (this 
is generated by the depreciation of the real effective exchange rate).
In the smaller sample erase (1970:Ql-1990:Q 1), the response of the non-wage government
'^ 'T h is response profile  is sim ila r w hen considering a lso  a , -  0.3596, th e  only  difference is tha t ill th is  case 
th e  im pact effect is sm aller, b u t still not significant (A p p en d ix , figure 37).
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consumption component to own shocks is bigger on impact but less persistent, returning to trend 
after one and a half years. Nevertheless, the response of employment (total hours and output i 
looks as in the case of a shock on wage government consumption, i.e. it is negative until the 
eleventh quarter (7th quarter, respectively) but thereafter it goes back to trend; whereas real 
wages increase significantly and in a hump-shaped pattern the first year after the shock (figure 12 
and figures 10 and 41 in Appendix). Consequently, the responses of private consumption, private 
investment (still residential investment determine its response profile) and imports1" are similar to 
the output response. Notice that the wage and non-wage components of government consumption 
are substitutes as relevant VAR analysis has indicated for the whole sample east'. Though in the 
smaller sample, while an increase in wage government consumption generates a negative response 
on the non-wage government consumption component, in the reverse case the response is positive1 
luit significant only be*tween the first and third quarter. Therefore, an unanticipated increase of 
the non-wage government consumption component the time that its share was small (20.1 percent 
in 197l):Ql. 15.22 percent in 1990:Q1. and finally 57.8 percent of total government spending in 
2003:Q1) was accompanied by an increase of the wage government consumption component that 
probably generated the real wage increase.'11 Hence, the nature of the relationship between the 
different spending components lias changed over time. This implies that when the share of the 
non-wage government consumption increased, its effects on employment, average hours and output 
switched to being positive1 and significant (only on impact, though, for employment and output). 
while the eifect on the wage component of spending became negative. Therefore, the composition 
effects of spending and their evolution over time are very crucial e lements for determining the 
responses of real wages, labor input and output. 401
40In th is  cast» rttr does not react in a statistically  significantly manner.
41 T he responses are not shown here but arc available upon request. The wane and non-wane component* were 
n troduced  to - c lh r r  in th e  benchm ark VAH. l*o(h orderings were considered. allowin- interaction* betw een the  
■conomic shocks of Ihe tw o spend ing  components, as well as taxes. The price elasticities was -().5 lor the iioti-waxe 
■oinponent n n d -1  fo ri he w age com ponent of government consum ption.
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Government Investment The effects of a government investment innovation on employment, 
average hours, total hours and real wages are displayed on figure 13. Employment responds in a 
negative but insignificant manner. The response of average hours is positive and quite persistent, 
it follows a hump-shaped pattern reaching its maximum one and a half years after the shock, 
thereafter it declines without returning to trend over the five year horizon studied. Total hours 
respond positively but quite insignificantly, whereas the response of real wages is insignificant 
over the first eleven-twelve quarters, thereof it turns negative and significant.
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The response of prices, output and consumption is not significant (see Appendix, figures 42 
and 43). Private investment is crowed out by government investment projects. Although business 
investment increases on impact, thereafter it returns back to trend; while residential investment 
declines significantly up to three years after the shock. However, the interest rate falls in a 
persistent manner. Both imports and exports fall, but their relative changes leads to an increase 
in net exports (the depreciation of local currency has generated a expenditure switch effect from 
imported to locally produced goods, which however did not lead to an increase in output) .42
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Findings: Overall, after having examined the effects of different spending components on 
labor input, real wages, output and its components wo conclude that there is a "“cost or labor 
market channel“ of fiscal policy as defined, by Lane and Perotti (2003) and Alesina et al (2002), 
respectively. Specifically, we have found that an increase in government purchases, and particu­
larly in the wage bill component of government spending, increases the wages in the private sector, 
reducing firms profits, which leads to a decrease in employment and business investment in the 
current and future periods. As a result, output, income and private consumption expenditure 43
43W hen considering th e  sm aller sam ple  case (1970:Q1-1990:Q 1) th e  governm ent investm ent shock is m ore p e r­
s is ten t, b u t of a smaller m agnitude com pared  to th e  whole sam ple case. Furtherm ore, all lab o u r m arket variables 
respond in an  insignificant m anner {A ppendix, figures 44, 45. 4G). T h e  only significant difference is tha t around  
th e  end of th e  horizon considered (17-18th  quarter) to ta l hours respond positively (due to  average hours) and  th is 
generates an  analogous response by o u tp u t, consum ption and  p rivate  investm ent. T hough , as for the  whole sam ple 
p rivate  investm ent decrease for two an d  a half years after th e  shock (although business investm ent increase on 
im pact, residen tia l investm ent fall u n til about th e  10th q u a rte r). Moreover, th e  increase in  o u tp u t fosters im port 
dem and: w hile exports are affected positively  betw een the  2nd  and  10th q u a rte r , as well a s  around the en d  of th e  
horizon considered.
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contract. Notice, that in case of an unanticipated increase in wage government consumption the 
nominal interest rate does not change in a statistically significant manner, while prices increase, 
so the real interest rate decreases in a significant manner, nevertheless business investment fall. 
However, residential investment is unaffected in the short run and increases significantly two years 
after the shock.
Increases in the non-wage component of government consumption or the government invest­
ment do not generate an increase in private sector wages (though in the smaller sample real wages 
were raised after a shock on the non-wage government consumption component, probably because 
the same shock prompt as well the wage-bill component of government consumption), as a result 
employment in the business sector is unaffected or increases on impact; though average hours 
increase in a persistent manner generating a significant increase in total hours (particularly in 
the whole sample case and mostly for non-wage government consumption). Furthermore, when 
the nominal interest rate increases on impact (non-wage government consumption) business in­
vestment are unaffected, whereas residential investment dec-line in a significant manner but only 
one year after the shock. An innovation in government investment boosts business investment, 
only on impact though, and decreases residential investment. However, in both cases private 
consumption and consequently demand is not enhanced, except on impact. Moreover, the de­
preciation of the real effective exchange rate implies that import demand is discouraged, while 
exports decline to a smaller extent or are unaffected.
It is note-worthy that when the labor input dec-lines, i.e. in the cases of a wage government 
consumption shock (both for the whole and smaller samples) and a non-wage government con­
sumption in the smaller sample, both employment and average hours decline. However, when the 
labor input increases, like in the case of a non-wage government consumption shock ( whole sample 
case) or a government investment shock (not significantly in the whole sample case, while it is 
significant in the small sample but only at the end of the horizon), the adjustment takes the form 
of an increase in average hours per worker, with employment changes being insignificant over the 
five year horizon considered. Thus, an increase in real wages deteriorates the competitive position 
of tTK firms inducing them, through profit maximization (or cost minimization), to reduce the 
number workers they employ; whereas when the spending boost is not affecting their labor costs, 
firms adjust their labor input only along the intensive margin because they anticipate that the 
shock will have temporary effects on private demand.
Are these findings in accord with the  theory? Several papers have study the effects of 
government wage bill. Finn (1998), in an environment of competitive labour markets and lump­
sum taxation, suggests that an increase in government employment can lead to lower employment 
(if the wealth effect is small) and higher real wages, as well as lower private hours, output and 
investment. In Ardagna (2001) where labour market is unionized the increase in government
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wage bill raises the outside option of workers, leading to liigher real wages in the private sector. 
Therefore, labor costs increase in both cases and can affect firms decisions on employment and 
investment ("crost or labor market channel" of fiscal policy). Pappa (2003) reports that an increase 
in government employment (in an Ft DC model) that leads through factor relocation to a reduction 
in private employment can reduce output, consumption and investment and raise real wages if 
government employment is unproductive for the private sector. Similarly. Cavallo (2003) finds 
that a government employment shock decreases private hours, output and investment.
When considering the non-wage government consumption and government investment a Real 
Business Cycle model with distortionary taxation could deliver some of the results. Specifically, 
the increase in spending that is to be financed by current and future taxes generates a wealth 
effect that decreases consumption and increases labor supply. Both the intertemporal substitution 
effect (individual prefer to supply more labor in the period where the labor taxes are low) and 
the intratemporal substitution effect (individual prefer to supply more labor when the cost of 
work relative to leisure is low) reduce labor supply while the intertemporal effect decreases also 
consumption. In this case the effect on labor supply and real wages is ambiguous, if the elasticity 
of labor is big enough labor supply could even decrease and real wages increase. Introducing 
price stickiness and monopolistic competition we can generate an increase in labor demand. 
The implications for employment and real wages, consumption and consequently output and 
investment will depend on the strength of the intertemporal and intratermporal substitution 
effects relative to the wealth effect and the severity of price rigidities, as well as the persistence 
of the spending shock and the timing of taxation.
An alternative explanation could be based on the notions of job creation and job destruction. 
Specifically, the wage pressure caused by an increase on the government wage bill could reduce 
substantially job creation, as well as, raise job destruction, while the boost in private demand by 
the increase on the wage and non-wage components of government spending might generate only 
a temporary reduction in job destmotion leaving unaffected job creation. In this case employment 
could be reduced.
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2.3.3 Tax shock *
The correlation between the cyclically adjusted spending and tax shocks is low and insignificant, 
therefore the ordering of spending and taxation does not have an effect on the responses generated. 
In figures 11, 15 and 16 we present the responses following a net tax shock, when net taxes are 
ordered first in the benchmark VAR with employment and average hours. Net taxes respond 
in a positive and persistent manner to an own shock, i.e they return to trend much after the 
20th quarter. The response of government spending is not significant, oscillating around the zero 
line over the whole horizon considered. The profile of responses of the fiscal variables indicates 
that following a shock on net taxes, the primary budget deficit declines in a persistent manner; 
alternatively starting from a balanced budget an increase in net taxes will generate a primary 
surplus.* 41 * The impact effect on prices is negative, it remains so until the eighth to ninth quarter, 
thereafter it becomes positive. However, prices' response is significant only on impact and after 
the eighteenth quarter.44 The net tax shock lias a negative but insignificant effect on the nominal 
interest rate until the seventh quarter, thereof it is positive and significant and stays so until the 
twentieth quarter.
Employment decreases on impact following an unanticipated increase in net taxes However, it 
increases in a significant and hump-shaped pattern after the fourth quarter reaching its maximum 
value around the eighth quarter, finally it returns to trend four years after the shock. Average 
hours oscillate around zero for about fifteen quarters, afterwards they decrease significantly. 
Therefore, it appears that a net taxes shock affects mostly employment than average hours for 
the first three and a half years, thereafter the effect on average horn's is more pronounced and 
thus more persistent. However, the response of total hours is mostly determiiKxl by the response 
profile of employment (it is significant between the fifth and fifteenth quarter). Real wages 
decrease on impact, and remain negative the first two quarters. After the eighth quarter their 
response becomes positive and remains so until the end of the horizon considered.
The impulse response of output is quite similar to the responses of employment and total
41 As displayed in figure 17 in the A ppendix , governm ent consum ption  will increase, though its  response is 
significant only on im p ac t, a s  well as afte r th e  13th q u a r te r . T he wage governm ent consum ption com ponent will 
increase su b stan tia lly  follow ing a  net taxes shock, bu t th e  non-w age governm ent consum ption com ponent will 
decrease in a s ta tis tic a lly  sign ifican t m anner. G overnm en t investm ent decline on im pact, but th ereafte r their 
response profile is in s ign ifican t. H ence, a fter an  u n a n tic ip a te d  increase on net ta x e s  th e  governm ent su b s titu te s  
th e  spending  in goods (governm ent, investm ent an d  non-w age governm ent consum ption ) w ith higher spend ing  on 
th e  governm ent w age bill. In  to ta l, th e  ex tra  revenues g e n e ra te  su rp lu ses, because  th e  governm ent spending  is
unchanged, i.e. th e re  a re  no “voracity" e je c ts  in th e  U K .
41 An analogous p a t te rn  o f  response  is p resen ted  in P e ro t t i  (2002) especially w ith  respect to  resu lts th a t refer to
his second sul>-sample 1980:Q 1-2001:Q2. notice th a t th e  p r ic e  elastic ity  o f  net taxes is 1.32 in th is sub-sam ple (and
1.21 over th e  whole sam p le  1963:Q  1-2001 :Q2). w hile we have  calcu la ted  it to  be 1.2996. Moreover, as is show n in
th e  previously m en tioned  p a p e r  reducing  by O.o th e  re levan t e lastic ities th e  resu lts  rem ain qualitatively  th e  same.
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hours. Specifically, it responds positively with a delay of one semester and has a hump-shaped 
profile reaching its maximum value after six to  seven quarters, finally it returns back to trend 
around the  thirteenth quarter. Analogous results are reported by Perotti (2001),45 where he also 
claims th a t the positive effect of output on taxes might be due to  the low output elasticity of 
net taxes (it is below unity, while in the US and Canada where net taxes have a negative effect 
on output it approaches two, because there are no lags in the tax collection of direct taxes to 
businesses). Increasing the output elasticity of net taxes by one he shows tha t this can generate a 
negative impact effect in the UK, however the impact effect remains positive and significant when 
considering only the period 1980:Q1-2001:Q2. Turning now to the GDP components, we see that 
the response profile of private consumption and private investment are qualitatively similar to the 
response of output, with the response of private consumption being more pronounced. Moreover, 
both residential and non-residential investment respond in a similar manner, however residential 
investment respond faster, i.e. one quarter after the shock, while the non-residential component 
responds three quarters after the shock. Similar responses for consumption and investment in 
the UK are reported in Perotti (2004), in particular for the sample 1980:Q1-2001:Q2. Both 
imports and exports are affected positively by an unanticipated tax hike, they both respond in 
the same humivsliaped pattern as output, with the export response being faster (one quarter 
after the shock) but less persistent than the corresponding import response. Hence until about 
the fourth quarter net exports were positive but thereafter they turned negative, wliicli is in line 
with an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (after the fifth quarter). Notice, that in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), net taxes were found to  have negative or insignificant effects in the 
US economy46.
H ow  cou ld  th e se  find ings b e  ju s tif ied  by  th e o ry ?  In principle, a tax hike in the current 
period, when government spending is unchanged, will be matched by lower taxes in the future in 
an HBC model with distortionary taxation. In this case it generates an intertemporal substitution 
effect making individuals more willing to work and consume in the future periods when taxation 
is smaller than in the current period, in addition it creates an intratemporal substitution effect
4DFor th e  US in the p e rio d  19$0:Q1-2001:Q2. a n d  for U K  a n d  A ustralia in th e  periods (19G3:Q1-2001:Q2) and 
(19GO:Q1-2001:Q2). respectively, a s  well as for th e  sm a lle r sam p le  st a rting  in 19S0:Q1. M oreover, notice th a t P ero tti 
(2004) considers  a tax  cut in s tead  o f a tax  hike.
4f'ln  th e  sm aller sam ple case th e  response of all variab le  a re  qualitatively  th e  sam e (figures 4S-51 in A ppendix). 
T h e  only difference is th a t average ho u rs  increase significantly  from the  Sth u n til th e  tw elfth  quarter, reinforcing 
th e  increase in to ta l hours driven by th e  increase in em ploym ent. The fall in real «ages la s ts  un til th e  six th  qu a rte r, 
th e re a fte r  th e y  return  to  trend . O u tp u t, consum ption and  investm ent respond as before. However, the  nom inal 
in terest ra te  declines in significant m anner betw een the  first and  ten th  qu a rte r. T he response of im ports is not 
sign ifican t, w hile exports dec-line betw een th e  4rth  an d  6 th  q u a rte r  and increase betw een th e  10th and 17th. 1 lie 
real effective exchange ra te  is deprec ia ted , but is response is significantly estim ated  only betw een the fourth  and 
S th q u a rte r .
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(the increase in the cost of work relative to leisure), that also affects negatively the supply 
of labor in the current period. Moreover, an increased tax burden on the part of firms (and 
consumers that lowers income and total demand) can make them reduce employment (reduction 
in the dem and for labor); if the adjustment cost of labor is small and shocks are perceived to 
be permanent. Nevertheless this will also depend on the extent of price rigidities. However, 
the net impact effect on employment and real wages might not be clear. Hence, according to 
the obtained dynamic response profile of real wages, the fall in labor supply should be smaller 
compared to  the fall in labor demand right after the shock occurs, decreasing real wages; while 
the  opposite appears to be the case one year after the net tax shock takes place. Furthermore, 
a  strong intertem poral elasticity of labor can generate an increase in private demand in the 
future periods.41 Alternatively, the relative movements of labor dem and and labor supply that 
decrease employment and real wage on impact lower labor costs faced by firms, improving their 
competitive position in the medium term, fostering exports and boosting business investment and 
employment, which in turn will increase output and private demand.
L R N T _ U t. -  u D E 3 _ i LRl ¡T_UK — LHRb — Ut
' - 1
4 k a 13 i; 14 ic :b :c d : 4 6 e lr i; ij 1? 'a
LPNT.UK LTH_UI- l_PNT_UI'- -  l RTCE-U I-
0 ;  4 £ 6 10 i r  14 16 1A
Figure 14: E. H. TH, RW - a contractionary net tax shock
^ 'T lie  p riv a te  sec to r perceives the tax h ike  as hav ing  long lasting effects, w hile  th e  in tertem poral e las tic ity  of 
lab o r supply  is low, so th a t labo r dem and falls m ore th a n  labor supply.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the dynamic resj>onse of employment, average hours per worker, total 
1 lours and real wages to monetary, government spending and net taxes shocks in the lTK. We con­
sidered the effects of a government consumption and a government investment shock separately. 
Government consumption is further decomposed into its wage and non-wage components. The 
main findings with respect to the monetary policy shock are as follows: the responses of employ­
ment and hours are negative and follow a hump-shaped pattern generating an analogous response 
for output. The adjustment- of labor input is primarily along the extensive margin, however there 
is also significant adjustment along the intensive margin one year after the shock (contrary to the 
previous findings for the US economy where the fall in average hours is transitory). When con­
sidering the smaller sample 1970 Ql-1990 Q 1 that covers the period of legislative change, average 
hours were found to respond faster and in a more pronounced way compared to employment, 
which implies that once the favorable legislative actions that improved labor market flexibility 
were in place, firms took advantage of them adjusting primarily along the extensive margin and
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to a lesser extent along the intensive margin following a shock, as we see from the whole sample 
case. Hence, the labor market reform that was pursued during the 1980s in the UK brought 
down the adjustment costs of labor input incurred by firms. Real wages are found to respond in 
a negative fas for the lTS economy) but insignificant manner.
Both the spending and net tax shocks have similar effect on output with those reported in 
Perotti (2 0 0 1 ) for the UK economy (particularly in the period 1980 Ql-2001 Q2). A spending shock 
leads to negative employment, hours and output responses; real wages are affected positively for 
one and a half year following the shock. The responses of the labor market variables and output 
are mainly attributed to the real government consumption expenditure and particularly to its 
wage government consumption component. Hence, a “cost or labor market channel" of fiscal 
policy as defined by Lane and Perotti (2003) and Alesina et al (2002). respectively, is present 
with respect to the government wage bill, i.e. the wage bill component of government spending 
increases the wage's in the private sector, reducing profits in the business sector, this in turn 
loads to a decrease in employment and business investment. As a consequence output, income 
and private expenditure contract. The non-wage government consumption component has a 
positive but small and transitory effect on employment and output, while the effect is positive 
and more persistent with respect to average hours and to a lesser extent for total hours. In 
addition, government investment have a positive, significant and quite persistent effect on average 
hours, while its effect on total hours is positive but insignificant, due to its insignificant effect on 
employment. Therefore, increases in the non-wage component of government consumption or the 
government investment do not generate an increase in labor c-ost. thus they do not deteriorate the 
competitive position of UK businesses. On the other hand, they also fail to boost private demand 
and employment. Furthermore, a net tax shock has negative effects on employment, hours and 
real wages on impact, though they switch to positive one to two years after the shock. Whereas, 
output responds positively with a delay of two quarters.
The response1 of employment and hours to fiscal policy shocks point to the absence of big 
adjustment costs of labor input. What instead affects their decisions heavily is their perception 
about the permanence of the fiscal shock. In particular when the labour input declines, i.e. in 
the erases of a wage government consumption (both for the whole and smaller samples) and a 
non-wage government consumption shock (in the smaller sample), both employment and average 
hours decline. However, when the labour input increase's, like in case of a non-wage government 
consumption shock (whole sample case) or a government investment shock (not significantly in 
the whole sample case, while it is significant in the small sample case but only at the end of the 
horizon considered), the adjustment takes place in the form of an increase in average* hours per 
worker, with employment change's being insignificant over the five year horizon. Thus, when real 
wages increase and the competitive position of the UK firms deteriorates, profit maximization
108 CHAPTER 2. TH E EFFECTS OF M ACRO SHOCKS ON THE UK LABOR M ARKET
(or cost minimization) induces them to reduce the number workers they employ; while when 
the spending boost is not affecting their labour costs, firms adjust their labour input only along 
the intensive margin because they anticipate that the shock will have only temporary effects on 
private demand. Hence, when the implications of the shock arc negative, they are perceived 
as long lasting, instead when they are positive they are perceived as temporary. Moreover, the 
permanence of the shook, the value of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply, as well as the 
extent to which prices are rigid determine also the implications of a net tax shock on employment, 
wages and output.
Overall, the responses of employment, hours, real wages, output and its components to macro- 
economic policy shocks point to the absence of big adjustment costs of labor input, to the relevance 
of the elasticity of labour supply, as well as to the importance of composition effects of the unan­
ticipated government spending changes, which in turn appear to generate different expectations 
on the private sector with respect to the permanence of the shocks. The responses to the govern­
ment spending shock liighlight the importance of exactly determining the fiscal policy action that 
is undertaken because different spending components have different effects on labour market vari­
ables and output components. Therefore, future research should be directed towards a theoretical 
investigation of the relationship between different spending components, labour market variables 
and output, focusing especially on the role played by the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply, 
the adjustment costs of labor input (hiring and firing costs, and in particular the flows in and out 
of unemployment), the persistence of government spending shocks and the timing of the taxes. 
Furthermore, it is worth examining the effects that different spending c o m p o n e n t s  could have 
on the job creation and tlie job destruction decisions of linns. Notice that job creation and job 
destruction could explain the movements of employment. Specifically, tlie wage pressure caused 
by an increase on tlie government wage bill could reduce substantially job creation, as well as. 
raise job destruction while the boost in private demand due to the increase on the wage and 
non-wage components of government c onsumption might generate only a temporary reduction in 
job destruction, without affecting job c reation. Consequently, employment will fall.
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2.6 Appendix
2.G.1 Stylized facts of the U K  labor market
The volatility measures displayed in figure 17 and table 2 are the standard deviations of the 
cyclical components of the labor market variables, divided by the standard deviation of the 
cyclical component of real GDP;4?4~J the period examined is li)70:Ql-20U3:Ql. As we see the 
labor market variables are more volatile in the UK than in the rest of the countries (employment 
is more volatile in UK than in Germany if we exclude the reunification year 1991). While the 
persistence measure displayed in figure 18 and table 3 is the first order autocorrelation of the 
cyclical component of each labor market variable divided by the first order autocorrelation of the 
cyclical component of real GDP (Hess and Shin 1997 and 1998). Employment is slightly more 
persistent in UK than average hours over the business cycle, while in France and Germany they 
are equally persistent. In Germany and Italy average hours are more persistent that employment 
(especially in Germany), this implies that there is not much adjustment along the intensive 
margin.
¡•HE.AvH |!
Figure IT: Volatility Measures
4vI'he s ta n d a rd  deviations ob ta ined  lor the  t 'K  are for em ploym ent 0.016231. for average hours 0.00S363. for
to ta l hou rs 0.021% '). for real waajes 0.01 F i l l .  0.160213 for unem ploym ent, an d  finally for real G DP 0 .0 1•‘5337. 
' 'T h e  cyclical com ponents were ex tra c te d  by m eans of th e  H od rick-Prescott filter (A=1G00).
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Figure IS: Persistence measures
TABLE 1: UK variables
vari alile volatility 1970:Q1-1990: Q-l 1991:Q1-20(I3:Q1
Total Hours 1. 1324 1.425G8 1.54851
Average hours 0.51528 0.54705 0.95095
Employment 1.058 5 1.05485 1.09297
Real Wages 0.935 Ob 0.89923 1.18478
As table 2 displays all UK variables became more volatile with respect to real GDP over the last 
part of the sample'"’0, on top of that during the second sub-sample the volatility of average hours 
came much closer to the volatility measure of employment, whereas real wages' volatility became 
bigger that the one for employment. In addition as table 3 shows all UK variables became less 
persistent with respect to real GDP over the cycle during the last twelve years'’1. Notice also 
that average hours* cyclical fluctuations became more persistent than those' of employment over
rj0llow ever. in ab so lu te  te rm s  all variables becam e less v o la tile  over the cycle over th e  last part of th e  sam ple. T he 
ac tu a l s ta n d a rd  dev ia tions for each variable are  a s  follows for 1991:Q1-2003:Q1: em ploym ent (0.10274). to ta l hours 
(0 .014556). average hours (0 .008939), real wages (0 .011137), real G D P (0.0091). W hereas for the 1970:Q 1-1990:Q 1 
p e rio d  we have em p loym en t (0 .018729), to ta l hours (0.025313). average hours (0.009713). real w ages (0 .015960). 
real G D I' (0,017755).
jl N evertheless, in abso lu te  te rm s  the  cyclical com ponen ts o f average hou rs and real G D P be cam e m ore persislent 
over th e  sam ple. T h e  ac tu a l co rre la tio n  values for the p e rio d s  1970:Q1-2003:Q1, 1970:Q M 990:Q  1 and 1991:Q1- 
2003:Q 1, are for gdp( 0.805. 0 .781, 0.925) for em ploym ent (0.909. 0.921. 0 .783), average hours (0.881. 0.874. 0.911). 
to ta l hours (0.910. 0.913.0.S5S). rea l wages (0.643. 0.618. 0.G20).
2.6. A P P E N D IX 113
the second part of the sample.
TABLE 2: KK variables
variable persistence ratios 1970:Q1-1990:Q4 1991:Ql-2003:Ql
Total Hours 1.1304 1.16901 0.92756
Average hours 1.0944 1.11907 0.98486
Employment 1.1292 1.18309 0.84648
Real Wages 0.79876 0.82970 0.67675
2.G.2 Construction o f the elasticities ahks
The construction of afj ks resembles the analysis of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2002) 
as well as Van den Noord (2002). and Giorno et al (1995). The interest rate semi elasticities of 
government purchases and net taxes are assumed to be zero agj ~  an = 0, as in Perotti (2001). 
The output elasticity of net taxes is constructed as the weighted average of each component of 
net taxes (direct taxes on households, direct taxes on business, indirect taxes, social security 
contributions by households and total transfers)5-. Each revenue component is decomposed into 
a tax rate anti tax base, for example:
R  = S { \ \ \P t ) \V t ( H t ,Eh )E(Y t )H(Yt)  (2.7)
i.e. we assume that real revenues (i?) are decomposed into tax rate S  which is affectetl by real 
wages H'i and prices ƒ*, and the tax base Et)E(Y t) I I (Y t ) .  with l i t  being average hours
and Et employment (E H  being total hours), with those two being affected by output V/. Taking 
logs (lower-case letters) and totally differentiating we can write:
d r
d st , ^O irt ^,dht
d w t à  c t d y t t
4  (—^  + 1)777-  4-1 + 77-rfpf1 du't Oht dy t dpt
s u dst . 1Vdw'1 X 11dct ± \ ( dst -L n  ° Wt 4 - 11dhi \a tu = { (77-----h i)—--- Hi JtT" 4 1 (7 7---- r 1)777 r IJ77—)
' 1 d i r t  d c - f  o y t t  d u ' t  O h  t d y t
dtp — d s t
dpt
(2.8 )
(2.9)
(2.10)
we construct a lg  in the way described above for d i r e c t  t a x e s  o n  h o u s e h o l d s  and s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  p a i d  b y  h o u s e h o l d s .  In order to do that we get (¡7^41), the elasticity of tax revenues 
per person to average real earnings, from Giorno et al (1995) until 1992 and Van den Noord (2002)
thereof, whereas we estimate the contemporaneous elasticity of real wages to employment (^J-)
and to average hours (§)4) and the contemporaneous elasticity of employment (g-jJ) [average
hours ( 7J77M] to output in the way that is described in Perotti and Blanchard (2U02).;,i
°"T I ip definitions used  are tak en  form the  O E C D  Econom ie Outlook 2003. 
j t \ \ 'e  repress:
Atr, = ci -  caAft-i -  C3Art -  -  C5Aft- 2 -  ccAf(- 3 -  cr Art-4
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The output elasticity of direct- taxes to businesses in constructed in the way described in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2001), though it is set to zero because in the UK there 
are lags of more than a quarter in tax collection"'4. We assume that the tax base for in d in c i  taxes 
fluctuates in proportion with private consumption, so we approximate the output elasticity of 
indirect taxes with the output elasticity of consumption, as in van den Noord (2002). To obtain 
the last elasticity we regress the log difference of real private consumption on the log difference 
of real output (on lead 1 and lags 0 to 1), Notice that the elasticity obtained is less than 1 (the 
average value is 0.7215 up to 2003: Q l)55 which is assumed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)"'\ 
The output elasticity of transfers is set to —0.1 until 1992 and afterwards is set to —0.2 as in van 
den Noord(2002)°'. Therefore, the average output elasticity of net taxes that is constructed as a 
weighted average of the net tax components is: a*y = 0.9977, (in Perotti (2 0 0 2 ) this was set to 
0.70). The price elasticity of net taxes is calculated to be atp =  1.2996'’*.
Following relevant literature we set the output elasticity of government purchases at zero 
(dgy = 0 ). so that there are no automatic responses of government purchases to contemporaneous 
economic developments within a quarter. In addition we set the price elasticity of real government 
purchases at (agp = —0.5). in the benchmark model, following the discussion in Perotti (2001) 
about the presence of indexation lags (more than one quarter) on wage and non-wage components 
of government spending5'-1. The employment elasticity of government spending and the average 
hours elasticity of government spending are both set to zero (agE =  (lqli = 0) following the same 
reasoning as for agy. The employment elasticity of net taxes is: a te  — 1.50(511. it is constructed 
assuming a change in employment holding constant average hours and output. Therefore, its value 
for direct taxes to households and social security contributions paid by households is given by: 
tltE = l ( ^  + 1)^^ + 1]. Transfers are expected to be affected within the quarter by movements 
in employment given output, therefore the relevant elasticity is obtained by means of regression
th e  coefficient rep resen ts th e  contem poraneous e la s tic ity  of real w age to em ploym ent (sim ilarly  for th e  o ther
cases). As in P e ro tti (2001) w hen the e stim ate  o f  c-s is nega tive  o r  very  insignificant we set it at zero.
/4\Ve regress th e  change in  log profits on th e  first lead  and  0 to  J  lags of ch ange  in the  log o f  real G D P. The
coefficient on th e  zero lag is th e  o u tp u t e lastic ity  o f p ro fits . T h e  elastic ity  o f d irec t taxes oil businesses to  th e  tax
base is  set to  one. given th e  p roportionality  of d irect ta x e s  on businesses.
J ’W hereas it is 0.7253 u p  to  lt)90:Q4.
J^ The ou tpu t e lastic ity  on non-tax  revenues (like p ro p e r ty  incom e tax es) is set to  zero.
J Transfers include social security contributions paid by  government, other current transfers paid by government, 
capital tax anti transfers paid and subsidies.
'j!*The price e lastic ity  of real direct taxes to  businesses, indirect taxes and  n o n -tax  revenues is set to  zero. The 
price  e lasticity  o f d irect tax es  to  households a n d  o f social security  co n tr ib u tio n s  can be o b ta in ed  from Vail den 
X oord (2002) by su b tra c tin g  1 from th e  elasticity  o f ta x  revenues per person  to  average earnings i.e . from 4 1). 
W hile the  price e lastic ity  o f  tran sfe rs  was set to  -1.
J "We also consider — 0 an d  —1. N otice, th a t w hen  we consider th e  w age bill com ponent of governm ent 
consum ption we set a9P -- —1, since indexation  of governm ent wages occurs w ith  a  lag above one tjuarte r. While 
for th e  non-wage com ponent o f government spen d in g  an d  governm ent investm ent we consider a91, = —0.5.
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analysis in a similar mode as above and its value is — U.2742C0. As before the employment elasticity 
of direct taxes to businesses is set to zero due to collection lags. The employment elasticity of 
indirect taxes is set to 0.3143 by means of regression analysis (which is analogous to the analysis 
described above though this time we regress real private consumption on employment). The 
average hours elasticity of net taxes is: a/// = 1.1029, given employment and output, and is 
constructed in a similar manner as
To obtain agTeer and (Hreer, lacking any institutional information we resort to regression analy­
sis. We regress the log difference of government purchases on the log difference of veer (with leads 
1 and lags 0 to 4). the contemporaneous elasticity was found to be agrerr =  —0.005565 and it was 
significantly estimated (t-stat=-2.1ol9)^2. This implies that an appreciation of the real effective' 
exchange rate generates contemporaneously a negative effect on real government purchases. An 
analogous analysis for each component of real net taxes produced highly insignificant effects, 
therefore we have set airi,er — 0 . Notice that both with respect to net taxes and spending any 
effects of a change in the real effective exchange rate that comes through inflation have already 
been accounted for. So the benchmark specification will include agrr(.r =  — 0. since the
automatic response1 of real government purchases on veer changes within the quarter is not dear 
and deserves further examination.
An alternative VAR specification that we have estimated includes total hours instead of em­
ployment and average ]tours. as well as real wages. In this case we follow a similar procedure as 
above to obtain the relevant elasticities. ntg is calculated to be 1.0023. while the total hours elas­
ticity of net taxes a(i), is found to he T lloO '^1. Regression analysis analogous to the ones described 
above was followed to get the real wage elasticity of real government purchases agtr = 0.1757.
<0T lie  log difference o f each com  poll n it  of tran sfe rs is regressed oil log difference o f em ploym ent (oil lead 1 and 
lags 0  to  1) and we ob ta in  the em ploym ent e lastic ity  of tran sfe rs as weighted average o f the  rt‘levant elasticity of 
each com ponen t. Only th e  elasticity  of social benefits is set at a value different th a n  zero, since for all the rest 
com p o n en ts  o f transfers the  (-s ta tis tic s  are below one in ab so lu te  term s.
t<l T h o u g h  in th is case only th e  direct taxes to  households and  th e  social security  con tribu tions received by the 
governm ent have a  non-negative elasticity , which equals to  1 for both  of th em  as for r>t F  (because the  employment 
and h o u rs  e lasticity  o f  wages is set to  zero since th e  e stim ation  gave us a  negative value). The elastieilies o f 
tran sfe rs , indirect taxes and business taxes is set to  zero.
c'\Y h e n  controlling lor inflation (by including leads and  lags of current in fla tion) th e  value o f the elasticity  rem ain 
app rox im ate ly  the sam e being alw ays sta tistica lly  significant.
F,3T h e  calculation of ou tpu t e lastic ity  of net tax e s  when to ta l hours are used is sim ila r to the  one described when 
we u sed  em ploym ent, th e  only exception  is th a t we use: “  1 ) f °r  direct taxes on households
and socia l security  contribu tions p a id  by households.
»tru i* calculated  in a sim ilar m anner as the one  for em ploym ent. T hough in th is case  th e  to ta l hours elasticity  o f 
tran sfe rs  is set to —0.1G7S. and th e  to ta l hours e lasticity  of indirect taxes is ca lcu la ted  to  be  O.l'SSo. T he to la l hours 
e lastic ity  of direct taxes on businesses is set to  zero, w hile tlie  to ta l hours e lastic ity  o f  direct taxes to  households 
and soc ia l security  con tribu tions paid  by households is ca lcu la ted  (as for em ploym ent an d  average hours) taking as 
given o u tp u t .
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this implies that an increase in real wages will generate an increase in real government purchases 
within the quarter. Notice that for the years under consideration (397U:QT2UU3:Ql) the real 
wage government consumption constituted on average the 56.87% of real government consumj)- 
tion and the 52.21% of real total government purchases in the UK. Therefore, any increase in 
wages will probably show up in government spending, within the quarter. However, wages could 
be fixed to a certain level for a certain period due to contractual arrangements, which implies 
that we should consider agtl, — 0 as benchmark case.^ The real wage elasticity of not taxes is 
constructed as a weighted average of the individual tax and transfer components and is found to 
be 1.8532.^'* . 1
T A B L E  3: Elasticities! of net taxes
output prices employment average hours total hours real wages 4
VAK with E and H 0.9977 1.2996 1.5069 1.1029 - -
YAK with T il atul R\Y 1.0023 1.2996 - - 1.4159 1.8532
Perot ti (200-1): 1963:1-2001:2 0,76 1.21 - - -
Perotti (2001): 1980:1-2001:2 0.82 1.32 - - -
i4 We also consider the  decom position  o f to ta l  governm ent purchases in to  governm ent consum ption and  govern­
ment investm ent: m oreover, we have fu rth e r decom posed  governm ent consumption in to  its  w age and non-w age 
com ponen ts. T h e  real wage e las tic ity  o f each sp en d in g  component, is co n stru c ted  by m eans of regression analysis. 
Specifically we have a9C%u. — 0.2255. ‘ 0 . awg,7.„, — 0.253?, o „ u -9 c . u -  — 0.3500, respectively for governm ent
co nsum ption , investm ent, w age government, c o n su m p tio n  an d  th e  non-w age com ponent of governm ent consum ption. 
fitH olding co n stan t to ta l h o u rs  and o u tp u t, w e c a lc u la te  th e  real w age elastic ity  o f  direct tax es  to households
an d  social secu rity  co n tr ib u tio n s  to  households as b e in g  equal to  — 1) w hich can be ob tained  from G iorno  et 
al (1095) and  van den  N oord (2002) for severa l years . T h e  real wage e lastic ity  o f direct taxes to  businesses is set 
to  zero  due  to  co llection  lags. T h e  real w age e la s tic ity  o f  ind irect taxes is ca lcu la ted  as the real wage e lastic ity  of 
p r iv a te  consum ption  (0.27*16) as described before. W hile  th e  real wage elastic ity  o f transfers is set to —0.1 un til
1002 and  —0.2 th e rea fte r  as for th e  ou tpu t e la s tic ity  o f transfers.
M> Not ice. th a t these* e la s tic ities  vary over tim e , th o u g h  as the  previously m entioned  studies we consider the  
average  values in th e  YAH analvsis.
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2.6.3 Monetary policy shock - Figures
SIP_UK LRGP-UK
Q ►
C' 1' -l € 8 IO 12 U  16 19 20
SIR_UI- -  " LPUT-UK
SP_UK ->  LGDDD_Ui- SIP_Uv
F ig u ro  lí.*: g , t , p , re e r  - responses t o  a c o n tra c t io n a ry  M P  sh ock  ( l í ' ¡ 0 : Q l - i y y 0 : Q 4 )
2.6.4 Government Spending Shock - Figures
r:-D
' I
ïir
tei
l iftp:
f e
!«!:!
pii!
f elitri!
118 CH APTER 2, TH E EFFECTS O F M ACRO SHOCKS ON TH E UK LABOR M ARKET
LPG P-'Jf -  '■ LrG2F_Ui'
LRGP-UK -  ■ _ R G P _ U i- LRGP-Ui- -  L r l lT_ !
>f.P -■ L r G D P _ L
r \ cv-
-e - >.
I
14 16 IS j D
-0.2
*0.6
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3.1 Introduction
Several recent studies- have exam ined the  effects th a t  fiscal policy has on p riv a te  consum ption 
and  inv estm en t, identifying th e  government spend ing  m ultip lier on o u tp u t. However, what is not 
a cco u n ted  for by this lite ra tu re  is the possibility th a t  fiscal policy can have different effects over 
th e  b u sin ess  cycle. It can be less or more effective as a policy instrum ent d ep end ing  on th e  s ta le  
of th e  econom y. For exam ple, fiscal policy m ight be  m ore  effective in m itig a tin g  economic slum ps 
th an  in m u tin g  booms, a lternatively  it m ight be less effective at leng then ing  expansions th a n  a t 
sh o rten in g  recessions. L iquidity  constrain ts can ex p la in  the  asym m etric effects of fiscal policy 
over th e  business cycle*. In recessions liquidity  co n s tra in ts  become binding across a w ider range
‘ 1 m n  g ra te fu l  to  R o b e rto  P e ro t t i  a n d  M ichael J .  A rtis  fo r th e i r  helpful c o m m e n ts  a n d  c o n s ta n t su p p o rt.  I a lso  
th a n k  O m a r  L icadro . E m m an u el C . M a m atzak is  a n d  M iltia d is  M a k r is  as well a s  se m in a r  p a r t ic ip a n ts  at th e  B an k  
of E n g la n d ,  a t th e  M acroeconom ics W orking  G ro u p  ( E ld ) ,  a n d  conference p a r tic ip a n ts  a t th e  8 th  In te rn a tio n a l  
C o n fe re n c e  o n  M acroeconom ic A n a ly s is  a n d  In te rn a tio n a l F in a n c e  (U n iv ers ity  o f  C re te ) fo r th e i r  useful su g g e s tio n s  
an d  c o m m e n ts .
2For e x a m p le ,  B lan ch ard  an d  P e r o t t i  (2002), F a ta s  a n d  M ih o v  (2001), P e ro t t i  (2 0 0 1 ), M ount ford a n d  V h lig  
(2000).
3S o re n se n  a n d  Yoslia (2001) s tu d y  w h e th e r s t a te  fiscal p o lic y  in  th e  T .S . is a sy m m e tr ic  o v e r th e  b u sin e ss  cycle. 
T h e ir  f in d in g s  in d ica te  th a t  tax  re v en u e  increases m o re  th a n  s p e n d in g  in  boom s: w h e reas in  s low dow ns b o th  rev en u e  
and  s p e n d in g  decline, bu t revenue  re m a in  at low levels for a  lo n g e r  tim e. T h e  im p lica tio n  o f  th e ir  an a ly s is  is th a t
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of households and firms (the opposite in booms). This will affect fiscal policy actions, and their 
propagation and transmission in the economy.
As Gali. Lopez-Salido and Valles (200-4) point out there is a consensus in the empirical lit­
erature that government purchases have positive effects on aggregate output; what has not been 
dealt with is the size of the fiscal multiplier, i.e. whether it is above or below unity. To determine 
this, it is the effect of fiscal policy on private consumption (the bigger component of aggregate 
demand) that has to be examined. Private consumption behaves in a quite different manner 
depending on whether or not liquidity constraints bind.
The typical Real Business Cycle model with lump-sum taxation predicts that the wealth ef­
fect of fiscal policy generates adverse effects on private consumption* 4. The presence of binding 
liquidity constraints alters the implications of fiscal policy actions on private consumption. The 
wealth effect of fiscal policy weakens, because fewer people have access to credit markets. Thus, 
it is likely that private consumption is increased after a fiscal expansion, amplifying the effects of 
government spending on output. This effect is strengthened further in recessions when liquidity 
constraints affect a larger fraction of the population. Hence, fiscal policy could have Keynesian 
effects (Gali et al (2004)), particularly in downturns of economic activity5 In periods of expan­
sion. liquidity constraints are less likely to bind or bind for a smaller fraction of the population. 
Households prefer to save if they are uncertain about their future income. Hence, a fiscal con­
traction. to avoid inflationary pressure in the economy, could lead to stronger positive reaction of 
private consumption (because of the stronger positive wealth effect of lower future taxation, or 
because income uncertainty is reduced as in Barsky et al (198G)), cancelling the contractionary 
effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand '^. v
After presenting our motivation and a short discussion of relevant literature, we present a 
stylized two period theoretical framework, where three types of individuals coexist. Neoclassical 
consumers that can “borrow and save“, Keynesian consumers that can only save and rule-of-
s t a te  fiscal policy  (p ro c y c lic a l b u d g e t su rp lu se s )  m u te s  eco n o m ic  e x p a n s io n s  to  th e  sam e  ex ten t as it  m itig a te s  
d o w n tu rn s .
4Aij increase  in  g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g , t h a t  h a s  to  b e  f in a n c e d  by c u r re n t  a n d  f u tu r e  tax es, w ill d ecrease  p riv a te  
c o n su m p tio n  (a n d  in c re a se  l a b o r  su p p ly )  b e c a u se  th e  p r e s e n t  d isc o u n te d  v a lu e  o f  d isp o sa b le  incom e will b e  reduced  
by  th e  h ig h er ta x a t io n  (n e g a t iv e  w e a lth  effect o f  t a x a t io n ) .  A llow ing  fo r d is to r t io n  ta x a t io n , th e  in te r te m p o ra l and 
th e  in tra te m p o ra l  e ffec ts  c o m e  in to  play. T h e  first o n e  im p l ie s  th a t  in d iv id u a ls  p re fe r  to  supply  m o re  la b o r , a s  well 
a s , co n su m e  m ore  in  th e  p e r io d  w h e re  tax es  a r e  low; w h ile  th e  second  o n e  in d u c e s  in d iv id u a ls  to  su p p ly  m ore labor 
w h e n  th e  cost o f  w o rk  r e la t iv e  t o  le isu re  is low .
'M o re o v e r, a s  lo n g  a s  a  f isca l ex p an s io n s  le a d  to  h ig h e r  in te re s t  r a t e s  a n d  lo w er asse t p rices, a n d  p eo p le  have 
access  to  a w hole ra n g e  o f  in te r e s t  b e a rin g  a s s e ts ,  th e n  th e  w ea lth  effec t c o u ld  b e  ev en  w eaker in  recessions (the  
o p p o s ite  in b o o m s).
T n  B a rsk y  e t a l (19SC) a  d e c re a se  in d i s to r t  ion a ry  ta x a t io n  in t h e  p re se n t p e r io d  to  be fin an ced  by  higher 
ta x e s  in th e  fu tu re  w ill le a d  to  a n  in crease  in  c o n s u m p tio n  if  fu tu re  in c o m e  is  u n c e r ta in  an d  in d iv id u a ls  have a 
p re c a u tio n a ry  sav in g  m o tiv e .
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thumb (ROT) consumers. We employ the assumption that government spending has a positive 
effect on disposable income. This is the case when government spending has a positive impact 
on output in the presence of nominal or real rigidities. We study the effect of fiscal policy in 
two cases. In the first, liquidity constraints do not bind in the first period; we refer to this as 
**Good times". Whereas, in the seoond, liquidity constraints bind, and this case is characterized 
as “Bad times". The main implication of the simple theoretical framework is that, under certain 
assumptions, a fiscal expansion will generate a stronger response of private consumption in Bad 
times compared to Good times. This effect will be bigger, the larger the fraction of liquidity 
constrained individuals
Turning to the empirical estimations, we use an unbalanced yearly panel data set (1970-2001) 
of nineteen OECD countries. Periods of recession (Bad times) are characterized for each of the 
countries. Following work by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and Perotti (1999), we use as a proxy 
of the degree of credit constraints, the maximum ratio of loan to the value of house in housing 
mortgages (LTV ratio), and we assign pairs of country-decades into high and low LTV groups. 
The next step is to extract the spending and tax shocks that are affecting private consumption 
in each state of nature and to categorize them into expansionary and contractionary.
The empirical evidence confirms the theoretical predictions suggesting that both a government 
spending and a tax shock have stronger positive effects on private consumption in recessions 
than in expansions. The effect is more pronounced in countries characterized by less developed 
consumer credit markets that are more likely to have a larger group of liquidity constrained 
individuals. Furthermore, in countries with less developed consumer credit markets consumption 
is affected the most by expansionary spending shock and contractionary tax shocks in Bad times, 
while in the more financially developed economies the effects on private consumption are driven 
by contractionary spending and tax shocks in Bad times, and solely by expansionary tax shocks 
in Good times.
3.2 Motivation and Related Literature
The motivation for this paper comes from two adjacent fields of research. The first is related to 
the theoretical and empirical literature on the assessment of fiscal policy shocks, and its effects 
on private spending. The second investigates the conditions under which fiscal policy can have 
Non-Keynesian effects, and implicitly or explicitly introduces a role for liquidity constraints in 
the analysis.
As discussed above, following a government spending shock that is financed by future lump­
sum taxes the typical BBC model predicts, through the negative wealth effect, a decline in 
consumption and an increase in employment that raises the return to capital and boosts invest­
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ment. On the other hand, the Keynesian analysis predicts that private consumption will increase 
after a government spending shock financed by future lump-sum taxes, because disposable income 
increases. Investment may be crowded out because the increase in consumption could raise the 
interest rate; but this depends on monetary policy'. The prediction of both models could be in 
line with a fiscal multiplier bigger or smaller than one. Nevertheless most of the empirical studies 
seem to confirm the traditional Keynesian view, finding a non-negative or positive response of 
private consumption to government spending (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2 0 0 2 ), Perotti (2004). 
Fat as and Miliov (2001) ) , 8
In a recent contribution to the literature, Gali et al (2004), very elegantly, bring the above 
approaches together by developing a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and 
infinite horizon optimizing, as well as, rule-of-thumb consumers (HOT)9. Conditional on having 
a large fraction of ROT consumers (around fifty percent of the population), and a high degree of 
price stickiness (average price duration of about four quarters) they conclude that a government 
spending shock generates an increase in aggregate consumption only if it is not very persistent; 
otherwise the negative wealth effect of higher taxation dominates. However, Gali et al (2004) 
do not consider the possibility of having asymmetric effects over the business cycle; which as we 
claim will be driven by the presence of (binding) liquidity constraints.
The second field of research relates fiscal policy outcomes to borrowing constraints. Several 
papers (e.g. Perotti (1090), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1990)) implicitly or explicitly add the as­
sumption that there exist credit market imperfections; hence both constrained and unconstrained 
individuals coexist in the economy10. This implies that the wealth effect of fiscal policy will be 
stronger when the fraction of unconstrained individuals is high enough, so that fiscal consolida­
tions (by reducing tax burden11 and boosting private consumption) can be expansionary. On 
the contrary, if the fraction of constrained agents is large enough, the wealth effect weakens and 
fiscal policy has Keynesian effects (this effect is stronger especially when the present discounted 
value of future taxation is quite high. i.e. in the presence of convex tax distortions). These
‘ H ow ever, in v e s tm e n t c o u ld  a lso  decrease  fo r o th e r  re a so n s  as well. A s is sh o w n  by  A lesina  e t a l (2 0 0 2 ) an d  
L a n e  a n d  P e r o t t i  (2 0 0 3 ) th e r e  is  a  "cost o r  la b o r  m a r k e t  c h a n n e l"  th ro u g h  w hich  h ig h e r  governm en t c o n su m p tio n  
( in  p a r tic u la r  i t s  w a g e  b ill c o m p o n e n t)  co u ld  lead  to  u p w a r d  w age  p re s su re  on  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  that, c o u ld  red u ce  
p ro f i ts  a n d  p r iv a te  in v e s tm e n t.
s H ow ever. B u rn s id e .  E ic h e n b a u m  and  F is h e r  (2 0 0 3 ) e x te n d in g  th e  s ta n d a r d  B B C  m odel w i th  h a b it  fo rm a tio n
a n d  in v es tm e n t a d ju s tm e n t  c o s ts  confirm  i ts  p re d ic tio n s .
■' K ey n esian  e ffe c ts  o f  f isc a l p o licy  a re  p o ss ib le  w h e n  so m e  in d iv id u a ls  a re  n o t o p tim iz in g  fully over lo n g  h o rizo n s
w h e n  cho o sin g  c o n s u m p tio n ,  b u t follow " ru les  o f  th u m b “ th a t  p lace  a  lo t o f  w eigh t on  c u rren t in com e. It t h a t  case, 
e .g . a  b o n d -f in a n c e d  t a x  c u t  w ill m ak e  th e m  in c re a se  t h e i r  c o n su m p tio n  d e sp ite  th e  fact th a t th e i r  life tim e  budget 
c o n s tra in t  is n o t a ffe c te d .
10S tu d ie s  o f  c o n s u m p tio n  b e h a v io r  have su g g e s te d  t h a t  th e  excess s e n s i t iv i ty  o f  co n su m p tio n  g ro w th  t o  )aI>or
in co m e  is an in d ic a tio n  o f  l iq u id ity  c o n s tra in ts  ( A t ta n a s io  1999).
11 C o n d itio n a l o n  h a v in g  a  sm all e x p ec ted  in c re a se  in  fu tu r e  taxes.
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Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy are more likely in cases of bad initial conditions12 i.e. high 
or growing debt-to-GDP-ratio (Perotti 1999), when the fiscal correction is large and persistent 
(Giavazzi and Pagano 1990. 1996). Crucial also is the composition of fiscal consolidation (Alesina 
and Perotti 1995. 1997); an expenditure cut has higher probability of success than a consolida­
tion based on tax increases13 14. Nevertheless, so far there has not been established a link between 
borrowing constraints that bind depending on the state of the economy and fiscal policy actions 
that generate Keynesian or non-Keynesian effects.
3.3 Theoretical framework
Consider a simple two period theoretical framework (t=l, 2). Suppose that there exist tliree 
types of individuals. Rule-of-thumb (ROT) consumers that consume their disposable income in 
each period, LC type (Keynesian individuals) who are liquidity constrained (can saw, but cannot 
borrow) and the U type (neoclassical individual) who are unconstrained (can borrow and save). 
Following Perotti (1999) we assume the presence of nominal or real rigidities so that fiscal policy 
has a positive effect on output. With respect to timing we assume that production takes place at 
the beginning of each period, while consumption and investment decisions take place at the end.
We examine two cases. In the first case, if the economy is in a Good state (expansion) in 
t=l, it will pass to a Bad state in period t—2. In the second case if the economy is in a Bad 
state (recession) in t= l, it will switch to a Good state in period t=2. The transition probabilities 
are assumed to be 1 , and are known by all individuals at the beginning of period t=l. During 
an expansion all individuals (except of ROT consumers) want to save, while during a recession 
all (except of ROT consumers) want to borrow, though this is not possible for the LC type of 
individuals. Incorporating both ROT and LC type consumers in the analysis we can replicate 
some of the real life phenomena, because even in Good times a fraction of the population will not 
have access to financial markets, while in Bad times this fraction will increase. Moreover, this 
will be relevant both for more and less financially developed economies.
3.3.1 Individuals
There exists a continuum of individuals indexed by i e[0 , 1]. A fraction Aj of them is of the ROT 
type, A2 are LC type individuals, whereas the rest (1 — A) +A2 ) are of the U type11. The V tyj>e
12C ru c ia l  is th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  p o lit ic ia n s  d isc o u n t th e  fu tu re  m ore th a n  c o n su m e rs , so  t h a t  co n su m ers  pe rce iv e  
the fu tu r e  ta x  b u rd en  a s  h igher.
n G ia v a z z i. Ja p p e lli a n d  P a g a n o  (2 0 0 0 ) find th a t  n o n -K ey n es ian  effects a r e  m o re  like ly  w h en  tax es  a n d  tra n s fe rs  
change  (h o w ev er they  focus on n a tio n a l  sav in g s). M o reo v er n o n -K ey n esian  re sp o n se s  a p p e a r  a sy m m e tr ic  a n d  
s tro n g e r fo r  fiscal c o n tra c tio n s  r a th e r  th a n  e x p an s io n . T a x  in creases h ave  n o  effect o n  sa v in g  d u rin g  p e r io d s  o f  
large f isc a l c o n tra c tio n s .
14\ \ ’e  a s s u m e  th a t to ta l  p o p u la tio n  is L — L ~  1, i.e. th e re  is no p o p u la tio n  g ro w th .
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individuals have full access (can save and borrow) to credit markets under all states of nature 
at the going interest rate r. When savings are positive (in Good times), both U and LC types 
invest in government securities and earn gross return equal to (1 +  r). In Bad times, only the 1* 
type individuals can borrow, and they repay in the second period. The LC types are constrained 
to consume their disposable income. The ROT individuals at all times consume their disposable 
income.
Both types of individuals own one unit of labor which they supply inelastically. In the first 
period individuals receive a real wage w f or w f depending on whether they are in a Good or 
Bad state, moreover wG > wB\ this assumption is considered to be a real life phenomenon since 
wages are mildly procyclical. If in Good state at time t= l, then next period they receive u f. 
Analogously, if in Bad state at time t= l then next period they receive wf.
Each 1' type individual maximizes expected utility
E U (C U C2) (3.1)
whore C\ and C% are first and second period consumption respectively and E  denotes expecta­
tions conditional on information available at the beginning of period 1. f/(.) is a von Neuman- 
Morgenstern utility function. The government imposes lump-sum taxes (T) on all individuals, 
except of the ROT consumers, in both periods. , .
The intertemporal budget constraint of the U type individuals when moving from Good to 
Bad times can be written as:
c'( + I i4  =  u .f +  Jftif -  T, -  RT-i (3.2)
2? =  j2— where (1 +  r )  is the real rate of return on savings.10
When switching from Bad to Good times the intertemporal budget constraint for the U ty])e 
of individuals is:
Cj +  Rc$ =  w f  4- R il'2 -  T\ -  RT-z (3.3)
When moving from Good to Bad times, the LC type individuals maximize a function like (1) 
with respect to the following intertemporal budget constraint: :
c\c  +  R d f  =  w? +  Rw f -  Ti -  i m  , (3.4)
whereas they face a analogous problem with the V types when considering the switch from Bad 
to Good times. Furthermore, the LC type individuals face the following complementary slackness 
condition:
M i s i C  =  / £i ( t£-*i — T \ —  C j C )  =  0
_________________________________ 0
irT ’o r s im p lic ity  w e a s su m e  t h a t  th e  r a te  o f  t im e  p re fe re n ce  (p) e q u a ls  th e  m a rk e t  r a te  o f  re tu rn .
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so when /q =  0 then Sfc  > 0 ; the liquidity constraints16 do not bind and people want to save 
i.e. we are in a situation of Good times; whereas when /q > 0, then = 0. so the liquidity 
constraints bind, people would like to borrow but they cannot, i.e we are in a situation of Bad 
Times.
The ROT consumers each period maximize1'
U(Ct )
with respect to the zero saving constraint c^OT — Wf, for t =  1 , 2 .
Finally aggregate consumption for / =  1,2 is given by:
c t  ~  +  ( 1  — — ^ 2 ) ^
(3.5)
(3.6)
Fiscal Policy
We assume that the government “consumes,> a quantity Gt, t  — 1 ,2  of the goods produced in the 
private sector of the economy. Implicitly we assume that the economy is characterized by real 
or nominal rigidities, so that government spending on goods and services has positive effects on 
labor demand and output1*. It finances its spending by imposing lump sum taxes on the V  and 
LC type individuals in each time period. In the first period the government budget constraint is 
Gi + D\ — T\ , whereas in the second G% — 7a + (1 4 - r)D \. B\ is the stock of debt at the end of 
period 1 and is defined in real terms.
Next we discuss the type of discretionary fiscal policy action undertaken by the government. 
First keep in mind the timing of events: following the realization of the productivity shock (we 
call it A) that pushes the economy into a recession {A LOVl ) or an expansion (A HIGn), fiscal policy 
actions are taken, then production takes place, at the end of each period comes consumption and 
investment decisions. Before the governments fiscal policy decision, individuals form expectations 
of the government's action in light of the productivity shock. Therefore the government sets the 
public spending equal to
C?i =  Gi  +  41 +  (3.7)
lCT h e re  h av e  been  sev era l w ays o f  in tro d u c in g  liq u id ity  c o n s tr a in ts  in  th e  l i te ra tu re :  ( i)  th e re  is a  w edge b e tw een  
the  b o rro w in g  a n d  len d in g  ra te s , (ii) th e  in te re s t r a te  v a rie s  c o n tin u o u sly  w ith  a m o u n t borrow ed o r  sav ed , (iii) 
there  is  a n  exogenous lim it (co u ld  b e  ze ro ) to  th e  am o u n t th a t  th e y  can  b o rro w , (iv) th e r e  c a n  a lso b e  a  " n a tu r a l“ 
debt l im it w hich  is th e  m a x im u m  a m o u n t th a t  th e  in d iv id u a ls  c a n  repay, a n d  is o b ta in e d  if  th e  co n su m er bu d g e t 
co n stra in t is so lved  w ith  re sp ec t to  th e  a s se t h o ld in g s  a n d  th e n  is i te ra te d  fo rw ard ; in  th is  case  th e  in d iv id u a ls  c a n  
borrow  o n ly  a  frac tion  o f  th e ir  n a tu r a l  d e b t  lim it.
^ A lte rn a t iv e ly ,  we co u ld  have a s su m e d  th a t  th e  frac tio n  Aj o f  th e  p o p u la tio n  is v e ry  im p a tien t so th e y  a lw ays 
prefer t o  c o n su m e  m ore  in  th e  first jK*riod, i.e, th e i r  r a te  o f  tim e  p re fe ren ce  ex ceeds th e  m arket r a te  o f  re tu rn  
ip>r).
1SN o m in a l r ig id itie s  (e .g . s tick y  p r ic e s )  faced b y  firm s a r is e  in  a n  e n v iro n m en t o f m o n o p o lis tic  c o m p e titio n  w ith  
dow nw ard  s lo p in g  d e m a n d  cu rves a n d  c o n s ta n t e la s tic ity  o f  s u b s ti tu tio n  a m o n g  firm s ' p ro d u c ts .
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and the taxes equal to * s 1
T \ ~ T \  -*r ^  + e] (3.8)
Where Gi =  t/Go and T\ =  \To- with Go. and 7o representing the beginning of period values 
before the productivity shock takes place (while ij and \  display the adjustment that takes
place from the beginning of period values Go and To). Moreover E(G]) = G \ + and
E (T\) = 7j -f- i.e. the individuals knowing the state of the economy correctly anticipate
that the government will respond setting spending and taxation to the above stated values (which 
are compost'd of a fixed part (Gj and 7\) and a part (u^ 41and ) that is set according to the 
realization of the productivity shock A). However they do not foresee £f  and e j  which represent 
the unanticipated component of fiscal policy actions. This is the component which is unanticipated 
as of the information available to individuals following the realization of the producthity shock 
at the beginning of period t= l .  We employ this assumption because we want to analyze how 
individuals respond to fiscal shocks when already in a ir.cession or an (jpansion.
Analogously in the second period we have ,
G - i =  G*2 +  P ^ 2 /A l  E  e 2 (3*9)
T'2 = X2 + <P^ 2/.42 “I” S2 (3.10)
with G '2 =  pG \ and T? = yTi- Moreover £j(G-2 ) = G<i + pv.y  12 and E\{TA  = 7a + pu|^ 12. i.e. 
the individuals knowing the value of the productivity shock in the second period anticipate (in 
period 1) part of the government's actions that will be undertaken in the second period.
Higher government spending affects positively real wages in both periods depending on the 
severity and the type of the rigidities assumed, while by assuming the presence of lumpsum 
taxation we exclude any effects of taxation on real wages19.
3 . 3 . 2  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  P r i v a t e  C o n s u m p t i o n
In this section we discuss what are the implications of these unexpected government shocks on 
the private consumption of the three types of individuals. Keep in mind that we are examining 
changes in consumption in period t—1 after the fiscal policy shock has occurred, compared to 
what would have been the case hadn't the fiscal shock occurred, conditional on knowing the 
realization of the productivity shock. The changes in disposable income are driven by the effects
lv \Ve em p lo y  th e  a s s u m p tio n  th a t  th e  eco n o m y  is  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by  an  u p w a rd  slo p in g  lab o r su p p ly  fu n c tio n . As 
L a n e  an d  P e r o t t i  ('2003) a rg u e , an  u p w a rd  s lo p in g  la b o r  su p p ly  c u rv e  a rises  a s  th e  eq u ilib rium  o f  a  u n io n ized  lab o r 
m a rk e t,  w h e re  e ac h  u n io n  d e fin e s a  sec to r; th a t  is  th e  m a s s  o f  f irm s fo r w hich  th e  union s e ts  th e  w age (A lesina 
a n d  P e ro tti  (1 9 9 9 )) . F u r th e rm o re ,  em p irica l ev id e n ce  by A lesin a  et al (2002). L a n e  and  P e ro tti  (2003). F a ta s  and  
M ihov  (2001) a n d  B u rn s id e .  E ic lien b au m  a n d  F isch e r (2003) re p o rts  p o s itiv e  e ffec ts  on  real w ages w hen governm ent 
sp e n d in g  in c re a se s .
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of the fiscal policy changes on real wages and taxation. The disposable income (V') is given byJ0:
Yi =  «1 — aiL\ (3.1 1)
with a\.n‘i > 0 (using lump-sum taxes can have a-i =  1). while real wages are approximated by:
(i.’l =  b\0\ -f fa/tj +  fa<fa (3.12)
we assume that b\ >  0. A\ is the productivity shock and takes a low value in Bad times and 
a high value in Good times, its coefficient fi>2 >  0) captures all the effect a productivity shock 
could have on wagers and wage setting. <I>i — s^o +  ^ i is a process that summarizes all remaining 
factors that affect wage setting, is a stochastic disturbance (uncorrelated with the productivity 
shock and the fiscal shocks and not anticipated by individuals). 4>o indicates beginning of period 
value, prior to the realization of the productivity shock (fa ><0). Using equations (7)*(8) and 
(11)-(12) we can write the end-of-period t=l disposable income as follows:
Y \  =  « l f a ( > / G b  +  P u <\ ’/ a i  “ t" - t )  T  f l \ b ’i A  \ -T  « j f a < f a  — « '¿ ( . \ 7 o  +  +  ¿ T ) ( 3 . 1 3 )
Notice that what we want to compare is the disposable income after all fiscal policy actions have1 
taken place, with the disposable income after the realization of the productivity shock but prior 
to any fiscal policy action. This change in disposable income in period t =  l can be separated into 
an anticipated and an unanticipated component. The anticipated component is AV’i/autMinted =  
Y\/nutir.ij)nicti~Yi/Ai'i where Y\/anticipated represents the disposable income following the anticipated 
fiscal policy action, whereas Vj/gi represents the realization of disposable income following the 
productivity shock but before the fiscal policy action is taken. The unanticipated component is 
V'l — Yi/anticiixiUtt =  AVj ƒ £ j., i.e. the value of disposable income at the end of period t =  l minus 
the value of disposable income following the anticipated fiscal policy change, this elfeet is due 
only to the fiscal shocks tj' and s j and the stochastic disturbance Hence we can write:
A f i/s\  ^1 ¡an tieipatet! ^lfa- j (tys. j -hcijfa'l,| (3.T1)
A ) I/„„tic ~   ^l/anlic.ijmted ~  “b ^ifas'^O (3.1o)
In the second period wo have:
>2 =  aitv-i — aTEi (3.10)
tt’2 =  b](j-2 +  fa .'1-2 + f a ^  (3.17)
.4-2 is the value of the productivity shock in the second period. <1*2 =  4- tg is a process that
summarizes all remaining factors that affect wage setting. r2 b a stochastic disturbance (uncor­
related with the productivity shock and the fiscal shocks and not anticipated by individuals).
•'’We assume lliat tile lump-sum taxation does not affect real waives.
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is the end of period one value prior to the adjustment of the productivity shock to its new 
value in the second period. What is relevant for the analysis is not the end of period two value 
of disposable income i.e. >2. but the expectation in period I  o f the value in disposable income in 
period 2, i.e. (> 2 ) =  *2/ 1- This implies that the fiscal shocks and and the stochastic
disturbance v 2 are not included since they are unanticipated as of the information available to 
individuals in period one. Keep in mind that A 2 is included (as well as the fiscal policy actions 
implied by the new value of the A parameter) because we have assume that the individuals know 
with certainty at t= l the value of the productivity shock in period t—2 (i.e. if it will be a Bad 
or Good period). Therefore combining (9)-(10) and (16)-(17) we find that:
£ 1(^2 ) = T-2/l — a \b\{r]G\ 4- pW'2/,42) + «1 ^ 1  + “  «2 (T 4- \T i 4- dnt^/ X2) (3.18)
substituting (7) and (8 ) we have:
£i(}'i) — ^2/1 ~  nibiv(G i 4- Pu<\f \ \  4- ef) 4- a ib \p iiy A2 + ai^2^i 4- (3.19)
-a>2X(Ti 4- d>uJ/A1 4- sf) -  « 2  <¿«2 /4 2
Similarly the change in the second period's disposable income following the shock can be sepa­
rated into anticipated and unanticipated components as of the information available to individuals 
following the productivity shock at the beginning of the first period. So the anticipated component 
is yyian tk-Y 'ifA i -  A >2/1 avtic and the unanticipated component is K2/1 ~Y-2/ \ amic,pnicd =  AY’2/ffl. 
Therefore:
a v 2Ai
2 / a n t ic
T 2 / 1  ^2/1 a n t  i c i p a t e d  -  a-2X~T + a ih & ’l (3.20)
^ 2/lnnf/c — ^2/.41 ~
a :biy/?UyA1 -  a2X(buf/A1 4- ai&iP«2/.y2 -  a26u^/A2 4- nikj£2$o (3.21)
Turning now to examine the changes in consumption we know that when moving from Good 
to Bad times the V and LC types can save and thus smooth their consumption between the two 
periods; hence under a quadratic utility function: ' 1 A C \ =  a j>e< the individuals
respond only to the innovations in the present discounted value of their disposable income. The 
same holds for the V  type individuals when moving from Bad to Good times because they can
J1 T h is  wav we a b s tr a c t  fro m  p re c a u tio n a ry  sa v in g  b e c a u s e  m a rg in a l u t i l i ty  is a s su m e d  to  lin ea r. H ow ever allow ing
tit
fo r convex  m arg in a l (fJ > 0 ) u t i l i ty  o f c o n su m p tio n  w ill in d u c e  p e o p le  w h o  w an t t o  sav e  to  sav e  m o re  a n d  people 
w h o  w ant to  b o rro w  to  b o rro w  less. T h e  s im p le s t fo rm  o f  u t i l i ty  fu n c tio n  a s su m e d  c o u ld  be : Cj — ¿ c j ,  w here 
it — y— , "  here p  i s  th e  r a te  o f  tim e  p re fe ren ce  a n d  is  a s s u m e d  to  b e  e q u a l  to  r .  so  th a t  It -  i .  N o te  th a t  i f  J  > It 
all in d iv id u a ls  p re fe r  to  a c c u m u la te  a n d  c o n su m e  a t th e  v e ry  las t p e r io d , s in ce  th e y  a re  very  p a tie n t  (p <  r ) .  If 
J  < It ( p> r ) th e  in d iv id u a ls  a re  very  im p a tie n t a n d  a r e  d issa v in g .
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smooth consumption. However, this is not the case for the LC type of individuals because 
of the binding liquidity constraints. Therefore the change in consumption in period t= l due 
to the fiscal policy change equals the change in their disposable income in the same period:
A C i  =  A Y i =  \ \  — V i/,41 =  ( T i  -  V i/a n h c )  +  0 ^1 /a n tic  ~  ^ l / X l )  =  A V ]/* ,  +  A Y j /a n t ic  ^
incorporates both the anticipated and unanticipated components. The ROT consumers under 
both states of nature will consume their disposable income in each period, therefore their change 
in consumption in period one will be equal to their disposable income change (following the fiscal 
policy action) in the same period (as for the LC types in Bad times).
Hence the simple theoretical framework employed implies that fiscal policy actions will have 
a positive effect on ROT individuals' consumption as long as the effect on real wages is positive. 
In addition they will have a positive effect on the LC and U types' consumption, if the positive 
effect on real wages outweighs the negative effect of higher taxation, leading to higher disposable 
income. In addition the effect on the LC types' consumption will be bigger in Bad times because 
they will face binding liquidity constraints and hence they will consume all their disposable income 
change.
Unanticipated fiscal policy changes are expected to have stronger effects on private consump­
tion in Bad times when individuals face binding liquidity constraints (LC types) and consume 
all their disposable income change at t= l without smoothing consumption over the two periods. 
This would be the case as long as. AVj/fl > i.e. the disposable income change in the
first period due to the unanticipated components of the fiscal shocks is bigger than the corre­
sponding disposable income change in the second period. The condition for this to hold depends 
on the parameters, ?/, \  and Abstracting from parameter £ by setting it equal to one. what 
matters is the weight that is attached on previous period's taxes (\) relative to the weight that 
is attached on previous period's government spending (?/). If x > i] future taxation matters more 
for the financing of current spending decisions.22 Hence, the bigger the fraction of the liquidity 
constrained and ROT individuals in an economy (that do not perceive the tax burdens to be born 
in the future out of a current spending expansion), the more likely it is that fiscal policy will be 
effective in recessions.23 In addition, if a fraction of the population faces binding constraints un­
der both states of nature (like the ROT consumers that have no access to financial markets) then 
fiscal policy would be always more effective in the countries having a bigger fraction of liquidity
" 'A llo w in g  for 0 <  £ <  1. w e co u ld  o b ta in  A V ‘i / e) >  A > 2/e , even w ith o u t \  > i;. w h ic h  w ould a lso  d e p e n d  on  
th e  s ig n  a n d  m ag n itu d e  o f th e  fiscal shocks a n d  th e  s to c h a s tic  d is tu rb a n c e  r i .  F o c u s in g  on £ =  1 is  eq u iv a len t 
to  a b s t r a c t i n g  from  incom e a n d  co n su m p tio n  ch an g es th a t  a re  not d riven  b y  th e  fiscal sho ck s. All th e  re m a in in g  
fa c to rs  a ffe c tin g  c o n su m p tio n  c h an g e  w ill he p ick ed  u p  by  th e  e rro r te rm s o f  t h e  e s t im a te d  e q u a tio n s  in th e  e m p irica l 
a n a ly s is  to  follow.
23A lte rn a tiv e ly ,  th e  m o re  likely to  have a  sm a lle r  n e g a tiv e  effect i f  o v e ra ll th e  effect o f  fiscal po licy  a c tio n s  o n  
c o n s u m p tio n  a re  n eg ativ e .
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constraint agents.
Disposable income changes induced by the anticipated component of fiscal policy actions will 
be of a positive nature if the positive effect on real wages is bigger than the negative effect of 
taxation. In addition, they are expected to be more important in Bad times, and more pronounced 
in countries with less developed consumer credit markets where a bigger fraction of the population 
is expected to face binding credit constraints and follow a rule of thumb consumer behavior.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
The implications of the theoretical discussion are tested using an imbalanced panel of yearly data 
from nineteen OECD countries24 from 1970 to 2001. The first step in our empirical strategy is 
to characterize the periods of recession (Bad times) for each country in the data set. The next 
step is to consider the role played by credit constraints. It is expected that fiscal policy is more 
effective in economies with less developed consumer credit markets, with the effects being much 
stronger in periods of economic recession. Hence, crucial to the results obtained will be the use 
of the right measure of the severity of liquidity constraints.
With respect to the effects of fiscal policy in Bad and Good times, there have been several 
recent empirical studies that have contributed to the literature.2'-' The studies by Perotti (1999) 
and Gavin and Perotti (1997) are those most related to the current study. Perotti (1999) analyzes 
the effects of fiscal shocks on private consumption; however, it considers as Bad times the periods 
with high or growing deficit or debt to GDP ratio and not the periods of low economic activity.
"4A ll v a riab le s  a re  from  th e  O E C D ’s E co n o m ic  O u t lo o k . O u r  d a ta  ru n  fro m  1970 to  2001 fo r A u s tra lia . 1970- 
2001 fo r A u s tr ia . 1970-2001 fo r B elg ium . 1970-2002 fo r C a n a d a .  1970-2001 fo r G e rm a n y . 1981-2001 for D e n m ark . 
1970-2001 for S p a in . 1970-2001 for F in la n d . 1970-2001 fo r F ran ce . 1970-2001 fo r th e  U K . 1970-2001 fo r G reece. 
1970-2001 lo r I re la n d . 1970-2001 fo r Italy . 1970-2001 fo r  J a p a n .  1971-2001 for N e th e r la n d s .  1970-2001 fo r Norw ay. 
1970-2001 for P o r tu g a l.  1970-2001 fo r S w eden , a n d  1970-2001  for th e  U S .
2 jG a li a n d  P e r o t t i  (2003) a re  e x am in in g  th e  c y c lic a l r e la t io n  b e tw een  b u d g e t v a r ia b le s  an d  econom ic  a c tiv ity ;  to  
th is  e n d  th ey  e s t im a te  fiscal ru le s  u s in g  o u tp u t  g a p  a s  w e ll a s  sq u a re d  o u tp u l  g a p  in  o rd e r  to  lest for th e  p resence  
o f  any  n o n -lin e a r ity  on th e  s ig n  a n d  in te n s ity  o f  d is c r e t io n a r y  fiscal p o licy  re sp o n se . T h ey  a rg u e  th a t ,  so  fa r. th ere  
h a s  n o t b een  an y  sig n ifican t c h a n g e  in th e  d i s c r e t io n a r y  fiscal po licy  a c t io n s  o f  th e  E M U  m em b ers  fo llow ing the  
im p o s itio n  of t h e  S ta b il i ty  a n d  G ro w th  P a c t .  L a n e  (2 0 0 3 ) . a s  w ell, d isc u sse s  th e  ro le  o f  fiscal policy  o v e r the  
cycle, fo cu sin g  o n  th e  l im ita t io n s  for fiscal p o lic y  to  a c t in a  c o u n te rcy c lic a l m a n n e r  in  less d ev elo p ed  econom ies. 
P e ro t t i  a n d  K o n to p o u lo s  (2002) a n a ly ze  th e  im p lic a t io n  o f  f ra g m e n ta t io n  in th e  p o lit ic a l  p ro cess  in d e te rm in in g  
fiscal o u tco m e s in  d ifficu lt tim e s . T o  a t ta in  th is  th e y  in te r a c t  th e  p o lit ic a l  v a r ia b le s  (n u m b e r o f  p a r tie s , n u m b e r  o f 
m in is te rs  a n d  id eo lo g y ) th a t  d e te rm in e  f ra g m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  p o litic a l p ro c e ss  w i th  th e  change  in  un em p lo y m en t. 
T h is  w ay  th e y  c a p tu r e  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  a  b a d  e co n o m ic  e n v iro n m en t fo r  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  po litica l v a ria b le s  on fiscal 
v a riab le s . In  a d d it io n  th ey  in te ra c t  th e  ab o v e  m e n tio n e d  v a r ia b le s  w ith  a  d u m m y  v a r ia b le  th a t d e te rm in e s  th e  s ta te  
o f  p u b lic  f in an ces  (a s  in P e r o t t i  (1999) in o rd e r  to  d e te r m in e  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  b a d  in itia l c o n d itio n s  in  te rm s  of 
th e  d e b t /G D P  ra t io ) .  T h e  r e s u l ts  in d ic a te  t h a t  in  p e r io d s  o f  b a d  tim e s ." w h e n  u n e m p lo y m en t increases by  P /i. tin* 
defic it in c reases  b y  0 .0 8 ‘/< o f  p o te n t ia l  G D P  m o re  fo r e v e ry  e x tr a  p a r ty  o r  s p e n d in g  m in is te r" .
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Gavin and Perotti (1997) analyze the behavior of fiscal balance and government revenue and 
expenditure in recessions and expansions in Latin American countries. They use two definitions 
of recessions. Firstly, they characterize as recessions the wars during which a country's growth 
rate is less than the average rate of growth minus one standard deviation of the growth rate series 
for each country. Secondly, they characterize as deep recession episodes for the OECD countries 
the periods where output growth is below -1 .
We consider two definitions of Bad times. The first measure of Bad times used is based on 
the cyclical component of real GDP and has been extracted by applying the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter where the lambda coefficient was set to 6 . The dummy variable DY takes the value 1 when 
the cyclical component is negative, while it is zero otherwise. According to DY there are (261) 
cases of Bad times, and (274) cases of Good times. This is a measure of the “output gap". The 
second measure of Bad times used is based on the cyclical component of unemployment rate, 
extracted as before by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (the lambda coefficient was set to 6 ). 
The dummy variable DU takes the value 1 when the cyclical component is positive while it is 0 
otherwise; this definition generates (270) cases of Bad and (265) cases of Good times. The last 
definition being related to the unemployment rate can be characterized as a milder definition of 
the cyclical economic conditions, since unemployment might be high and or increasing not only 
during periods with low or declining output growth.26
Being constrained to used yearly data since non-interpolated fiscal variables are not available 
on quarterly frequency for most countries, we prefer to use the above described definitions of Bad 
times so as to generate enough Bad time data points.2. Using definitions analogous to Gavin and
■' in  ft p rev io u s version  o f  th e  p a p e r  we have c o n s id e re d  tw o  m o re  d e fin itio n s . T h e  first o f them  co rre sp o n d s  to  
th e  c h a n g e  in th e  cyclical co m p o n e n t o f real G D P ; th e  d u m m y  v a riab le  DAY* ta k e s  th e  value  1 w hen th e  c h an g e  
o f th e  c y c lica l com p o n en t o f  rea l G D P  is  n e g a tiv e  an d  0 o th e rw ise . A c co rd in g  to  DAY* th e re  are  (285) cases o f  
G o o d  a n d  (251) cases o f  B a d  tim e s . T h e  o th e r  d e fin itio n  c o rre sp o n d s  to  t h e  ch an g e  o f  th e  cyclical co m p o n e n t o f  
u n e m p lo y m en t ra te , so  D A t/  ta k e s  v a lu e  1 w h en  th e  c y c lica l co m p o n e n t is  p o s itiv e  a n d  zero  w hen it is n eg ativ e : 
th is  g e n e ra te s  (245) c ases o f B a d  t im e s  an d  (290) cases o f  G o o d  tim es.
T h e se  d e fin itio n s c a p tu re s  th e  re la tiv e  ch ange  c o m p a re d  to  th e  la s t p e r io d 's  s t a te  o f  n a tu re : i.e. w hen o u r  o u tp u t  
g a p  in d ic a to r  ( th e  first d e fin itio n  o f  B a d  tim es D Y ) im p lies  t h a t  we a re  in  a  recession  for tw o co n secu tive  p e rio d s , 
d e sp ite  a n  im provem ent in  th e  o u tp u t  g a p  m e a su re  from  o n e  p e r io d  to  t h e  o th e r , DAY*, ev a lu a tin g  th e  re la tiv e  
c h an g e  o f  th e  o u tp u t g a p  m e a su re , w ill classify  th e  c u rre n t p e r io d  a s  G o o d  tim e s . A n a lo g o u sly  w hen in  G o o d  tim e s  
a c c o rd in g  to  t lie o u tp u t g a p  m e a su re , w i th  th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  th e  o u tp u t  g a p  d e te r io ra t in g  betw een  tw o c o n se c u tiv e  
p e r io d s . D A Y ' will c lassify  th e  c u r re n t  s ta te  a s  B a d  tim es . T h e re fo re  th e  e s t im a te s  u n d e r  th is  d efin itio n  c a p tu re  
th e  e ffe c ts  o f  fiscal p o licy  a c t io n s  o n  p r iv a te  c o n su m p tio n  w h en  th e  s ta te  o f  th e  e co n o m y  im proves o r  d e te r io ra te s  
w i th o u t  a c tu a lly  b e in g  in  a  recessio n  o r  econom ic  e x p an s io n  acco rd in g  to  th e  o u tp u t  g a p  m easu re  u sed . S im ila rly  
fo r th e  re la tio n  betw een D lT a n d  D A i/ .
T h e  r e s u l ts  th a t c o rre sp o n d  to  th e s e  a lte rn a tiv e  d e f in itio n s  a re  q u a li ta t iv e ly  s im ila r  to  th o se  re p o r te d  below , 
h o w ev er th e y  a re  n o t re p o r te d  in  o rd e r  not to  c lu t l e r  th e  e x p o s itio n .
- T h e  u s e  o f  in te rp o la te d  fiscal d a t a  o f  a  q u a r te r ly  f req u e n c y  w ould  d e te r io ra te  th e  q u a lity  o f  th e  in fo rm a tio n  
b o rn  b y  t h e  e s tim a te d  fiscal sh o ck s , w hich  w ill b e  c ru c ia l fo r th e  a n a ly s is  th a t  w ill b e  ca rried  out. in  th e  n ex t
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Perotti (1997) produces insufficient data points to carry out the analysis in Bad times. Moreover, 
when output growth is negative, i.e. we are in a deep recession episode, all governments whether 
in a more or less financially developed economy are expected to provide a fiscal stimulus to the 
economy. This implies that the effect of fiscal shocks on private consumption in Bad times will 
be biased upwards by the fact that the fiscal impulse will be of a bigger magnitude.
The definitions used capture relatively well the economic downturns that many countries have 
experienced in the early 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
TABLE 1: D E F IN IT IO N S  O F BAD TIM ES
Dummy Definition 1 0 Total
DY Cyclical component of real GDP growth>0 
DU Cyclical component of UnRate>0
261 274 
270 205
535
535
With respect to the role of credit constraints on the effects of fiscal policy actions on private 
consumption, we follow previous work by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and Perotti (1999). We 
use as a proxy for credit constraints the maximum ratio of the loan to the value of the house 
in housing mortgages for first time buyers (LTV ratio). Jappelli and Pagano (1991) that have 
constructed this measure provide an extensive discussion of why this measure is appropriate as 
a proxy for liquidity constraints faced by consumers, even in countries where the credit to the 
private sector as a share of GDP is relatively liiglr?. Following, Perotti (1999) we assign each 
country-decade pair in high or low LTV group, using a cutoff value of 80 7( for the LTV ratio. 
The countries already in a high LTV group before 1994 are retained in the same group for the 
period from 1995 onwards, assuming (as Perotti (1999)) that the LTV ratio does not decrease 
over time. The countries belonging to a low LTV ratio before 1995 are either reassigned in the 
high LTV ratio group or remain in the low LTV group29. *28
sec tio n s.
28A s J a p p e ll i  a n d  P a g a n o  (1994) a rg u e , t h i s  is t h e  c a s e  “b ecau se  th e r e  is n o  necessa ry  c o n n ec tio n  betw een  th e  
d e g re e  to  w h ich  c red it is  a v a ila b le  to  firm s a n d  t h e  d e g re e  to  w h ich  i t  is a v a ilab le  to  c o n su m ers ''.  Som e useful 
c o m p a riso n  o f  th e  L T V  r a t i o  a n d  c red it to  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r  a s  a  f ra c t io n  o f  G D P . w hich is a n  in d ex  o f  financial 
in te rm e d ia t io n  fo r th e  e c o n o m y  a s  a  w h o le , a r e  sh o w n  in  th e  A p p e n d ix  (T ab le  8).
2<'L o a n - to -V a lu e  l ia t io :  r a t i o  o f  loan  to  v a lu e  o f  h o u s e  in  av erag e  m o r tg a g e  c o n tra c t ,  from  Ja p p e ll i  a n d  P agano
(1991) a n d  P e ro t  t (  1999). T h e  c o u n try  d e c a d e  c h a ra c te r iz a t io n  re p o r te d  in  P e r o t t i  (1999) is: (I lig h -L T V  countries- 
d e c a d e s )  A u s tr a l ia  19S0-1991 , C a n a d a  1980-1994 . G e rm a n y  1980-1994. D e n m a rk  1970-1994. S p a in  1980-1994. 
F in la n d  a n d  F ra n c e  1 9 6 5-1994 . l TK 1970-1994, I r e la n d  1965-1994, N orw ay  1980-1991, Sw eden, US (19654991). 
C o u n try -d e c a d e s  w ith  L T V  less th a n  80 p e rc e n t:  (low  L T V ): A u s tra l ia  1965-1980. A u s tria , B elg ium  19654991, 
C a n a d a  1965-1980. G e rm a n y  19G5-19S0, D e n m a rk  1 965-1970 . S pain  1965-1980, G reece . Ita ly  a n d  J a p a n  19654991. 
N e th e r la n d s  1965-1994, N o rw ay  1905-19SO, P o r tu g a l  1965-1994. T h e se  high a n d  low LTV g ro u p s  fo r th e  sample 
u se d  in th e  c u r re n t  s tu d y  a re  p re sen te d  a t th e  A p p e n d ix  (T ab le  9 ).
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3.4.1 M odel Specification and E stim ations
As we have discussed above the U and LC types of individuals respond to the unanticipated 
fiscal policy shocks. The LC type individuals will respond also to anticipated changes in their 
disposable income when they face binding liquidity constraints, while the ROT consumers will 
respond both to unanticipated and anticipated disposable income changes under both states of 
nature. Therefore, we should include a proxy of the “anticipated“’ disposable income changes 
(AYi/antic) that are induced by the anticipated component of fiscal policy actions. We expect 
that this proxy will have more important effects in Bad times than in Good times; because in Bad 
times it is related both to ROT and LC type consumers, while in Good times it concerns only 
the ROT consumers. Notice that even if we do not distinguish between Bad and Good times, 
and we consider only a categorization of more and less financially developed economies both the 
disposable income proxy and the unanticipated components of the fiscal variables should have 
more pronounced effects in the less financially developed economies because it is more likely that 
a bigger fraction of their population faces binding liquidity constraints in both recessions and 
expansions, or that a bigger fraction of their population behaves as rule-of-thumb consumers.
As discussed above we study how individuals’ consumption responds to fiscal shocks when 
already in a recession or an expansion. The simple theoretical framework implies that the IE 
type individuals always smooth their consumption (reacting only to the unanticipated component 
of the fiscal policy change): AC[ = , this is true, for the LC  tyjxs only in Good
times. While in Bad times their consumption change equals the change in their disposable income 
(including both the anticipated and unanticipated component): A =  AVj/Sl + A Y xjan(ic. 
The same applies fo r  the R O T  consumers under both states o f nature. Hence, the equation 
to be estimated would be composed of two components, an unanticipated component which is 
determined by the fiscal shocks £j\ s [  and the stochastic disturbance tq. and an anticipated 
component of the disposable income changes which is proxied by AV'i/a7]fir. Therefore, we will 
estimate the following specification for the high and low LTV groups:
ACj =  a i ( l  — L h ) î f + 0 -2( 1 —D i ) r f + 0 3 ( 1 —D i) A y i / a„/jC+Q4L>isf+Q5D i £ ^ + a 6£>iAVj/an/jC+t>i
(3.22)
D\ is a dummy variable taking the value 1 in Bad times and 0  in Good times, s j  is the spending 
shock and cq gives us its effect on consumption in Good times, while eq gives us its effect in Bad 
times, erf is the tax shock and eq* are its effects in Good and Bad times, respectively. 0 3  and 
qg are, respectively, the Good and Bad time effects of the disposable income proxy. While iq is 
a stochastic disturbance that is uncorrelated with the fiscal shocks. Notice that the coefficients 
of fiscal policy variables in Good and Bad times capture the effect on private consumption for 
the 1«. LC and ROT type individuals. Whereas, the coefficient of the disposable income proxy
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in Good times captures the change in consumption for the ROT individuals; in Bad times the 
coefficient of the disposable income proxy incorporates the effect of anticipated income changes 
on the private consumption of the LC and ROT consumers. This setting captures in a simple 
way the real life fact that some people face binding constraints both in recessions and expansions, 
with the liquidity constraints binding for a bigger fraction of the population in recessions.
In order to construct the proxy AVj/Qnilc, and to deal with the endogeneity of current income 
changes with the fiscal variables, we predict the “anticipated" disposable income change using only 
lagged information. Notice that the disposable income proxy according to equation (15) should 
capture the anticipated fiscal policy effects on disposable income conditional on the realization 
of the productivity shock (i.e. knowing the state of the economy at the beginning of period one). 
Therefore we predict AY) / anuc with the fitted values (AY*) from the regression30:
AY) =  AYi_i + AYt-2 +  AYi_3 +  AT  Lt~i +  AT L t-2
+ A G 'i_ i  +  A G , _ 2  +  A C f _ 2  +  A C f - 2  * cdurri +  alum F tdum (3.23)
i.e. we regress the change in households disposable income (AYJ) on the first, second and third 
lagged values of AY), on first and second lagged values of changes of government spending ami 
cyclically adjusted labor taxation (direct taxes and social security contributions paid by house­
holds), and on the second lagged value of the change in consumption and its interaction with 
country specific dummies (cdum) (see Perotti, 1999) in order to capture country specific con­
sumption dynamics. Finally, tdum. are year dummies that control for global economic develoj>- 
inents. The lagged values of the change in taxation and expenditure can be thought of capturing 
the anticipated effects of fiscal policy changes on disposable income, while the lagged values of 
the disposable income change control for the state of the economy.31
Fiscal shocks
Next we discuss the estimation of the fiscal shocks. To get consistent estimates of the coefficients 
of (22) we need to exclude any feedback on fiscal policy variables due to economic activity. 
Therefore, we should not consider the component of fiscal policy changes which is driven by
30T h e  fiscal v a r ia b le s  u se d  a re  Gt■ g o v e rn m e n t c o n s u m p tio n .  Tt : t o t a l  ta x  rev en u es  ( to ta l  d irec t ta x e s ,  social 
se c u rity  c o n tr ib u tio n s  rece iv ed  by th e  g o v e rn m e n t a n d  to ta l  in d ire c t  ta x e s ) . T L t: in co m e a n d  so c ia l s e c u rity  tax es 
p a id  by em ployees. A ll v a r ia b le s  a re  e x p re sse d  in  r e a l  p e r  c a p i ta  te r m s ,  for th e  fiscal v a r ia b le s  w e h a v e  u sed  the  
G D P  d e fla to r , w h e re a s  fo r p riv a te  c o n su m p tio n  a n d  h o u se h o ld  d isp o sa b le  in c o m e  we h av e  u sed  th e  d e f la to r  of 
p r iv a te  c o n su m p tio n . M oreo v er, follow ing P e r o t t i  (1 9 9 9 )  we sca le  e a c h  v a r ia b le  by  th e  lag g ed  v a lu e  o f  real per 
c a p i ta  d isp o sa b le  in co m e  ( th e  a rg u m en t fo r  th a t, is  t h a t  a  fiscal p o lic y  c h a n g e  w ill h av e  d ifferen t e ffec ts  o n  p rivate  
c o n su m p tio n  w h e n  g o v e rn m e n t c o n su m p tio n  o r  t a x a t  io n  is 10 p e rce n t o r  40 p e rc e n t  o f  G D P ).
31 A lte rn a tiv e  sp e c if ic a tio n s  w ere  also c o n s id e re d , u s in g  u n a d ju s te d  in s te a d  o f  cyclica lly  a d ju s te d  m easu re s of 
A T T . T h e  p re fe r re d  o n e  h a d  a  b e tte r  fit.
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cyclical movements in economic activity. The focus should be on discretionary policy changes of 
an unanticipated nature. Discretionary policy changes, as is discussed Gali and Perotti (2003), 
can be decomposed into a systematic or endogenous component (systematic responses to changes 
in actual or expected cyclical economic conditions) and an exogenous component (random changes 
in budget variables (e.g. war spending etc). Perotti (1999) provides a discussion of whether it 
is appropriate to talk about discretionary changes in taxation and spending with no feedback 
from GDP when using yearly data. He claims that the assumption that policy makers do not 
respond much to economic environment within a year is not unreasonable with respect to several 
government spending components. However, it is quite likely that such kind of feedback will 
exist with respect to taxation. Nevertheless, Perotti (1999) argues that “even if the estimated 
surprises are not truly exogenous, this is likely to bias...the coefficients o f  tax surprises upwards, 
both in Good and Dad tim es,... but it is not clear why it should seriously bias their difference". 
However. Bad and Good times in Perotti (1999) correspond to periods of high debt and/or 
deficit, not recessions and expansions as in our analysis. In our case it is likely that fiscal 
policy might be conducted in a countercyclical manner, being stronger in Bad times because an 
economic downturn is more costly to policy-makers so they will choose to respond in a more 
decisive manner to adverse economic conditions. This would imply that the difference between 
the coefficients of fiscal variables in recessions and expansions might be biased. Moreover, there 
might be strong monetary and fiscal policy interactions. This would also affect the coefficients of 
the fiscal variables, especially in downturns of economic activity where the fiscal and monetary 
authorities might coordinate to get the economy out of the recession.
To extract 5^,the fiscal policy shocks, we perform OLS on the following system of equa­
tions,32 where we are dealing with the above mentioned problems by adding two lagged values of 
the change in real GDP (Q), as well as. including the lagged change in short term interest rate 
(//?S):33
A  G t  =  « n  +  a ^ A G f - i  +  a i 3 A 7 ) _ i  4- a j 4 A Q t _ i  +  a \ $ & Q t —2 +  a ^ A  I R S t - i  +  -f*
A TLf — agi 4- c ^ A G f —i  + aysAfT Lt—\ 4* 4- o,25^Qt~2 4- a 2 c A / i2 « S f _ i  4- ejs.24)
A Qt =  031 4- «32ACt#_i -j- 033A rf_i + 034AQ/_i 4- a3sAQ/_2 + a3cA/i?Sf_i +
32A s in  P e ro t t i  (1999) in  each  reg re ss io n  th e  c o n s ta n t  is  a llow ed  to  c h a n g e  in  1975. M oreover, we a llow  for a 
p o s t-M a a s tr ic h t effect o n  E t 1 c o u n tr ie s  b y  a llo w in g  a  d iffe re n t m ean  a f te r  1992; th is  c a p tu re s  m ore c o o p e ra tiv e  
and  p o ss ib ly  m ore  c o o rd in a te d  p o lic ies  a s  well a s  a  t re n d  to w a rd s  fiscal c o n so lid a tio n  in  th e  run u p  to  t h e  E M l \  
T he  c o u n tr ie s  co n sidered  are: A u s tr ia ,  B elg ium , G erm an y , D e n m a rk , S p a in , F in la n d . F ra n c e . l TK, G reece, Ire la n d . 
Italy, N e th e r la n d s , P o rtu g a l a n d  Sw eden ,
33D a ta  for real G D P a n d  s h o r t- te rm  in te re s t r a te  a re  from  O E C D , E conom ic  O u tlo o k  a n d  In te rn a tio n a l F in an c ia l 
S ta tis t ic s  o f  th e  IM F.
XmCHAFTER 3. THE ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY OS PRIVATE CONSUMI
Tilt* government spending shock will be s f  as estimated above, whereas the cyclically adjusted 
tax shock is constructed as proposed by Blanchard (1993). and it is sJCA = — 6ts f T L t . o t
is a weighted average of the GDP elasticities of direct taxes to households and social security 
contributions paid by employees, i.e. the components of XX. These elasticities are taken from 
OECD's Economic Outlook (2003). Giorno et al (1995). and Van den Noord (2 0 0 2 ) .31
Notice that in order to capture the effect of credit or liquidity constrained consumers we 
should estimate equation (22) for the two LTV groups that represent different degrees of develop­
ment of consumer credit and mortgage markets. The larger the fraction of liquidity constrained 
individuals, the stronger the effect of fiscal policy on private consumption. Particularly in Bad 
times when liquidity constraints bind for more people (or when they are stricter) and consump­
tion smoothing is not possible. Hence, we expect that a government spending shock, will have 
positive and stronger effects on private consumption in Bad times compared to Good times in 
countries characterized bv less developed consumer credit and mortgage markets, This happens 
because the liquidity constrained individuals being at a “corner" solution will consume their in­
come increase that results as a consequence of the spending shock. In more financially developed 
economies, where the fraction of liquidity constraint individuals and rule-of-thumb consumers is 
much smaller, we would expect that a government spending shock has smaller effects on private 
consumption compared to the less financially developed economies. Though, even for them fiscal 
policy might be more effective in Bad times if the fraction of population affected by liquidity 
constraints increases in Bad times.
Similarly a tax shock (tax hike) is expected to have a stronger negative effect on consumption 
in periods of economic: slowdown compart'd to economic expansions, in less financially developed 
countries. The other side of the coin would lie that a tax cut could boost private demand by 
much more in downturns relative to upturns, in countries where access to consumer credit is 
limited. In countries with more developed consumer credit markets the effects should be of a 
smaller magnitude, still though it is possible that a tax shock might have1 stronger effects in a 
recession relative' to an expansion, as long as the fraction of the population that cannot smooth 
consumption increases in Bad times.
Moreover, wo expect that the disposable income proxy will have more pronounced effects on 
consumption in the low LTV rather than in the high LTV group, whereas it will be of a bigger 
magnitude for both of them in Bad times. The first result holds, as long as. a bigger fraction of 
the population does not have access to financial markets in the low LTV than in the high LT\ 
group. In addition the second result holds if the constraints bind for more people in both LTV 
groups during Bad times.
'F o llo w in g  w o rk  l»y P e ro t t i  (2 0 0 1 ) w e a re  a s su m in g  in te re s t  ra te  sem i e la s tic itie s  lo r tax es a n d  sp e n d in g  equal
mm
to  zero .
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3.4.2 Estimation Results
The analysis will be conducted in four steps. First, we will examine the implications of fiscal 
shocks on private consumption in the whole OECD sample without using the LTV categorization 
or the Bad-Good times definitions. This way we will get a better idea of what the results are 
for the benchmark model using the whole OECD sample, and whether the categorizations that 
we shall use next make sense. As a second step we will analyze what are the implications if 
we consider the two LTV groups separately (high and low), without considering the Bad times 
definitions. If there exist consumers that haw limited access to consumer credit under all states 
of nature then fiscal policy will be more effective in the low LTV group. The third step will be 
to consider the fiscal policy actions taken in Bad and Good times for the whole OECD sample, 
without making use of the LTV index. The conclusions drawn will be related to the effectiveness 
of the exogenous component of discretionary fiscal policy on affecting private demand over the 
business cycle, a useful benchmark for the final step of the analysis. The fourth and last step 
will be to investigate the role of liquidity constraints (as proxied by the LTV indexed) in the 
transmission of fiscal shocks in recessions and expansions. In all the above cases we will consider 
also the decomposition of fiscal innovations into their expansionary (when spending shocks are 
positive and tax shocks negative) and contractionary (when spending shocks are negative and tax 
shocks positive) components. 30 *5
Fiscal policy in OECD countries
First we present the benchmark model which is estimated by the Prais-Winsten estimation pro­
cedure allowing for a panel-level heteroskedastic AR(l) error structure3^ ' with country and year 
dummy variables. Table 2 displays that a government spending shock has a very strong positive 
effect on private consumption, while the tax shock has a negative effect of a smaller magnitude 
though. Moreover, the disposable income enters with a positive and significant coefficient, ac­
cording to the theoretical discussion this should indicate the presence of liquidity constrained 
individuals. Overall, the effects are of a Keynesian nature. After using the categorization of fiscal 
shocks into expansionary and contractionary components (see table 1 0 , Appendix) we find that 
an expansionary spending shock has a positive and quite strong effect on private consumption,
30T h e  coefficient est im a te  o f  a n  e x p an s io n a ry  sp e n d in g  sh o ck  d isp lay s th e  effect on c o n su m p tio n  from  a  sp e n d in g
in crease , w h en  fiscal p o lic y  is se t in  an  ex p an s io n a ry  m a n n e r . T h e  n egative  o f  a coefficien t e s t im a te  o f  a  c o n tra c ­
t io n a ry  sp e n d in g  shock  g iv es th e  effect in c o n su m p tio n  follow ing a  decrease  in  g o v e rn m en t sp e n d in g  (o r a lte rn a tiv e ly
th e  effect on an  in c rease  in  sp e n d in g , w hen fiscal po licy  is se t in a  c o n tra c tio n a ry  w ay). S im ila rly , th e  (n e g a tiv e  o f
th e )  coefficien t o f  an  ex p an s io n a ry ’ t a x  shock re p re se n ts  th e  effect o f a tax  c u t on p r iv a te  c o n su m p tio n , w h ile  th e  
coefficient o f  a  c o n tra c t io n a ry  t a x  sh o c k  re p re se n ts  th e  effect on p r iv a te  c o n su m p tio n  fo llow ing  a  ta x  h ike.
^ ’A lte rn a tiv e ly , w e e s t im a te d  t h e  m o d el by p o o le d  O LS a llo w in g  fo r h e te ro sk e d as tic  a n d  a u to c o rre la te d  o f  o rd e r  
o n e  e r ro r  s t r u c tu r e  (N ew ey-W est s ta n d a r d  e rro rs ). T h e  re su lts  o b ta in e d  a re  q u a li ta t iv e ly  s im ila r .
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while a contractionary spending shock still has a positive but very small and insignificant effect 
on private consumption. These results are confirmed by relevant Chi-square tests (table 10. Ap­
pendix). Both expansionary and contractionary tax shocks generate similar (negative) effects on 
private consumption, though the contractionary tax shock has a slightly bigger and much more 
significant coefficient, though the Chi-square test performed does not reject the null of a common 
effect in both cases/' Overall, spending shocks’ effects present significant asymmetry, with the 
expansionary spending shocks having the most important effects/*
Table 2
Variables OECD IILTV LLTV
A
A
AYt
Nobs
n ‘2
Adj H2 1st regr.
2.2910(3.32)***
-0.4101(-3.14)***
0.7586(2.24)**
535
0.321
0.873
0.1662(1.31)
-0.2070(-3.52)***
0.4077(4.75)***
302
0.5147
0.873
3.1199(3.63)*** 
-0.539G(-.3.19)*** 
0.7475(2.07)**
233
0.4013
0.873
Nobs 1st regr. 544 544 511
t-statistics* in vthesis,  ***, **,* statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Tht* next step is to introduce the high and low LTV categorization and see whether the results 
change ill a significant manner. The results are shown in the last two columns of 'Iable 2 for each 
LTV group. The estimates after pooling the two groups are reported in Table 3. As expected 
spending, taxation and the disposable income proxy have bigger coefficient estimates in the ease of 
the low LTV group. However, only the spending shock has statistically different results between 
the two groups. The tax shock produces different effects in the two LTV groups, though the 
difference between the two groups is statistically different from zero only at the 2 0 % level of 
significance. Therefore, fiscal policy shocks and particularly government spending shocks have 
asymmetric effects in the two LTV groups, suggesting that liquidity constraints are important. *3
3 ‘ T h e  re su lts  a r e  to  b e  r e a d  a s  follows: an  d e c re a se  in  ta x  b u rd e n  by 1% will in c re a se  c o n su m p tio n  l»v 0 .528% .
w h ile  an  in c re a se  in  tax  b u rd e n  w ill decrease c o n su m p tio n  by  0,638% .
3SC onsidering ; th e  tw o  h y p o th e s e s  to g e th e r, w e a re  a b le  t o  re jec t th e  nu ll o f  c o m m o n  effects w h en  fiscal p o licy  is 
c o n tra c t io n a ry  a n d  e x p a n s io n a ry  (T ab le  10).
3.4. D A T A  A N D  E M P IR IC A L  S T R A T E G Y 159
T at,le 3
Variables
sf LLTV 3.4863(3.44)***
( H LTV  -  L L T V ) -3.3630(-3.30)***
s',LLTV -0.5264(-3.20) ***
e',(HLTV -  LLTV) 0.2431(1.34)
A YtLLT V 0.7626(2.14)**
A Y t(H L T V  -  L L T V ) -0.0837(-0.33)
Nobs 535
R2 0.3755
Nobs k  R2 in the 1st regr. 544 (0.873)
t-statistice in parenthesis, ***, **,* statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
In the high LTV group (table 10. Appendix), contractionary and expansionary spending 
shocks have a positive effect of a similar magnitude, but they are statistically insignificant. The 
expansionary tax shock seems to have a much bigger impact on private consumption than the 
contractionary tax shock, i.e. a decrease in taxation increases consumption by about the double of 
the absolute value of a private consumption decrease following an increase in taxation. However, 
relevant Chi-square tests do not confirm this result.
Both spending and tax shocks of expansionary and contractionary nature are of a bigger mag­
nitude in the low-LTV group. Expansionary' spending shocks have a much more pronounced, pos­
itive and significant effect on private consumption, compared to contractionary spending shocks. 
While it is contractionary tax shocks that appear to have a significant impact on consumption. 
Though, the Chi-square tests reported support only the case of different spending effects and 
not tax effects. Considering both hypotheses together we are able to reject the null of common 
effects when fiscal policy is expansionary and contractionary. After pooling all observations (table 
11, Appendix) expansionary spending shocks in the low-LTV group are the driving force of the 
asymmetry between the effects of spending shocks in OECD countries (the expansionary spending 
shocks are of a much bigger magnitude in the low-LTV group). In addition, there is significant 
asymmetry in the effects of a contractionary tax shock between the two LTV groups, with the 
effect being almost three times bigger in absolute value in the case of the low-LTV group. Hence, 
an increase in spending and an increase in taxation are translated into much bigger consumption 
changes in the low-LTV group, that is characterized by less developed consumer credit markets, 
than in the high LTV' group.
Before turning to examine the role of liquidity constraints in the transmission of fiscal shocks 
in recessions and expansions, we analyze how tax and spending shocks affect private consumption 
in recessions and expansions in all the nineteen OECD countries considered. The results will be
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suggestive of the effectiveness of fiscal policy over the business cycle and will serve as a useful 
benchmark in order to evaluate the effect that the interaction of the degree of development of 
consumer credit markets (as described by the LTV ratio) with fiscal policy shocks has on private 
consumption in upturns and downturns of economic activity.
We estimate two versions of the model. In the first one, according to our simple theoretical 
framework, the proxy AVJ captures the effects of anticipated income changes on private consump­
tion of liquidity constrained individuals. While in the second AYt is allowed to have a different 
effect in Bad and Good times, i.e. allow for liquidity constraints to bind both in Good and Bad 
times; we expect though the result to be stronger in Bad times. In both cases we include a full 
set of country and year dummy variables. Tables 4 and 5 present the estimates that correspond 
to the four definitions of Bad times.
When examining DY. we see that spending shocks have a positive effect on private consumi>- 
tion which much more pronounced in Bad times. Tax shocks, have a negative effect in both states 
of nature with their effect being stronger and more significant in Bad times. The disposable in­
come proxy lias a bigger effect in economic recessions. Though. Chi-square tests indicate that 
only the effect of the spending shock has statistically different effects in Good and Bad times.
After decomposing the fiscal shocks into expansionary and contractionary categories, in the 
case of definition DY, we see (table 12 Appendix) that an expansionary spending shock generates 
a bigger (positive) impact effect on private consumption than a contractionary spending shock 
when in Bad times. So an increase in spending affects consumption (positively) by much more 
than a corresponding decrease when in Bad times; tliis appears is not the case in Good times as 
can be seen by the reported Chi-square tests. Moreover, there is a statistically significant and 
much bigger (positive) effect on private consumption following an expansionary spending shock 
in Bad than in Good times.
A contractionary tax shock in Bad times appears to affect consumption to a greater extent 
than an expansionary tax shock in Bad times, though the Chi-square tests reported in Table 12.1 
do not confirm this result . In Good times there is an indication of asymmetric effects, with bigger 
coefficient (in absolute values) for the case of an expansionary tax shock, though the relevant test 
performed does not reject the null of a common coefficient for expansionary and contractionary 
lax si locks. While, contractionary tax shocks have a bigger (negative) and more significant impact 
effect on private consumption in Bad times, than in Good times. Whereas, for expansionary tax 
shocks we cannot reject the null of a common effect both in Bad and Good times.
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TABLE 4
Variables DY DY
efB a d 3.6949(3.62)*** 3.8225(3.82)***
Good 0.7130(0.88) 0.3064(0.41)
e \B ad -0.5711 (-3.61)*** -0.6199(-3.90)***
s\G ood -0.3422(-1.00) -0.2012(-0.62)
AY, 0.7467(2.27)** -
A YtB ad - 0.8351(2.48)**
A YfGood - 0.6000(1.74)*
Nobs 535 535
NofBad Times 261 261
jr:2 0.368 0.386
A-2 (and p-values):bg=gg 5.22(0.0224) 7.88(0.0050)
A" 2 :bt=gt 0.36(0.5477) 1.32(0.2505)
.V2 : bAY, = gAY, - 1.18(0.2779)
Adj./f2 fc Nobs 1st regr. 0.873 (544)
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X 2 tests we report p-values).*
**. **,* statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
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Variables DU DU
sP,Bm l 1.8343(1.83)* 2.2484(2.38)**
ejGood 0.5958(0.73) 0.1963(0.20)
s  f B a d -0.5305(-3.77)*** -O.G185(-4.53)***
e\Good 0.0420(0.22) 0.1368(0.74)
a ü , 0.6529(2.01)** -
A ŸfBad - 0.8300(2.48)**
A Ÿ tGood - 0.5270(1.(12)
Nobs 535 535
NofBad Times 270 270
R 2 0.437 0.475
A'2(and p-values):bg=gg 0.89(0.3456) 2.79(0.0950)
A'2 :bt=gt 0.13(0.0133) 10.95(0.(HX)9)
A 2 : bAŸt = gAŸt - 2.08(0.1488)
Adj.i?2 cG Nobs 1st regr. 0.873 (544)
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X 2 tests we report p-values).
***, **.* statistical significance at 1%, o%  and 10% level of sign if., respectively.
The DIT definition that is based on the unemployment rate and describes milder recession 
episodes produces analogous results for the spending and tax variables. However the estimates 
are of a smaller magnitude and not as significant as before, in particular those refering to the 
fiscal shocks.The disposable income proxy, as above, produces positive and more significant effects 
in Bad times. Moreover, we see (tables 13 and 13.1) that expansionary fiscal shock produce a 
strong and significant positive effect in Bad times, which is of a bigger magnitude and statistically 
different than in Good times but it is not statistically different from the effects of contractionary 
spending shock in Bad times. As far as taxation is concerned, both contractionary and expan­
sionary tax shocks generate similar magnitude effects in Bad times, while the contractionary tax 
shock (a decrease in taxation; the negative of the coefficient) increases consumption and generates 
a statistically different effect compared to Good times. Notice that in this case tax shocks have 
insignificant effect in Good times.
Overall, fiscal policy appears to have Keynesian effects on private consumption in Bad times 
for the whole OECD sample. A tax cut in downturns increases private consumption more than 
a tax cut in upturns of economic activity, whereas a spending shock generates much more pro­
nounced effects in periods of reduced economic activity. Furthermore, the results obtained point 
to the following: Expansionary spending shocks in Bad times are more important in generating
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positive effects in consumption and differ significantly both with respect to the corresponding ef­
fects in Good times and the effects of a contract ionary spending shock in Bad times. With respect 
to taxation, expansionary tax shocks in Good times (a decrease in taxation, i.e. the negative of 
the coefficient estimate) raise significantly consumption, mainly for DY (though the magnitude 
of the effect does not differ significantly from the effect in consumption caused by a tax hike as 
part of a contractionary tax policy in Good times); while a contractionary tax shock in Bad times 
generates a significant reduction in private consumption, which is statistically different from the 
corresponding effect in Good times, but not statistically different from the magnitude effect of a 
expansionary tax shock (a tax cut) in Bad times.
Hence fiscal policy (particularly an expansionary spending shock) is more effective in mitigat­
ing economic slumps rather than in muting booms, with respect to its effect on private consump­
tion. As far as taxation is concerned, we see that tax effects on consumption are stronger in Bad 
times particularly because tax shocks, contractionary or expansionary, are equally important in 
Bad times, while at the same time contractionary shocks in Bad times affect private consumption 
to a greater extent relative to their corresponding effect in Good times. Alternatively we could 
say that government spending is a more effective mechanism in shortening recession episodes 
than lengthening expansions in OECD countries. Tax policy has very negative effects on pri­
vate economic activity if pursued in a contractionary maimer in particular in Bad times than in 
Good times; whereas there are no significant indications that its contractionary (tax hike) and 
expansionary (tax cut) components produce asymmetric effects (in terms of the magnitude of the 
coefficient) in Bad times.3"
A possible justification for these results is the presence ofliquidity constraints that bind for a 
fraction of the population in all OECD countries during Bad times, so that unanticipated fiscal 
policy actions that increase or decrease disposable income will induce them to consume more or 
less, respectively.4" Next, wc will evaluate the implications of credit constraints.
The effects of credit constraints in recessions and expansions In this section we will 
examine the effects of consumer credit availability on the way that fiscal policy affects consumption 
behavior. Consumer credit availability is determined by the LTV ratio41.
31 In case  o f  a lax  h ike  con su m p  lio n  decreases, th e  o p p o s ite  in  case  o f a ta x  c u t.  b u t th e  re su lt is o f  a  sym m etric- 
n a tu re .
Jt)A lte rn a tiv e ly , th e  fiscal p o licy  shocks m igh t b e  c o u n te rcy c lica l, w ith  th e i r  effect b e in g  in h e re n tly  s tro n g e r  in  
recessions b ecau se . T h o u g h , e v en  in  th a t case liq u id ity  c o n s tr a in ts  shou ld  b in d , o th e rw is e  in d iv id u a ls  sh o u ld  b e  
ab le  to  sm o o th  th e ir  c o n su m p tio n .
J I As b e fo re  wc e s tim a te  tw o v ers io n s  o f e q u a tio n  (22). T h e  first one im p o ses a  c o m m o n  A } '( in  CIoocl a n d  
B ad  tim es , w hile  in th e  second  AY’t is  allowed to  have  a  d iffe ren t effect in u p tu rn s  a n d  d o w n tu rn s . A full set o f  
co u n try  a n d  y e a r  d um m y v a ria b le s  h av e  lieen in c lu d e d , a n d  th e  e s tim a tio n  is c o n d u c te d  fo r a  h igh  a n d  a  low L T V  
c o u n try -y e a r  g roups. T h e  P ra is -W in s le n  e s tim a tio n  p ro c e d u re  th a t  allows for p an e l-lev e l h e te ro sk e d a s tic  A R (1 )
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The results presented on Table 6 make use of the DY definition of Bad times and refer to 
the high and low LTV groups. A government spending shock affects in a positive and significant 
manner private consumption in Bad times with respect to the high LTV group; though in Good 
times its effect is not statistically significant, and the coefficient has a negative sign. The tax 
variable lias a negative and significant effect which appeal's to be of a similar magnitude in 
both Good and Bad times. The disposable income proxy enters with a positive and significant 
coefficient both in Good and Bad times, though its effect is bigger in Good times.
Fiscal policy is more effective for the low LTV group. A government spending shock has a 
much bigger and statistically significant coefficient in Bad times, on top of that the tax shocks 
have a bigger effect and are statistically significant only in Bad times. The disposable income 
proxy has a bigger effect on private consumption in the low LTV group, with its effect being more 
pronounced, as expected, in Bad times. However, it is only the spending shock that appears to 
have statistically different effects (at conventional levels of statistical significance) on private 
consumption in Bad and Good times.
Therefore, spending shocks have more pronounced effects in Bad times for both LTV groups, 
though the magnitude of the coefficients is much bigger when considering the low LTV group. Tax 
shocks have a bigger coefficient for the low LTV group rather than the high LTV group, however, 
in both cases we cannot reject the null of a similar effect in Good and Bad times. Analogously, the 
effect of the disposable income proxy is bigger in the low LTV group. In addition, the disposable 
income proxy has a stronger effect in Good times for the high LTV group, whereas its effect is 
bigger in Bad times for the low LTV group (though only at the 20% percent level of significance).
e r ro r  s t r u c tu r e  was riseti. Q u a li ta t iv e ly  s im ila r  r e su lts  w e re  o b ta in e d  w h e n  we e s t im a te ti  th e  m o d e l w ith  pool«! 
O L S  w ith  N ew e r-W e st s t a n d a r d s  e rro rs .
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TABLE 6: DY
Variables 1 2 3 4
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
¿¡Bad, 0.5255(2.73)*** 0.4932(2.60)*** 4.7018(3.89)*** 4.9059(4.12)***
¿¡Good -0.0641 (-0.040) -0.0690(-0.44) 1.3097(1.05) 0.5108(0.39)
e\Bad -0.2l85(-2.47)** -0.2327(-2.70}*** -0.7016(-3.97)*** -0.76Ll(-4.28)***
e\Good. -0.1868(-2.52)** -0.2013(-2.78)*** -0.5507(-0.G7) -0.2 401 (-0.30)
AT, 0.4139(4.84)*** - 0.7589(2.15)** -
AYf Bar/ - 0.2750(2.77)** - 0.8475(2.40)**
AYtGood - 0.4841(5.38)*** - 0.5599(1.50)
Nobs 302 302 233 233
NofBad Times 149 149 112 112
i?2 0.528 0.535 0.443 0.465
X 2 (and p-values) for bg=gg 5.49(0.0191) 5.15(0.0232) 3.61(0.0574) 6.16(0.0131)
A' 2 :bt=gt 0.08(0.7765) 0.08(0.7723) 0.03(0.8565) 0.42(0.5192)
X'2 : bAY, =  gAY, - 6.45(0.0111) - 1.73(0.1883)
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical significance at 1%, f.% and 10'X level of eignif*. respective!;
Decomposing the fiscal shocks into their expansionary and contractionary components we see 
that with respect to the high-LTV group the contractionary spending shock produces bigger and 
significant effects on private consumption in Bad times, and moreover that its effect is statistically 
different from the corresponding effect in Good times, as well as the effect of the expansionary 
spending shock during Bad times (tables 14 and 14.1, Appendix). We can interpret this result in 
two ways, firstly that a spending cut in Bad times (the negative of the coefficient estimate) reduces 
to a much greater extent private consumption, than the corresponding pick up in consumption 
following an increase in spending in Bad times. A second interpretation is that a spending 
increase during a period of Bad times where fiscal policy has been conducted in a contractionary 
way generates much bigger, positive, effects in private consumption.
A contractionary tax shock in Bad times generates strong negative effects on private con­
sumption, but it does not differ significantly in terms of magnitude from the expansionary tax 
shocks in Bad times. Whereas, in Good times it is expansionary tax shocks that significantly 
affect the private consumption, though still their magnitude does not differ significantly compared 
to contractionary tax changes. Furthermore, there are no significant differences in terms of mag­
nitude between contractionary and expansionary tax shocks in Bad and Good times, confirming 
the result obtained before.
Expansionary spending shocks in Bad times are the most im]>ortant factor that affects private 
consumption in the low-LTV group, and it is statistically different from contractionary spending
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shocks in Bad times, and expansionary spending shocks in Good times. In addition, as for the 
high-LTV group, contractionary tax shocks in Bad times affect in a significant manner consump­
tion changes, though its effect differs significantly from the corresponding effect of a expansionary 
tax shock in Bad times. Hence, a tax hike in Bad times reduces consumption, but not more that 
the corresponding increase in consumption following a tax cut in Bad times. Therefore, the bigger 
source of asymmetry comes from the spending shocks, with the contractionary component being 
more influential in the high LTV group and the expansionary component in the low-LTV group.
TABLE 7: DU
Variables 1 2 3 4
- II-LTV H-LTV L-LTV Lri;r
sf Bad. 0.4209(2.22)** 0.4297(2.23)** 2.9310(2.00)** 3.5925(2.5:
sfGood 0.0074(0.05) 0.0200(0.12) 1.1154(0.88) 0.2346(0.
sfBad -0.1758(-1.98)** -0.1751(-1.90)** -0.0102(-3.53)*** -0.7477(-4.3
sfGood -0.2272(-2.82)*** -0.2338(-2.90)*** -0.0212(-0.09) 0.1615(0.1
ay; 0.3971(4.00)*** - 0.0547(1.83)* -
AY] Bad - 0.3352(3.34)*** - 0.8843(2.41
A YtGood - 0.4309(4.01)*** - 0.4907(1.3
Nobs 302 302 233 233
NofBad Times 150 150 120 120
R 2 0.519 0.519 0.474 0.522
X 2 (and p-values) for bg=gg 2.07(0.1019) 2.57(0.1090) 0.91(0.3110) 3.12(0.077
X 2 :bt=gt 0.18(0.0700) 0.23(0.0307) 3.85(0.0198) 8.32(0.003?
.Y2 : b&Yt =  g&Y, - 1.25(0.2031) - 3.33(0.0081
t-statistics in parenthr'siri (in A’2 tests we report p-values).**** **,* statistical significance at 1 %. r.%. anil 10% level of signif.. re>i
According to the DU definition of Bad times (table 7) that makes use of the cyclical component 
of the unemployment rate, the effects of spending shocks on private consumption for the high 
LTV group follow the same pattern as those under the first definition of Bad times, i.e. the 
coefficient estimates are bigger and significant (only) in Bad times, lax  shocks appear to have a 
relatively stronger effect in Good times, though this is not supported by relevant Chi-square tests. 
The disposable income proxy has significant and positive coefficient estimates in both Good and 
Bad times, moreover we cannot reject the null of a similar effect in both states of nature. When 
examining the coefficient estimates for the low LTV group we see that spending shocks have much 
bigger effects compared to high LTV group, in addition the effect in Bad times is more pronounced 
compared to that in Good times. The tax shocks have coefficients of bigger magnitude' compart'd 
to the high LTV group in Bad times, with their effect being insignificantly estimated in Good 
times. The disposable income proxy has a bigger effect on private consumption relative to the
|j ||| j ji. >1 j U, 11
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high LTV group, having also a more pronounced effect during recessions as expected.
With respect to the high LTV group, as before contractionary spending shocks in Bad times 
affect mostly private consumption (tables 15 and 15.1. Appendix). Tax shocks, contractionary or 
expansionary, in Good times affect in an analogous manner consumption; whereas only expan­
sionary tax shocks are significant in Bad times, though the results produced are not statistically 
different from the effects of an contractionary tax shock.
Expansionary spending shocks generate a very pronounced effect in Bad times for the low- 
LTV group, which though does not differ much from the coefficient estimate of a contractionary 
spending action in Bad times (table 15.1); however it significantly different from the impact of a 
spending expansion on private consumption in Good times. Tax effects are mostly important in 
Bad times, with the expansionary and contractionary effects being of symmetric nature.
Findings: Overall the results obtained under both narrow (DY) and broad notions of slow­
down in economic activity (DU) provide support for the presence of asymmetric effects of fiscal 
policy in the high and low LTV groups. Under all definitions a tax shock (tax hike) reduces 
consumption the most in Bad times in the low LTV group, but it has minimal effects in Good 
times. On the contrary, in more financially developed economies (the high-LTV group) a tax 
shock appears to have a negative effect of a similar magnitude during both upturns and down­
turns of economic activity. Furthermore, the effect of a tax shock in Bad times is much bigger in 
the low LTV group as can judged from the magnitude of the coefficient estimates.
Moreover, after decomposing the tax shocks into their contractionary and expansionary com­
ponents we see that they are affecting consumption effectively both in Bad and Good times for the 
high-LTV group. In particular the most pronounced effects on private consumption are obtained 
when considering the following cases: a contractionary tax shock in Bad times as defined by DY 
(i.e. a tax hike or a tax cut when tax policy was previously set in a contractionary manner), an 
expansionary tax shock in Bad times as defined by DU (i.e. a tax cut) and an expansionary tax 
shock in Good times.
In the low-LTV group the most pronounced effects on private consumption come from the 
contractionary component of a tax shock. Hence, a tax cut in Bad times, when policy was 
previously conducted in contractionary manner, boosts substantially private consumption (the 
opposite if we consider a tax hike). The expansionary component of tax shocks is effective in Bad 
times, though only in the case of less severe recession episodes (like DU).
Government spending shocks affect consumption expenditure the most during recessions in 
both LTV groups, however the effect is much more pronounced in countries with less developed 
financial systems as was predicted by the model. Additionally, in the high-LTV group it is the 
crontractionary component of spending shocks that affects consumption the most. i.e. a spending 
cut during a recession period (e.g. in order to improve the fiscal balances) lias devastating effects
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on consumption; alternatively, a spending increase in a recession period, when fiscal policy was 
pursued in an contractionary manner boosts effectively private consumption. On the other hand, 
it is the expansionary component of spending shocks that raises private consumption in Bad times 
for the low-LTV group, because an increase in government spending (in the presence of binding 
liquidity constraints) raises disposable income encouraging people to increase their spending. The 
disposable income proxy has positive and significant effects in both LTV groups, with its effect 
being much more pronounced in the low LTV group as expected. In addition, there is limited 
evidence that the coefficient estimates are of bigger magnitude in Bad times for the low LTV 
group. On the contrary when considering the high LTV group, in most cases, there is clear 
evidence of a bigger coefficient in Good times.
Therefore, during recession episodes fiscal policy in the low LTV group shares (or drives) 
the stabilization properties of the whole OECD sample case, i.e. fiscal policy (both spending 
and tax) shocks are more effective in mitigating recessions rather than muting expansions, with 
respect to its effect on private consumption. Alternatively, fiscal policy actions are more able 
in shortening recessions than lengthening expansions. Whereas, for the high LTV group, an 
unanticipated increase in spending boosts private expenditure only in Bad time's as for the low 
LTV group, however tax policy is equally effective under all states of nature. This is due to the 
fact that taxation has a direct effect on individuals' income and since most people can smooth 
their consumption at all times, tax changes will have similar effects under all states of nature.
Robustness Test Nevertheless, the results obtained so far might be affected by the fact that 
some or all the countries that have been categorized to the low-LTV group have switched status 
from 1995 onwards, due to financial liberalization. According to Jappelli and Pagano (1991), the 
LTV ratio was 60% in Austria. Japan and Portugal, 75%. in Belgium and Netherlands, 50% in 
Greece, and 56% in Italy in 1991. We shall explore how our results change if wo assign Belgium 
and Netherlands in the liigh LTV group from 1995 onwards. A similar exercise will be done for 
the other two groups of countries i.e. Austria. Japan and Portugal, and finally Italy and Greece.
Under all definitions of Bad times the results remain qualitatively similar both for the high 
and low LTV categories, the only difference is in quantitative terms. Specifically the coefficients 
of all variables in most cases become bigger, in absolute terms, especially in Bad times for the 
low LTV group, whereas for the high LTV group the coefficient estimates do not change much or 
they decrease1". This implies that the effect of fiscal policy on private consumption is stronger in 
recessions in the low LTV group, when fewer countries are characterized as having less financially 
developed economies overtime. This is true only if OECD countries are converging in terms 
of the development of their financial markets, and fewer countries or none is included in the
J i Hcsull.s a rc  av a ilab le  u p o n  req u est.
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low LTV group after 19954344. Hence. in the event of convergence of financial development and 
harmonization of financial systems in OECD countries overtime, all or most of the low LTV group 
observations refer to the prior to 1995 period observations. In this case, fiscal policy (taxation and 
government expenditure) in the low LTV group has greater impact on consumption especially in 
Bad times, than if we allow the countries under consideration to be assigned to the low LTV group 
after 1995. An explanation for this could be that fiscal policy has become less effective in boosting 
output and private demand overtime in the event of financial liberalization and abolishment of 
restrictions on credit availability to consumers41'.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper has presented in a simple theoretical framework the idea that fiscal policy can have 
asymmetric effects on consumption in recessions and expansions in the presence of binding liq­
uidity constraints. Fiscal policy will be more effective in stimulating private consumption and 
pushing the economy out of a recession, when liquidity constraints bind for a large fraction of the 
population. This idea was investigated empirically on a panel of nineteen OECD countries.
Before characterizing periods of expansions and recessions using alternative definitions, we 
showed that, in OECD countries, fiscal policy has Keynesian effects on private consumption 
expenditure, i.e. a spending shock has a positive effect and a tax shock has a negative effect 
on private consumption, with the spending effect being more pronounced. Moreover, it is the 
expansionary component of the spending shocks (or expansionary spending shocks) that exert 
the bigger effect on private consumption rather than their contractionary component (or con­
tactionary spending shocks); whereas the contractionary and expansionary components of the 
tax shocks affect symmetrically private consumption. After considering recession and expansion 
episodes, we found that both tax and si »ending shocks affect consumption changes in Bad times 
more than in Good times. This happens because private consumption is affected the most by *4
4 3 W h e n  we assign  B elg ium  a n d  Net her lan d  to  th e  h ig h  LTV  c o u n tr ie s  a f te r  1993 th e  h igh  L T V  o b se rv a tio n s  
in c re a s e  from  302 to  316 a n d  th e  low LTV o b se rv a tio n s  d ec re a se  from  23 3  to  219. A f te r  in c lu d in g  J a p a n ,  P o r tu g a l  
a n d  A u s tr ia  in th e  h igh  L TV  g ro u p  th e  o b se rv a tio n  b e co m es 337 a n d  198 , re sp ec tiv e ly  for th e  h ig h  a n d  low  L T V  
c o u n tr ie s ,  f in a lly , a f te r  in c lu d in g  G reece a n d  I ta ly  in  th e  h igh  LTV  g ro u p  th e  o b se rv a tio n s  used  in  th e  re g re ss io n s  
a re  351 a n d  184 re sp ec tiv e ly  fo r  th e  high a n d  low L TV  gro u p s.
44 W ith  respect to  D Y , a f te r  th e  reassignm ent o f B e lg iu m  an d  N e th e r la n d s  to  th e  h igh  LTV g ro u p  a f te r  1993 we 
h a v e  15 1 and  107 B a d  tim e  e p iso d es , respec tive ly  for th e  h igh  an d  low L T V  g ro u p s. W h en  reass ig n in g  A u s tr ia , J a p a n  
a n d  P o r tu g a l  we get 1G3 a n d  9 8  episodes o f  B a d  tim e s  resp ec tiv e ly  in h ig h  a n d  low LTV  groups. A f te r  re a ss ig n in g  
G re e c e  a n d  Ita ly  to  th e  h igh  L T V  group a f te r  1995 w e get 169 a n d  92  e p iso d es  o f  b a d  tim es , re sp ec tiv e ly  in  th e  
tw o  L T V  groujis. W h en  c o n s id e rin g  D T w e h av e  1G3 a n d  9S, th en  1C8 a n d  98 a n d  finally  176 a n d  9 0  B a d  tim e  
e p is o d e s  in high ancl low L TV  gro u p s.
4c,P e r o t t i  (2004) e x a m in e d  th e  fiscal m u ltip lie r  in  th e  l TS. U K , G erm an y . A u s tra l ia ,  an d  N ew  Z ea lan d  a n d  
d is c u s se d  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f  d e c lin ed  po ten cy  o f  fiscal p o licy  a f te r  th e  1980.
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the expansionary component of spending shocks in Bad times, while both contractionary and 
expansionary tax shocks are important in Bad times.
Following Jappelli and Pagano (1994). we used as a proxy for credit constraints the maximum 
ratio of the loan to the value of the house in housing mortgages (LTV ratio), and we assigned 
country-decade observations to a high and low LTV group following the work of Perotti (1999). 
Using this measure we showed that fiscal policy has asymmetric effects in high and low LTV 
groups. Specifically, a spending shock has much more pronounced effects in the low LTV group 
than in the high LTV group (in particular, the expansionary component of a spending shock), 
similarly for the tax shock, though the results appear to be less significant (in this case the 
difference is statistically significant when considering the effects of the contractionary component 
of a tax shock).
After introducing in the analysis the alternative recession and expansion categorizations we 
found that the results provide evidence for the presence of asymmetric effects of fiscal policy in 
upturns and downturns in countries with more and less developed consumer credit markets. In 
most cases considered, tax shocks reduce consumption the most in Bad times when analyzing the 
low LTV group (for the most severe recession episodes (as modeled by DY) this is attributed to the 
contractionary component of the tax shock, i.e. a tax cut in Bad times, if policy was previously 
conducted in contractionary manner, boosts significantly private consumption (whereas a tax hike 
decreases consumption). When considering the high LTV group tax shocks have negative effects 
of a similar magnitude dining Good and Bad times (in particular we refer to the contractionary 
component of tax shocks in Bad times (i.e. a tax hike or a tax cut when tax policy was previously 
set in a contractionary manner) and the expansionary component of tax shocks in Good times 
(i.e. a tax cut) when considering severe recession episodes (as those modeled by definition DY)). 
Moreover, the effect of a tax shock in Bad times is much bigger in the low LTV group.
Government spending shocks affect private consumption expenditure the most during reces­
sions in both LTV groups, nevertheless the effect is much stronger in countries with less developed 
financial systems as was anticipated. Though this effect originates from different components of 
the spending shock in the two groups. For example, with respect to the higli-LTV group it is 
the contractionary component of the spending shocks that affects consumption the most40, while 
in the low LTV group it is the expansionary component of government spending shocks that 
influences private consumption the most. These hold both for narrow (I)Y) and broad (DU) 
definitions of recession episodes, and can be explained by the fact that credit constraints bind for 
more people in economies with less developed consumer credit markets, as well as. by the fact
J<‘T h ere fo re  a  sp e n d in g  c u t  d u r in g  a rece ssio n  p e r io d  h a s  d e v a s ta tin g  effects o n  p r iv a te  c o n su m p tio n ; a lte rn a tiv e ly , 
a  sp e n d in g  in c re a s e  in  a  rece ssio n  p e r io d , w h e n  fisca l p o lic y  w as p re v io u s ly  p u rsu e d  in an c o n tra c t io n a ry  m an n e r , 
b o o s ts  e ffec tiv e ly  p r iv a te  c o n su m p tio n .
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that during; deep recession episodes credit constraints bind for a larger fraction of the population, 
both in more and less developed consumer credit markets.
The normative aspect of this analysis points to the need for discretionary fiscal policy actions 
as a way of mitigating economic slumps. The unanticipated components of both tax policy and 
government spending decisions are effective in Bad times in all OECD countries no matter what 
the level of their financial development is. however their effects are much bigger in countries where 
consumers have limited access to credit markets. In addition, when fiscal policy shocks are pro­
cyclical (i.e. negative spending shocks and positive tax shocks in recessions) then a “switch" to 
countercyclical shocks (spending increases and tax cuts) could improve significantly consumption 
outcomes. Hence, unless OECD countries (anti specifically EMU countries) are converging over­
time in the degree of development of their financial systems there are reasons for not impairing 
fiscal flexibility by stringent fiscal rules (such as the Stability and Growth Pact or SGP). Because, 
for example, if countries are in a recession but still face the danger of breaching the 3 % limit 
implied by the SGP they will have to take one-off measures to correct their fiscal position, though 
this will bring them into deeper recession since it will affect negatively private consumption.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Maximum LTV ratio versus domestic credit to  the private sector as a 
percent o f  GDP
TABLE H
Countries Maximum LTV ratio Domestic Credit to Private sector as a percentage of GDP
1980-1994 1980 1994 2001
Australia high 2G.279 G7.897 89.765
Austria low 73.355 91.058 100.890
Belgium low 29.045 70.004 77.069
Canada high GO. 720 78.004 80.753
Germany high 74.785 101.080 121.040
Denmark high 40.808 31.128 141.790
Spain Itigli C7.577 7-1,550 105.880
Finland high 47.485 09.759 57.672
France Itigli 102.1.'50 87.000 89.813
United Kingdom high 27.025 109.450 138.840
Greece low 43.757 31.019 38.139
Ireland Itigli 29.037 45.215 111.820
Italy low 55.991 59,527 79.978
Japan low 131.080 203.170 186.750
Netherlands low 90.393 88.229 142.000
Norway Itigli 51.380 71.415 $2.840
Portugal low 73.158 G2.00G 146.200
Sweden high 75.930 108.920 101.650
United States Itigli 78.458 95.073 145790
As Jappclli and Pagano (1994) suggest even if a country lias a big domestic credit (to the 
private sector) to GDP ratio, i.e it is characterized by high level of financial intermediation, this 
does not necessarily imply that consumers will have easy access to credit:4,48 this is the case with 
Japan and Austria and Netherlands as can be seen in Table 8 .4'* On the other hand, easier access 
to consumer credit, does not necessarily lead to a larger fraction of credit to the private sector 
as a percentage of GDP. as is the case for Australia. Finland, France and Norway. Therefore. *40
^ 'H ig li  in d ica tes  ab ove  SO p e rce n t and  low below  SO p e rce n t.
4s S ource : W orld H ank. W o rld  D evelopm ent In d ica to rs .
40T )ie  2001 en try  for S w ed en  co rre sp o n d s  to  1999 in fo rm a tio n .
17 {CHAPTER 3. THE ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY ON PRIVATE CO SSU M l
there other factors that determine consumers' behavior towards credit across countries, e.g. tax 
incentives, demographics, even cultural factors. While, the LTV ratio will be affected mostly by 
supply side factors, e.g. regulation, costs of enforcing loan contracts related to the length of the 
judicial process, information sharing mechanisms among lenders etc.
TABLE V: MAXIMUM LTV RATIO
Country L-LTV H-LTV Country L-LTV H-LTV
Australia 1970-79 1980-2001 Greece 1970-2001 -
Austria 1970-2001 - Ireland - 1970-2001
Belgium 1970-2001 - Italy 1970-2001 -
Canada 1970-1979 1980-2001 Japan 1970-2001 -
Germany 1970-79 1980-2001 Netherlands 1970-2001 -
Denmark - 1981-2001 Norway 1970-1979 1980-2001
Spain 1970-79 1980-2001 Port ugal 1970-2001 -
Finland - 1970-2001 Sweden - 1970-2001
France - 1970-2001 USA - 1970-2001
UK - 1970-2001
3.7.2 Fiscal shocks: Decomposition into expansionary and contractionary com ­
ponents
TABLE 10
Variables OECD 11 LTV LLTV
SfCoTi 0.0125(0.01) 0.1902(0.80) 0.0117(0.39)
£? Exp 4.3423(3.09)*** 0.1319(0.53) 5.5095(3.91)***
SfCon -O.C386(-3.88)*** -0.1434(-1.45) -0.7774(-1.12)***
e\Exp -0.5280(-l. 10) -0.2750(-2.45)** -1,0306(-1.02)
A Ÿ t 0.0182(1.93)* 0.4111(4.78)** 0.5345(1.51)
s9t Con =  SfExp 4.70(0.0302)+ 0.02(0.8717)+ 4.02(0.0419)+
s\Ccm ~  s\Exp 0.07(0.791)+ 0.50(0.4515)+ 0.00(0.8120)+
Joint 5.57(0.0619)+ 0.50(0.7540)+ 4.99 (0.0824)+
Nobs 535 302 233
ir2 0.370 0.515 0.100
1-statistics in paren thesis. * * * .  * * , *  s ta tis tica l s ign ifican ce  at 1%.  an d  109t level o f  sign ificance, respecti\
+ C lii- s q u a re  tests , p -va lues in paren thesis
B
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Variables
-{'LIT Y( Con) .0793(0,10) AY,(IILTV-IJ;rV) .131(0.50)
ri'l.I.TV(i:xp) 5.023(3.70)*** ^MT\'(ton)=ry,LLT\r(i:xp) 3.70(0.05-11)+
rf M.TV(Con) -.770(-3.S9)*** £* LLTV((’on)=5{ LLTV(Exp) 0.00(0.9922)+
riU.TViKxp) -.700(-0.79) Joint for ILTV (Xa(2)) 1.20(0.1225)+
rJ'OILTV-I.LTVK’oii -,829(-o.50) 5?(IILT\r-LLT\dCon=5?(llLTV-U;rV)i:xi) 3.11(0.0780)+
Y'dILTV-LLI'VJHxp -5.200(-3.5i)*** sft (HLT V-LLTV)C011=4 (HLTV-U.TV) Exp 0.01(03)303)+
£;(HLTV-U:rV)Con .453(0.40) Joint ft.r m;rv-u;rv (x2(■-»)) 3.51(0.1702) +
r!(II!TV-LLTV)I'J£i> .538(2.00)** Nobs 535
a y ,u ,t y .505( 1 .(¡2) li2 0.121
1-st Ml iM ics in I »¡went liesis. ***, **.* statistical significant-rat lVt. ’»Vi and lOVi level of significance. respect jvelv.
+('lii-sc]uni e tests. |>-values in pareiit liesis.
TAMl.K 1U
Variables I ) Y I ) Y
r/liad{Exp) 5 .8 4 2 (4 .0 4 )*** 5 .7 3 0 (3 .9 0 )***
s!t} Had(Con) 0.903 (0 .59 ) 1.147(0.71)
srjGood{ Exp) 0.715 (0 .77 ) 1.111(1.30)
srqGood{Con) 0 .191 (0 .11 ) -0,510 (-0.11)
s1, Ilnd(Exp) -0 .000 (-1 .07 ) - 0 .170(-0.85)
slBad(Con) -0.812 (-1 .3 3 )* * * -0 .8 4 0 (-1 ,38 )***
SfCtood(Exp) -0.701 (-2 .1 3 )** -0 .080 (-2 .08 )**
£l(lood.{C(m) -0.033 (-0 .08 ) 0.0117(0 .10)
A Y , 0 .01 2 (2 .07 )** -
A Y  i Had - 0 .7 0 5 (2 .10 )**
A Y  ¡Good - 0.522(1 .58)
N obs 535 535
U 1 0.428 0.435
=-M t-statistics in p a r e n t  liesis (in A' 2 tests we r e p o r t  ]»-v a lu e s ) .
***. **.* statistical significance at 1CX. TEA ami 10 lX level of signif.. respectively.
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TABLE 12.1
Wald tests corresponding to Table 12 DY I)Y
if Bad(Exp)=if Bad(C'on) 4.52(0.033) 3.73(0.053)
srj Good(Exp)=rf Good (Con) 0.08(0.775) 1.03(0.309)
if  Bad(Con)=if Good (Con) 0.15(0.694) 0.82(0.366)
if Good(Exp)=if Bad(Exp) 10.23(0.001) 8.53(0.003)
£*Bad(Exp)=£* Bad(Con) 0.14(0.705) 0.38(0.540)
ej Good(Exp)=£[ Good (Con) 1.49(0.222) 1.78(0.182)
e J Bad (Con)=£ \ G ood (Con) 2.69(0.100) 3.18(0.074)
£}Good(Exp)=e{Bad(Exp) 0.02(0.881) 0.12(0.728)
if Bad(Con)=£f Good(Con) Sc. £fGood(Exp)=if Bad(Exp) 10.82(0.004) 10.10(0.006)
e\ Bad(Con)=cf Good (Con) Sc £* Good (Exp)=i{ Bad(Exp) 2.70(0.259) 3.25(0.196)
AY? Iiad=A Y/Good - 0.61(0.433)
p-values in parenthesis
TABLE 13
Variables du DU
e^Bad(Exp) 4.207(2.49)** 3.882(2.34)**
YfBad(Con) 1.031(0.70) 1.610(1.09)
if  Good(Exp) 0.303(0.27) 0.987(1.02)
XfCood(Con) 0.587(0.41) -0.508(-0.38)
z\Bad{Exp) -1.010(-2.89)*** -0.839(-2.50)**
z^Badföcm) -0.731 (-3.93)*** -0.743(-4.11)***
z\G ood{Exp) -0.365 (-0.65) -0.445(-0.84)
z\Good{Ccm) 0.130(0.59) 0.051(0.26)
A Y, 0.642(2.06)** -
A Y  t Bad - 0.792(2.41)**
AYiG ood - 0.470(1.46)
Nobs 535 535
R2 0.449 0.475
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X 2 tests we report p-values).
***. **.* statistical significance at 1%, 5 9 t and 10% level of signif.. respectively.
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TABLE KU
Wald tests eorrespomliiie; to Table 13 IM* DC
if I iad (Fxp)—S'j I lad( Con) 1. 0.70(0.383)
if Good(Txp)=if Good(Con) 0.02(0.801) 0.08(0.109)
if Bad(Con)=if Good(Oon) 0.00(0.809) 1.31(0.252)
£fc;ood(i:xp)=-?Bad(i:xp) 1.01(0.031) 2.78(0.093)
if Bad (Exp)=£ f Bad (Con) 0.11(0.321) 0.0-3(0.819)
ifGood( Exp)=if Good (Con) 0.39(0.112) 0.03(0.120)
ifliad( Con )~s\ Good (Con) 9.87(0.(X)1) 9.02(0.(X)1)
ifGood(Exp)=if Bad(Exp) 0.88(0.317) 0.39(0.331)
i f  Bad( Con ):=if Good( Con) k. if  Good(Exp)=if Bad(Exp) ■1.98(0.083) 1.79(0.091)
i f  Bad(Con)—if Good(Con) Ar ifGood(Exp)=ifBnd(Exp) 12.98(0.(X)1) 12.03(0.001)
AY ƒ Bad=AY/ Good - 1.89(0.109)
p-vahi^s in imrenthr'sis
TABLK 11: I)V
V a r ia b le s 1 2 3 1
- I I -L T Y n-i;i'v I .- b T Y I.-I .T V
^ I I a d ( L ' x p ) 0 .0 1 0 (0 .1 2 ) 0 .0 9 2 (0 .2 8 ) 0 .7 1 0 (1 .3 2 )* * * 0 .0 1 0 (1 .2 7 )* * *
~°( Bad{C(m) 0 .9 3 1 (2 .8 7 )* * * 0 .8 9 0 (2 .0 2 )* * * 2 .2 2 1 (1 .1 7 ) 2 .1 0 2 (1 .2 5 )
i f Good(i:.rp) 0 .0 0 2 (0 .0 1 ) -0 .0 3 0 (-0 .1 2 ) 1 .0 1 9 (0 .0 2 ) 1 .9 1 7 (1 .1 3 )
i f  Goo<l{Coi}) -0 .1 18(-O ,40) -0 .()S 7(-0 .31) 0 .1 0 3 (0 .0 8 ) -1 .3 0 1  ( -0 .5 1 )
-0 .091  (-0 .3 8 ) -0 .1 0 3 (-0 .0 0 ) - 2 . 3 1 3 (-1 .32) - 1 .9 1 1(-1 .0 0 )
s\Bad(C<m) -0 .3 4 2 (-2 .3 3 )* * -0 .3 3 5 (-2 .2 7 )* * -0 .9 5 1  ( -1 .5 7 )* * * - 0 .9 3 2 ( - 1 .5 9 )* * *
s^Good^E-r])) -0 ,3 1 7 (-2 .3 7 )* * -0 .3 1 7 (-2 .3 S )* * - 0 .7 0 5 ( - 1 .0 l ) -0 .8 9 7 ( -1 .2 5 )
s\Good{C(m) -0 .0 8 8 ( -0 .8 1 ) -0 .0 9 7 (-0 .8 S ) -0 .2 1 1  (-0 .2 2 ) - 0 .1 5 9 ( - 0 .1 1)
A V*/ 0 .3 8 3 (4 .4 1 )* * * - 0 .5 3 0 (1 .5 3 ) -
A Y tB ad - 0 .3 1 2 (3 .3 8 )* * * - 0 .0 0 1 (1 .0 7 )*
A V iGood - 0 .1 0 0 (1 .2 2 )* * * - 0 .3 7 1 (0 .9 7 )
N obs 3 0 2 302 2 3 3 233
I f 0 .3  13 0 .513 0 .5 1 2 0 .5 1 7
l>'Uth^>is (ill .V1 t.'St: 1 .***. **.* statistical si^ nitkancc at I an3 l e ’L lew] ‘if si;
i
t ¡Vr’K
M^jpW>WWW mniiiBijw«Juiin*
178 CHAPTER 3. TH E A SY M M E TR IC  E FFEC TS  OF FISCAL P O L IC Y  ON PR IVATE COSSUH IE*
TA B LE 14.1 :DY
Wald tests corresponding to Table 14 11 L T V II LTV L L T V L L T V
s f  B ad (Exp) = sf  B ad ( Con) 2.83(0.092) 2.05(0,152) 2.92(0.087) 2.53(0
s f  Good(Exp)=ef Good(Con) 0.07(0.796) 0.01(0.915) 0.07(0.789) 0 . 7 6 ( 0
s f  Bad (Con) = s f  Good (Con) 7.69(0.005) 5.95(0.014) 0.58(0.445) 1.39(0
r^Good (Ex p)—sf Bad (Ex p) 0.01(0.926) 0.09(0.762) 6.23(0.012) 4.20(0
ef Bad(Exp)=s| Bad(Con) 0.98(0.322) 0.80(0.371) 0.58(0.416) 0.27(0
£{Good(Exp)=£*Good(Con) 1.33(0.249) 1.22(0.269) 0.14(0.707) 0.28(0
Sf Bad (Con) = 5  J Good (Con) 2.36(0.124) 2.01(0.156) 0.40(0.526) 0.49(0
Sf Good(Exp)==:i Bad(Exp) 1.40(0.237) 1.20(0.273) 0.68(0.408) 0.29(0
sf Bad(Con)=£fGood(Con) A: s f  Good (Exp)=£^Bad( Exp) 8.27(0.016) 7.03(0.029) 8.32(0.015) 8.15(0
s\ B a d (C o n )= £ iG o o d (  Con) A: s\ G ood  (Exp)—s^  Bad (Exp) 2.95(0.228) 2.48(0.289) 1.10(0.578) 0.83(0
AY,Bad=AY/G<xxl - 0.44(0.509) - 0.73(0
p-values in parenthesis
V a ria b le s 1 2 3 1
- H -L T V II-L T V L -L T V L -L T V
sf Bad{ Exp) 0.215(0.60) 0.306(0.8G) 7.742(2.75)*** 7.181(2.63)***
sf Bad,{Con) 0.076(2.06)** 0.601(1.84)* 2.686(1.47) 3.218(1.76)*
sf Good,{Exp) 0.066(0.22) 0.024(0.08) -0.372(-0.10) 1.614(0.72)
sf Good (Con) -0.058(-0.21) -0.001(-0.02) 1.426(0.66) -1.002(-0.42)
s\Bad{Exp) -0.329(-2.16)** -0.365(-2.33)** -2.721 (-2.64)*** -2.458(-2.46)**
s\Bad[Con) -0.004(-0.02) 0.040(0.24) -1.039(-3.G7)*** -1.027(-3.75)***
s\Good{Exp) -0.273(-1.74)* -0.250(-1.58) -0.316(-0.25) -1.011 (-0.89)
SjGood(Con) -0.185(-1.60) -0.211 (-1.80)* 0.273(0.05) -0.(X)3(-0.01)
A  Y t 0.409(4.72)*** - 0.609(1.84)* -
A Y  t Bad - 0.325(3.19)*** - 0.733(2.15)**
A Y  (Good - 0.460(4.54)*** - 0.340(0.97)
Nobs 302 :i02 233 233
i f 0.522 0.518 0.520 0.542
t-siatisties in parenthesis (in A’2 tests we report p-values ).***. **,* statistical significance at 19J. T>% an'.'l 10% level <if sijtnif., t e:
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TABLE If..1:1)1*
W a ld  trsts com *sjx>iid ing to  T ab le  15 I I  L T V H L T V L L T V E L T Y
£ f Bad ( Kx|>)=£*f B ad ( C on  ) 0.00 (0 .110 ) 0.27(0.001) 1.80(0.170) 1.15(0.281)
i f  (I cm k1 ( Ex p )=f f  G o o d  (C o n ) 0 .07(0 .701) 0.00(0.052) 0 .21 (0 .615 ) 0 ,13(0 ,512)
s f  Bad ( Con )=£ f  G ood  (C o n ) 3 ,11(0 .003) 2.33(0.120) 0 .21 (0 .021 ) 1.08(0.150)
Sf G ood  ( Ex p ) = Bad ( Ex p ) 0.12(0 .728) 0.-12(0.510) 1.80(0.0^7) 2 .17(0 .115)
cj Bad( Exp ) = i {B a d (  C o n ) 1.50(0.221) 2.10(0.112) 2 .15 (0 .112 ) 1.05(0.108)
z] G oo d  ( Ex p )=z\ G oo d  ( C oi i ) 0.10(0 .002) 0.03(0.801) 0 .17 (0 .681 ) 0 ,50 (0 .455 )
£ f I ia d (C o n )= £ jG o o d (C o n ) 0 .01 (0 .310 ) 1.01(0.201) 0 ,10 (0 .011 ) 1,11(0.035)
s ft C loo d ( Ex] >)=£/ Bad( E x p ) 0 .07(0 ,787) 0.20(0.501) 2.30(0.12-1) 1.03(0,300)
£f  B a d (C o n )= £ f G ood  (C o n ) G  £ fG o<K l(IL\p )= rJ ,B ad (E x p ) 1.00(0.131) 3.18(0.175) 0 ,53 (0 .038 ) 7 .01(0 .030)
r{B ad (C on ) = £ {G o o d (C o n ) Sr £ jG o < K l(E x p )= rJ lia d (E x p ) 0 .01 (0 .031 ) 1.03(0,111) 12.08(0.002)) 8.88 (0 .011 )
A Y /  B a d = A  Y i  G ood - 1.01(0.201) - 2 .12 (0 .110 )
p-vrtlut’s in jiRi,*‘ntl),,f*is
i
r '
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